At the turn of January 2026, Iran is experiencing a severe socioeconomic crisis and mass protests. Since late December 2025, demonstrations that began in Tehran and spread to dozens of cities have been triggered by rising inflation (over 40%), the collapse of the national currency, and a sharp rise in food prices. Initially economic in nature, the protests quickly took on a political tone, involving young people and women and expressing general dissatisfaction with the system of governance. The authorities respond with harsh repressive measures: dozens have died, thousands have been detained, and the top leadership promises "no leniency." Despite this, the regime maintains control over the army and security forces, reducing the likelihood of an immediate change of power. On the foreign policy front, Iran remains isolated: negotiations with the United States are not underway, and the military leadership threatens retaliation for hostile rhetoric. The underlying causes of the crisis include structural economic problems, sanctions, declining oil revenues, and social discontent accumulated over years of restrictions and high living costs. Consequently, the country is under severe strain: economic stagnation and international pressure are fueling protest sentiment, but the political system remains stable thanks to the control of security institutions.

STEM presents an interview with Oral Toga, a Turkish expert on international relations and a senior fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM).

-How do you assess the current level of discontent in Iranian society? How do the protests of 2025–2026 differ from previous ones (for example, after the death of Masha Amini in 2022)? What was the catharsis for these protests?

-First of all, it must be noted that interpreting every protest in Iran as something that will 'topple the regime' is not an accurate reading. Iran possesses a highly dynamic social structure. Since the Tobacco Protest, Iranian history has witnessed dozens of protests. What needs to be examined here are the dynamics of the protests. On the other hand, it is common knowledge that there is a severe social and economic crisis in Iran. Not all of these protests are of the same nature. I can state that the protests we are witnessing today have developed in a completely organic manner.

The protests in Iran began on Saturday, December 28, 2025, with electronics merchants shuttering their shops at the Alaeddin Shopping Center and Charsou Mall in Tehran. This is no coincidence, as the merchants here sell electronics. The sudden spike in the dollar placed merchants selling imported goods in a complete deadlock. When shopkeepers opened for business in the morning, they were unable to calculate the price at which to sell their existing stock or how much they would need to pay suppliers for new orders. Furthermore, monthly rents in these shopping centers had reached 5 to 6 billion Rials. Considering that the minimum wage in the country is only 156 million Rials, it becomes apparent that the rent for a single shop is equivalent to 35 months of a worker's salary. Merchants, having lost the ability to price goods and replenish stock in the face of hyperinflation, lowered their shutters and began protesting. This initial action quickly spread to the Tehran Grand Bazaar. This development carries significant symbolic weight, as the bazaar merchants are historically known as one of the staunchest bases of support for the Islamic Republic. Security forces intervened with tear gas against demonstrators gathered in front of the Alaeddin Shopping Center on Lalezar, Charsouq, and Jomhouri Streets. By the night of December 29, the protests had spread to Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, Qeshm Island, Zanjan, and Hamedan.

Unless a serious provocation or major incident erupts, I believe these protests will fizzle out over time and will not evolve into a Mahsa Amini-style movement. People are caught between economic and social hardships and the external threats facing their country. They have not forgotten the fear they experienced just seven months ago when their neighboring streets were struck.

-Is the economic crisis a cause or a consequence of the government? What was the root cause of the sharp decline of the rial, inflation, and the collapse of the consumer market—structural problems, sanctions, corruption, or economic policy errors?

-The greatest problem in Iran, as in many countries in the region, is 'institutionalization.' The second major issue is uncontrolled internal migration, which has been intensifying since the 1960s. These two factors bring about governance challenges and have caused crises in dozens of different areas, ranging from food security to traffic safety. Although the Iranian political establishment strives to generate flexible and radical policies to address this, it fails to provide lasting solutions due to the lack of institutional capacity. The positioning of the IRGC as a second state parallel to the government has also inflicted heavy damage on institutional integrity.

All of this leaves matters to the will of individuals. In matters left to human will, it is possible to encounter every kind of setback and deterioration. Everything we see in Iran today, from the water crisis to the housing crisis, is a consequence of other things, not the cause.

