STEM interview with Turkish political commentator and professor at Baskent University in Ankara Hasan Unal.

- How does Turkey assess its role in NATO amid the changing geopolitical landscape?

- In the context of shifting international relations and political dynamics, especially within the collective West, the future of NATO remains uncertain. For example, Donald Trump has expressed rather dismissive views on NATO, while European countries exhibit signs of disunity. Therefore, it is difficult to make definitive predictions about NATO’s future.

However, regarding Turkey’s ties with the alliance, its position remains quite firm. Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952—not just a member, but a reliable ally. Over time, it has become one of the key countries in the alliance, possessing the second-largest army among NATO states. Its armed forces are highly effective, and its defense industry relies significantly on domestic capabilities.

Thus, regardless of what happens to NATO, Turkey is likely to benefit. Everything depends on the decisions made by the U.S. and European countries. If NATO were to dissolve, that would be an entirely different matter.

- How serious are the disagreements between Ankara and Washington regarding the supply of F-16s and the sanctions over the purchase of S-400s?

- The long saga of Turkey’s arms purchases from the U.S., particularly regarding F-16s and previously F-35s, is no longer a concern for the Turkish defense industry, as the fifth-generation fighter KAAN is already under development. I believe it will take to the skies by 2028. Thus, Turkey no longer depends on American military aircraft.

Once the KAAN fighter is operational, Turkey will undoubtedly continue working on developing sixth-generation combat aircraft of its own. In the future, it could cooperate with countries like China, perhaps not in terms of production but in marketing on the global defense market.

As for the purchase of F-35s and F-16s, as well as the repeated refusals from the U.S., this topic has become more of a slogan for both Turkish and American politicians rather than a real issue. In reality, it doesn’t hold much significance. For instance, Turkey wouldn’t have bought the F-35s anyway, as these aircraft are not particularly reliable. They keep crashing and are not fully combat-ready. Even in the U.S., only 19% of these planes are operational under normal conditions. Essentially, the U.S. saved Turkey from a major problem by blocking the sale.

Nevertheless, there is a strong lobbying effort in both Turkey and the U.S. pushing to sell these aircraft to Turkey and other NATO countries. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force has reduced its own procurement of F-35s but continues aggressively marketing them to European allies and non-NATO countries in the Far East, such as Japan. It seems to be more of a financial trap—one that Turkey, fortunately, managed to avoid.

If Turkey needs a military aircraft before 2028, when its own fighter takes flight, the situation might change. What aircraft could Turkey buy in that case? Currently, the Turkish government is considering purchasing 40 to 80 Eurofighters. However, I disagree with this decision and criticize it. The issue is that Eurofighters are produced by four European countries: the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Germany, in particular, is known for easily imposing arms embargoes on Turkey. We are tired of these sanctions over even the smallest issues.

Therefore, I strongly doubt that buying Eurofighters would be a good choice for Turkey. If a Western aircraft must be purchased, I would prefer the French Rafale, as it is entirely manufactured in France. This could also bring political benefits—perhaps even leading France to distance itself from Greece and Cyprus.

However, if there is no strict requirement to buy aircraft from the West, the situation changes entirely. For example, the Russian Su-57 appears to be an excellent fighter. China has also developed outstanding combat aircraft. Initially, they were on par with the F-35 but significantly more efficient. Now, there are reports that China has already created a hypersonic fighter.

So why be fixated on Eurofighters and similar models? But that’s just my opinion. What the Turkish government ultimately decides is another matter.

- What role does Turkey play in shaping Europe's independent military potential? Given that establishing such a military-political bloc would be difficult without Turkey, is Ankara ready for more active engagement with the EU in this direction? Could Turkey’s involvement in developing Europe’s defense structure be a key factor in deepening cooperation and bringing it closer to full EU membership?

- This is a very good question, as it touches on the future of the so-called "collective West." It remains unclear whether the U.S. has truly left Europe to fend for itself or not. However, it is quite likely that American authorities will no longer be as willing to provide security for Europe free of charge in the future.

Under these circumstances, if Europe truly intends to build its own defense structure, it will find it difficult to do so without Turkey. But the question is: in exchange for what? Would Turkey contribute to strengthening European security in the hope of moving closer to the EU? No, that scenario would not work. If Turkey were offered an accelerated process of full EU membership, that would be a different story. But if, as in past decades, little Greece continues to play a leading role in shaping European policy toward Turkey, then Europe should deal with its own problems with Greece and the Greeks. Their security does not concern us at all.

Another important aspect is the purpose of Europe's defense structure. For example, is it intended to counter Russia? Such a scenario is doomed from the start. Why should Turkey damage its relationship with Russia—an important political and trade partner, with whom military cooperation is also possible—for the sake of unpredictable Europeans, who from a Turkish perspective appear highly unreliable? Let them handle their own defense issues.

