The strategic location of Afghanistan has once again acquired particular significance in global politics, emphasizing its role in regional influence and power dynamics. Statements by U.S. President Donald Trump regarding the possible return of the Bagram air base, in the context of China, underscored the growing role of Afghanistan in Eurasian geopolitics. The country connects South and Central Asia, as well as China and the Middle East. On the one hand, Afghanistan is geographically and culturally tied to Central Asia; on the other, it is linked to South Asia, while simultaneously constituting part of the Middle Eastern sphere. For this reason, throughout history, it has repeatedly become the object of interest and rivalry among global powers. In the 19th century, Great Britain pursued an active policy in the region; in the 20th century, the Soviet Union; and at the beginning of the 21st century, the United States. Today, competition for influence is intensifying: China has become one of Afghanistan’s key economic partners, Russia has officially recognized the Taliban regime, and the United States has increased its diplomatic engagement. At the same time, the role of regional powers - Pakistan, India, and the states of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan - is also rising.

Transformation of Approaches

New approaches to the Afghan question rest on the recognition that long-term control over the country cannot be achieved solely through instruments of hard power. History provides convincing evidence: no great power has succeeded in establishing sustainable control over Afghanistan. This is explained by several factors, including its complex mountainous terrain, deep social fragmentation, and the strong resilience of its society to external interference. Afghan armed groups have accumulated unique experience in waging guerrilla warfare, enabling them, for centuries, to drive out foreign adversaries. As a result, external actors increasingly resort to indirect forms of influence: China through economic investment, Russia through diplomatic initiatives, and Pakistan through trade restrictions. Under these conditions, the role of Central Asia - and above all Uzbekistan, which is capable of offering models of economic cooperation and transit solutions - becomes especially significant in shaping new strategies of engagement with Afghanistan.

The Russian Factor

Russia’s current policy toward Afghanistan is primarily diplomatic in nature. Moscow was the first to recognize the country’s new government, a move that may be seen as an attempt to seize the initiative in South Asia and to demonstrate its readiness to take an active stance in the region. This step is partly explained by Russia’s desire to compensate for its declining influence in the Middle East, especially following weakened positions in Syria and limited impact on the dynamics of the Iran-Israel conflict.

Formally, diplomatic ties between Russia and Afghanistan appear close. In practice, however, their rapprochement is constrained by geographical distance, cultural differences, and diverging political ideologies. Consequently, despite a declared partnership, the two states remain distant from one another across key dimensions of cooperation.

China’s Limitations?

China, having established itself as a close economic partner of Afghanistan, has also launched several diplomatic initiatives, including the Taliban's ambassador personally presenting credentials to Xi Jinping. Furthermore, Beijing has begun to view Afghanistan within the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project and has initiated trilateral platforms involving Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yet, at present, China's economic influence in the country has significantly weakened. In June 2025, the Taliban unilaterally terminated a 25-year contract with the Chinese company CAPEIC for the development of an oil field in the Amu Darya basin, citing violations of the agreement. There is also a perception that Beijing has not received adequate security guarantees from Kandahar, prompting it to scale back cooperation. As a result, China's strategic approach to Afghanistan has shifted toward a more cautious and restrained posture, reflecting its broader regional influence considerations and the importance of Afghanistan in Eurasian geopolitics.

A “Return” of the United States?

After a prolonged absence of direct engagement, the United States in 2025 carried out its first high-level visits to Kabul since its withdrawal from Afghan territory. Three visits were made: one in March and two in September. The most recent was particularly noteworthy, as it was led by Adam Boehler, the Special Representative for Hostage Affairs, who has been referred to as a “new Zalmay Khalilzad.” His very arrival signaled a shift in Washington's approach: whereas previously the U.S. operated primarily through Arab intermediaries such as Qatar, it has now moved toward direct dialogue.

In parallel, the U.S. strengthened ties with Pakistan. Following the visit to Washington in August 2025 by Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, the U.S. formally designated the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) a terrorist organization, a significant gesture toward Islamabad. Thus, it appears that the United States is reviving its political activity in South Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan, returning to the “AfPak” framework as an integrated strategic direction of its foreign policy.

The Pakistan-India Dilemma

With respect to the two key states of South Asia - Pakistan and India - Afghanistan has yet to develop a clear and consistent strategy. During the war against the U.S., the Taliban benefited from support and a safe haven on Pakistani territory. However, since coming to power, they have sought to avoid dependence on Islamabad, perceiving it as a threat to national sovereignty. An additional source of tension stems from terrorism, particularly the activities of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), based in the border areas. Despite official Afghan statements denying support for the group, its historical cooperation with the Taliban and ideological proximity provoke serious suspicions in Islamabad. The situation is further complicated by Pakistan’s economic measures - restrictions on trade, tighter border controls, and the deportation of Afghan refugees - all of which deepen mutual mistrust.

This tension provides India with opportunities to use cooperation with Afghanistan as a means of exerting pressure on Pakistan. New Delhi may well view such engagement through the lens of regional rivalry, attempting to turn Kabul into an additional lever in South Asian politics. However, the motivations of the Afghan elite are not limited to pragmatism and realpolitik: religious-civilizational context and constructivist elements of identity hinder an open reorientation toward India and “betrayal” of Pakistan. Thus, Afghanistan finds itself caught in a geopolitical dilemma, balancing between two rival South Asian powers while attempting to avoid direct alignment with either.

A Unified Central Asian Approach?

The approach of Central Asian states toward Afghanistan differs significantly from that of other external actors. Regional countries share cultural and historical affinities with Afghanistan and aim to build relations in line with restoring these ties. At the same time, with a population of roughly 37 million, Afghanistan is viewed as a promising market for the exports of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as well as a transit corridor linking Central Asia to South Asia and to global ports - Gwadar and Karachi.

Cross-border infrastructure projects retain particular importance, including the TAPI gas pipeline, the CASA-1000 energy initiative, and the development of the Trans-Afghan transport corridor. At present, the states of Central Asia are seeking to consolidate their approaches: in August 2025, a meeting of Special Representatives on Afghanistan was held. Significantly, the region has not replicated Moscow's position on recognizing the current Afghan regime, instead following its own model. Any decision on this issue will likely be made collectively, reflecting the aspiration for coherence and autonomy in regional policy.

Balance of Power

Afghanistan’s contemporary foreign policy has acquired a distinctly multi-vector character. In contrast to the Taliban’s first period of rule (1996-2001), when Kabul's external relations were largely limited to Arab and Islamic countries, the state now seeks to expand its engagement with Russia, China, India, and Central Asian states. At the same time, the preservation of sovereignty and the avoidance of dependence on any single power remain the chief priorities of Afghanistan's leadership.

Fully aware of its geostrategic uniqueness, the Afghan elite increasingly asks: why do external actors come to control and exploit the country’s advantages, while Afghanistan itself does not make sufficient efforts to utilize them independently? This question encourages Kabul to consider positioning Afghanistan as a potential hub for Eurasian transport and trade corridors and to strengthen its role in regional processes.

Conclusion

Afghanistan thus remains an arena of rivalry among global and regional powers, each seeking to advance its own political and economic interests. At the same time, the Afghan elite are taking steps to enhance the state's agency, seeking to transform the country's geographical advantages into a resource for an independent, multi-vector foreign policy.

 

Authors:

Islomkhon Gafarov, PhD in Political Science, Policy Analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Alouddin Komilov, Policy Analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms, Adjunct Assistant Professor at Webster University in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Bakhtiyor Babadjanov, Associated Researcher at the Center for Progressive Reforms, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.