-What is the role of reformists in the government? Can President Pezeshkian's policies be considered an attempt at genuine reform, or is it merely a "facade change" while maintaining theocratic control?

-Masoud Pezeshkian is a figure who has commanded respect across the political spectrum since the 1990s, known for his sincerity and candor. His personal story—losing his wife at a young age, raising his children as a single father, and his success as a physician—resonates deeply with the Iranian public. Furthermore, he is known as a straight shooter who never minces his words. Consequently, I believe Pezeshkian is speaking his mind openly. However, it must not be forgotten that the establishment in Iran is powerful and highly centralized, and Pezeshkian operates within strict constraints.

-Is there a moderate elite capable of leading the transition to a new governance model? Which political groups or figures could act as an alternative to the current system, and how influential are they?

Although Iran’s fragmented structure may appear to be a liability, it actually provides strategic advantages in certain aspects. Consequently, the decapitation strategy that Israel applies to almost every adversary may not be effective in Iran. For this reason, intelligence operations are conducted in a manner designed to sow mistrust among the ruling circles. In intelligence terminology, this is referred to as 'elite fracturing.'

The Fakhrizadeh assassination, for instance, was such a maneuver. This assassination did not merely eliminate a key scientist; it also pitted the Ministry of Intelligence against the IRGC Intelligence Organization. The Haniyeh assassination was also a move of this nature. However, these fissures are recognized by the Iranians, and rapid countermeasures are taken accordingly. You can observe this when looking at the institutional and legislative measures implemented following the 12-Day Conflict.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the political landscape in Iran is highly volatile. The sudden fall from grace of a figure who appears prominent today, or an unknown individual unexpectedly rising to prominence and taking the reins, are recurring realities in Iranian history. Looking at Iran’s trajectory over the last 150 years is sufficient proof of this.

-What is the relationship between protest movements and ethnic minorities? What role do Kurdish, Azerbaijani, Baloch, and other communities play in the current discontent?

-While today’s merchant protests do not possess a direct ethnic dimension, we have observed an escalation of violence particularly in the Lor region, in towns such as Azna and Lordegan. There are sociological root causes for this that are distinct from the protests themselves. Furthermore, factors such as police intervention with water cannons in sub-zero temperatures exacerbated the situation in certain locations.

Instances of indiscriminate gunfire by members of certain Kurdish tribes—bearing in mind that firearms hold a significant place in Kurdish culture—also presented a distinct dynamic. However, nearly all of these occurrences should be viewed as isolated incidents, and it must not be forgotten that Iran is a nation of 90 million people. Finally, as I mentioned earlier, the public's security concerns take precedence over many other issues.

-Who really controls economic policy? What is the role of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) in the economy—and is it hindering reforms?

-Many decisions in the country are made within the Office of the Supreme Leader (Beyt-e Rahbari). Following the Iran-Iraq War, the country required reconstruction. The militias who waged 'jihad' to defend their country during the war saw their institutional standing strengthened in the early 1990s, and they were called upon to wage a similar jihad for the nation's reconstruction.

The IRGC, having embarked on this jihad for reconstruction, acquired significantly broader powers around 2004–2005 and gained a decisive say in all of the country's mega-projects. However, it must not be forgotten that the IRGC reports directly to Khamenei and, by extension, to his office.

Beyond all this, it is also necessary to mention that there are groups benefiting from Iran’s isolation from the world, profiteering from the opportunities created by this closed system. Yet, the issue greater than all of these, as I mentioned earlier, is the lack of institutionalization in the country.

-What is the possible scenario for political transformation? Is gradual liberalization and elite change through negotiations realistic, or will this inevitably lead to a more radical change in the political system?

-Since the death of Ebrahim Raisi, Iran has been demonstrating significant flexibility across its domestic, foreign, and security policies. I believe that, barring a major catalyst, this trend of flexibility will persist, and the country will proceed with a structure that is—albeit de facto—freer than it was 20 years ago. However, given the volatility of the political landscape, I am of the opinion that it would be imprudent to make a definitive reading regarding the future of Iranian politics at this juncture.

-If the protests escalate into a revolution, what will replace the system? Are "Arab Spring" models possible, or will a unique Iranian path emerge? Which forces will occupy key positions?