Moreover, if Turkey’s participation in European defense negatively impacts its relations with the U.S., that would be yet another strong argument against such cooperation. Overall, it is difficult to understand what exactly Europe is aiming for. Modern European governments cannot gather their thoughts enough to formulate a coherent strategy. The most they seem capable of is having a couple of cocktails after dinner at a pub.

Today’s Europe is run by an absolutely absurd liberal elite that sees war with Russia as nothing more than an excuse for entertainment, like a night out at a club. Serious cooperation with such politicians is impossible.

However, things could change. For example, if so-called right-wing parties come to power across Europe in the next two to three years, we might witness a completely different political landscape.

- How does Ankara balance between the West and Moscow in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine? Will Turkey continue military cooperation with Russia despite Western sanctions?

- I do not believe that Russia needs any military support from Turkey to repel Ukrainian attacks and advance deeper into Ukrainian territory. From the very beginning of the conflict, Russia has had a military advantage.

Turkey does not have close military ties with Russia—in fact, there are none. However, in economic and trade sectors, cooperation between the two countries has significantly expanded over the past decades. Turkey has learned to navigate these relations despite Western sanctions against Russia, and I am confident that it will continue to do so in the future.

-What are the prospects for the gas hub that Moscow wants to establish in Turkey?

- This idea was proposed by Putin several years ago. However, Turkey’s policy on this matter has fluctuated over the past two years. Whether Putin will continue to push this project forward remains uncertain. However, it appears that it has been put on hold for now.

-Do Turkey’s relations with Iran influence its Kurdish policy?

- When analyzing Turkey’s relations with Iran in the context of the American and Israeli project to establish an independent Kurdistan in the Middle East, the following points should be noted.

In the 1980s, after the Islamic Revolution, and later in the 1990s, the U.S. and especially Israel made numerous attempts to provoke a war between Turkey and Iran. However, no Turkish government fell into this trap.

It seemed that the current Turkish government, with its Islamist leanings, might be more susceptible to such manipulations. At certain points in recent years, such a scenario seemed possible. However, it never materialized.

Now, a new potential threat has emerged. The U.S. and Israel are using extremely aggressive rhetoric against Iran, threatening it over its nuclear program and hinting at the possibility of military action.

How this will affect Turkey’s foreign policy remains unclear. However, considering that Turkey is currently facing a deep and prolonged economic crisis, I sometimes think that the current government might seek closer ties with the U.S. in opposition to Iran. Nevertheless, my intuition tells me that even the current Turkish leadership will not go that far and will maintain neutrality in any potential conflict between the U.S. and Israel on one side and Iran on the other.

- Recently, media reports have mentioned the opening of a customs post between Armenia and Turkey. Is it possible for Turkey to open its border with Armenia without a final settlement of relations with Azerbaijan?

- The short answer is no. Unless there is a comprehensive agreement between Baku and Yerevan, Turkey will never open its border with Armenia. This has been made clear by all Turkish governments over the past decades, including the current one. Although in 2009–2010, the government’s policy on this issue was somewhat contradictory, Ankara later returned to its traditional stance.

At that time, Turkey’s wavering policy toward Armenia was largely driven by its ambition for European integration. However, today, the European Union factor no longer plays a significant role in Turkey’s policy, and I do not think the government will take such a step.

Moreover, this would be a serious political risk at a time when the government’s popularity is rapidly declining. There are no clear benefits that could outweigh the potential losses. Therefore, I believe that opening the border without Azerbaijan’s consent is out of the question.

- Can Turkey act as a security guarantor in a peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan?

- Absolutely, yes. There is no doubt about it. And I believe this will eventually happen.

Whether it is officially stipulated in the agreement or not, Turkey will undoubtedly play a significant role both in the process of drafting the peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan and in the signing of a treaty that formalizes mutual recognition of borders and satisfaction with the current state of affairs.

There is no question that Turkey will be actively involved in this process. Moreover, in the future, as the reconciliation between the two countries progresses, Ankara will again take a key position.

I think a significant part of Armenian society has already realized this, especially after the events of recent years. In the past, there was a perception in Armenia that their country was at the center of global affairs, that everything revolved around it. However, in the end, it became clear that this was a profound misconception.

Armenia is now in an extremely difficult situation—economically, financially, politically, militarily, and in many other aspects. This has led to a reassessment of perspectives. In these new realities, Turkey will undoubtedly play a crucial role.

- What is Turkey’s position on the Zangezur Corridor?

- As before, Turkey states and continues to insist that the Zangezur Corridor should be opened in accordance with the trilateral agreement signed on November 10, 2020. This position remains unchanged and will not be altered in the future.

At the same time, it is important to consider the current geopolitical situation. Iran is in a sharp confrontation with Israel and the United States, while Russia has effectively abandoned its support for Armenia. Under such conditions, Armenia is unlikely to be able to obstruct the implementation of this project.

Moreover, opening the Zangezur Corridor will bring significant economic benefits to Armenia, particularly in terms of trade development and economic ties.

