The intensification of contradictions in the Eastern Mediterranean is unfolding against the backdrop of persistent regional turbulence associated with the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the overall deterioration of security in the Middle East. Under these conditions, a new architecture of interaction is gradually crystallizing, at the center of which are Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.

The strengthening of their coordination is largely determined by the Turkish factor and growing strategic rivalry with Ankara. The rhetoric of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan toward Israel underscores the mounting mutual distrust. Israel, however, avoids direct confrontation, preferring a policy of indirect containment and the consolidation of ties with states that have traditionally maintained tense relations with Turkey. As a result, a triangle of Israel–Greece–Cyprus is emerging, possessing the potential to transform the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The signing, in December, of agreements among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel on joint military exercises and the deepening of defense cooperation constitutes an important step toward institutionalizing trilateral interaction. This is not a matter of isolated gestures of political support. The planned measures include military exercises, joint training of special operations forces, staff consultations, and regular negotiations.

For Turkey, this represents a strategic challenge: the area of implementation of these arrangements overlaps with spaces that Ankara considers crucial for the realization of its doctrine of expanded maritime presence. It is no coincidence that, on the eve of the summit, Erdoğan warned against encroachments on Turkey’s rights—an assertion that should be interpreted as an attempt to consolidate politico-legal positions in disputed maritime zones.

In parallel, the political dimension of trilateral rapprochement is intensifying. High-level meetings between the leaders of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus demonstrate not only convergence in defense interests, but also a consolidation of positions regarding Turkey’s regional policy. The sharp assessment by the Israeli leadership of Turkey’s role in Middle Eastern processes allows one to speak of the formation of an informal anti-Turkish coalition based on shared threat perceptions rather than ideological affinity.

Additional significance is attached to Cyprus assuming the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2026. This creates an institutional window of opportunity to influence EU debates concerning Turkey, its energy and maritime policies, as well as the Cyprus settlement process. Through Greece and Cyprus, Israel gains an indirect channel of access to the pan-European agenda, thereby expanding its diplomatic leverage.

Military-technical cooperation is becoming an independent driver of deeper partnership. Agreements on Greece’s procurement of Israeli PULS multiple launch rocket systems, the deployment of Barak MX air-defense systems in Cyprus, and discussions of new contracts all testify to the systemic nature of defense integration. This represents not only the modernization of the capabilities of Greece and Cyprus, aimed at offsetting Turkey’s regional advantage, but also the creation of a long-term dependence on Israeli technologies and training.
For Israel, this means an expansion of export opportunities for its defense-industrial complex; for Athens and Nicosia, it signifies the strengthening of their deterrence potential and an enhancement of their bargaining position in relations with Ankara.

The emerging configuration is directly linked to the competition among geostrategic doctrines. Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” concept presupposes the expansion of its sphere of influence in the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Black Seas, accompanied by the active development of naval infrastructure. Against this background, the growing activism of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus is perceived by Ankara as an attempt to constrain its room for maneuver. At the same time, the new coordination is not aimed at open confrontation; instead, the emphasis is placed on strengthening alliances, demonstrating presence, and creating deterrent mechanisms that complicate Turkey’s realization of its ambitions.

The economic dimension reinforces the politico-military dynamics. The three countries actively support the development of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. The initiative is positioned as an alternative to routes passing through Turkey and as an instrument for diversifying transport and energy linkages. However, it contains inherent contradictions. Its implementation faces competition from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, uncertainty regarding investment provision, and a high degree of instability in the regions through which the route is expected to pass.

A symbolic example is the port of Piraeus which, while being the most logical gateway to the Mediterranean, is controlled by a Chinese state-owned company, underscoring the dependence of European strategies on infrastructure integrated into Chinese logistical networks. Thus, the economic corridor simultaneously constitutes an instrument of political pressure and a source of structural risks.
At this stage, Turkey has adopted a posture of cautious expectation, combining tough rhetoric with the practical build-up of its naval capabilities. The implementation of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, investments in the navy and related infrastructure, and heightened activity in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean demonstrate Ankara’s determination not to relinquish the initiative. However, the formation of the Israel–Greece–Cyprus triangle alters Turkey’s strategic calculus, as it creates a dense network of states around it that are concerned about its regional policies and prepared to coordinate their efforts.

As a result, the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming a space of structured competition among several centers of power. On the one hand, Turkey seeks to consolidate its position as a maritime power and key transit hub. On the other hand, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are consolidating their efforts to limit Turkish dominance by employing instruments of defense cooperation, diplomacy, and economic initiatives. This competition does not necessarily lead to direct confrontation, but it elevates the importance of military-political signaling, alliance frameworks, and technological advantages.