-I cannot say that I consider it likely that these protests will evolve into a revolution. However, should events escalate at any point—whether due to attacks or protests—the Iranian administration is adopting significant security measures to counter such threats. The project to consolidate intelligence organizations is one such measure. Likewise, the re-establishment of the National Defense Council is another. The powers envisioned for SAMA are by no means insignificant. When we examine the policies Iran is pursuing, we observe a dual approach: steps that are highly flexible and lenient on one hand, yet extremely harsh and uncompromising on the other. The distinction Khamenei has drawn between 'protesters' and 'rioters' regarding these events is a significant indicator of the prevailing perception within Iran.

-Is there a risk of increased separatism in the provinces, and to what extent are such scenarios being discussed by analysts? Will the country be able to restore its influence in the Middle East after military and economic upheavals, or will it remain isolated?

-"There has always been a separatist undercurrent in Iran. In a genuine 'failed state' scenario—should a state of statelessness emerge—these groups would naturally seek to fill the vacuum. However, I believe we are currently very far from such a point.

Even during the 12-Day Conflict, these groups demonstrated a reluctance to mobilize. This is because the disastrous consequences of moves made in the past with USSR support, or during the chaos of 1979, remain vivid in the collective memory.

Furthermore, the IRGC has developed a concept known as 'Mosaic Defense' to counter the possibility of a scenario similar to the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. According to this doctrine, even if the central command in Tehran is compromised, the provinces possess plans to combat these movements autonomously. Consequently, for separatist movements to gain significant momentum and generate real impact, a massive rupture would need to occur within Iran.

Iran's influence in the Middle East is a geopolitical and the political consequence. Even during the Shah's era and prior, there were groups and communities in the region that Iran kept within its sphere of influence. I believe the crux of the matter lies not in the mere existence of this influence, but rather in how it is leveraged and the nature of the policies formulated around it.

-How might a mass exodus of young and poorly integrated groups change the country's social landscape? To what extent are modern technologies (VPNs, digital networks, protest networks) changing the possibilities for protests and their control?

-There is almost no aspect of the world left untouched by modern technology. However, I do not believe it is a significant factor within the context of these specific protests. That said, it undoubtedly has a profound impact on Iran’s internal affairs.

Although Iranian security elites began to perceive the gravity of the situation particularly during the Arab Spring, they only began implementing policies that yielded tangible security results following the Mahsa Amini era. Significant measures have been taken in the cyber domain. Nevertheless, despite resistance from the conservative faction, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is attempting to alleviate public pressure by allowing for relaxation in various areas, most notably regarding the hijab. I believe this process will eventually find an equilibrium.

I do not know if these steps will reverse the country's brain drain, but I must reiterate what I stated at the outset: as long as the issue of institutionalization remains unresolved, it is difficult to provide a definitive solution to these types of problems.

-How do you explain the fact that protest activity in Iran is unevenly spreading and has barely affected a number of large cities with a predominantly Azerbaijani population, while in some smaller cities and predominantly Persian-speaking regions, social mobilization appears more noticeable?

-There has been no significant mobilization, not only in Tabriz but in many major cities across Iran. The footage circulating in the media generally depicts incidents occurring in the Lor-majority districts of western and southwestern Iran. Consequently, viewing these specific protests through a strictly ethnic lens would be inaccurate. Finally, the security concerns I alluded to earlier play a substantial role.

-How significant is the external factor in current Iranian processes? Do you see signs of coordination, support, or informational influence from outside, especially through diasporas and foreign media platforms?

-I consider this topic to be of critical importance. Aside from a small segment of the youth, Iranians inside the country remain largely unaware of the debates taking place within the Iranian diaspora. Most Iranians are not even aware of the songs produced by prominent diaspora music groups. Of course, there is a demographic that follows global trends, and this group possesses a very high intellectual caliber. However, I am referring to the average citizen.

Certain groups within the diaspora, in particular, attempt to secure political capital and power by projecting an influence they do not actually possess. Through their flawed readings of the ground reality, they manipulate the global narrative regarding Iran. Israel’s 12-Day Attack was highly successful at the tactical level, yet it failed to achieve its declared strategic objectives. This is something Israeli security elites themselves admit. In my view, the primary reason for this failure was that their assessment was based on the perceptions manufactured by the diaspora.