-What are the prospects for the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in the context of the emerging new world order, which is becoming increasingly unpredictable? What challenges and risks do OTS member states face in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment? Can Turkey, by strengthening its role in Europe, contribute to enhancing the OTS’s position on the global stage?

- This is a rather complex question, especially when considering the Organization of Turkic States as a whole.

When it comes to relations between Ankara and Baku, the situation is fundamentally different. As the great statesman Heydar Aliyev once said: “One nation, two states.” After Azerbaijan regained its occupied territories, the country stands firmly on its feet. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have a unique character—they are special in essence, form, content, and direction of development.

However, when it comes to the Turkic states of Central Asia, a completely different geopolitical reality emerges. These countries cannot survive independently without full cooperation with Russia, as Central Asia is a battleground for influence between China, Russia, and now also India, which is actively seeking to strengthen its presence in the region.

Therefore, Central Asian states are compelled to maintain cooperation with Russia—primarily in the fields of defense and security. However, in economic and trade spheres, as well as in cultural and other aspects, interaction between Turkey and the Central Asian Turkic republics is actively developing, and this process should continue.

Going beyond these parameters could complicate the situation. For example, the more actively Turkey operates in the region, the more suspicion it may generate from China and Russia. Therefore, the strategy must be extremely transparent.

One possible option would be to offer Russia and China observer status in the Organization of Turkic States. This could help ease tensions and reduce distrust toward the OTS’s activities from these major powers. Thus, this issue requires a highly balanced and cautious approach.

- What is the purpose of Turkey's expanding military and economic presence in Africa?

- This is a completely natural process, as Africa has long been an arena of competitive struggle among various countries.

Western powers, especially France and the United Kingdom, have traditionally exercised influence on the continent. However, it can be said that their former dominance has effectively been lost. The former colonial powers—Britain and France—merely exploited Africa’s resources without paying much attention to the dire conditions of the local population or taking the worsening living standards seriously.

At the same time, over the past 30 years, the Chinese have been extremely active in Africa, successfully building strong relationships and creating reliable bridges for cooperation. Alongside China, Turkey and Russia have also been actively engaged in the region. Each of these countries has its own strengths, but they also face certain challenges.

Overall, Turkey will continue its presence in Africa because there is a real demand for its economic and military cooperation. Africa remains an open field for competition, but the chances of Western countries restoring their former dominance on the continent appear to be extremely low.

- Can Turkey act as a mediator in negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow?

- Yes, Turkey can certainly facilitate peace negotiations or, if preferred, initiate the peace process. However, its role essentially ends there.

At present, the U.S. administration under Trump is inclined to engage in direct dialogue with Russia. In such a scenario, Washington does not require any intermediary.

Nevertheless, even in this context, there might still be a need for a country like Turkey to host a meeting between the two sides—perhaps in Istanbul or Ankara—and to help coordinate the process in some capacity.

That said, if the U.S. intends to negotiate with Russia directly, the peace process will move forward without intermediaries.

- How do you assess the potential of the emerging strategic alliance between Azerbaijan, the U.S., and Israel? Could this triangle influence the normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel and open new prospects for regional cooperation?

-  Azerbaijan once played a key role in easing tensions between Turkey and Israel, which also contributed to the normalization of relations between Ankara and Washington.

However, following the events in Gaza, the Israeli genocide, and everything else, Turkey-Israel relations have once again deteriorated significantly. At present, Turkey does not see any national interest in rapprochement with Israel and Washington.

In this situation, for example, President Aliyev could play a role in mediating the relationship. Moreover, I believe Trump is also preparing certain steps to improve bilateral ties between Turkey and Israel.

The main issue, however, is that the Islamist tendencies of the Turkish government strongly influence its relations with Hamas and Israel. Even if a modus vivendi is found between Ankara and Tel Aviv, the next Israeli attack on Hamas—or vice versa—will bring the situation back to square one. Thus, this remains a deep and fundamental problem.

- What is the likelihood of a potential conflict between Turkey and Israel over the Syrian issue? What risks and challenges does Ankara face at this stage of the Syrian conflict, especially in the context of shifting regional dynamics?

- This is a very logical and indeed a good question. In fact, Turkey’s policy on Syria has contradicted its own national interests from the very beginning of the war in 2011. Since then, Turkey has not reassessed this mistaken policy. Now, amid reports of the weakening Assad regime, many analysts claim that Turkey is allegedly seeking to establish a military base in Syria.

However, in my view, this is not in Turkey’s interest. Why would Turkey need a military base in Syria? If the goal is to combat the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and Syrian Kurdish forces, there is no need for bases in Syria. Turkey has a long border with Syria, from which it has already conducted multiple military operations, successfully striking the PKK and Syrian Kurdish formations.

I do not understand Turkey’s policy in Syria and actively criticize it. If the Syrian issue becomes another area of competition between Turkey and Israel, it will bring no benefit to Turkey. Turkey’s policy in Syria needs a reassessment.