-Recently, discussions of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi have intensified again in the international information space. To what extent, in your opinion, does this discourse have real political significance within Iran itself, rather than abroad?

-Reza Pahlavi may well be a well-intentioned figure who loves his country. However, I am of the opinion that his strategy—aligning himself with those bombing the country while calling for a 'rebellion'—was fundamentally flawed.

The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) once held significant influence within Iran. However, the Iranian people never forgave them for siding with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. Today, they continue to exist merely as a marginal group. Even this specific move by Pahlavi is an indicator of just how disconnected he is from Iran and his inability to read the ground reality.

Apart from this, the existence of public nostalgia for the 'Shah era' is an undeniable fact. However, it must not be forgotten that this is a nostalgic reflex born out of a desire to escape current hardships. I am unsure how much political capital the nostalgia felt for his grandfather would actually translate into on the ground.

Finally, as I touched upon earlier, people in Iran are largely unaware of the discourse within the diaspora in their daily lives. Consequently, I cannot say they are truly attuned to Pahlavi either.

-Considering various transformation scenarios, which internal or external actors, in your opinion, are truly capable of influencing the formation of Iran's post-crisis political project?

-As long as Khamenei remains in power, the current order is unlikely to change significantly. As for the era that follows, it is too early to speculate, and doing so could be misleading. Currently, two main schools of thought regarding the survival of the state are emerging within the system.

The first is the reformist school, represented by Rouhani and his team. They advocate that Iran should position itself within the international system while still preserving its identity as an Islamic Republic. For the past two years, Iranian politics has been generating policy in this direction, and I can state that this approach has found traction both in foreign policy among neighbors and in domestic policy among the public.

The second school believes that Iran can only ensure its security by pursuing a much harder line. This faction actively implemented its policies from the 2020 parliamentary elections until the day Ebrahim Raisi died; however, realizing the heavy cost this hardening imposed on Iran, there was a return to flexibility. Similarly, the fact that the Ahmadinejad era precipitated the Green Movement had also triggered a return to flexibility in the past.

Consequently, in response to the tested policies of the hardliners, a solution has been crafted through an intermediate figure like Pezeshkian—someone who is reformist yet loyal to the revolution. I believe this trajectory will continue to be maintained.

-How reliable are the reports from unofficial Iranian sources about the IRGC launching missile and air defense exercises? What message do you think Iran is sending with these exercises—to its domestic audience or to its external adversaries?

-Even when everything appears to be going smoothly, a military force is obligated to prepare for the worst-case scenario. Being 'ready' is the most fundamental requirement of the military profession. Given the current circumstances in Iran—where the possibility of a second attack is so widely discussed—it comes as no surprise that the military wing is making preparations.

Since the attack on the consulate in Damascus on April 1, 2024, Iranian security elites realized that Israel might intend to launch an operation against them, and they calibrated their maneuvers accordingly. The Pezeshkian administration attempted to shore up the domestic front, while the foreign policy team engaged in negotiations with the international community and the U.S., seeking to ensure Iran's security under the protection of international law and norms. Meanwhile, the military strove to overhaul national defense, particularly air defense systems. However, it cannot be said that they were successful.

Nothing has changed in the aftermath of the 12 days. Pezeshkian and his team continue to address domestic political issues; the foreign policy team persists in its efforts to reach an agreement with the U.S. and bring Iran under the umbrella of international norms (it must not be forgotten that on the very first day of the conflict, even as Iranian commanders were being killed, Abbas Araghchi appeared on live television to declare that they had not abandoned negotiations); and the military continues its preparations. Consequently, rather than sending a specific message, this is simply a situation consistent with the natural order of things.

-How do you assess Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's statement that the current crisis is a "struggle for the survival of the Islamic Republic"? Does the protest activity within Iran today truly pose an existential threat to the regime, or is this more political rhetoric?

-I do not believe this statement was directed solely at the protests. Particularly considering that it was articulated by the Foreign Minister, I view it as a response to both the external threats targeting Iran and the threats generated by internal structural issues. These protests, like all those preceding them, are merely a consequence of the structural problems I alluded to earlier.