Interview with James Sherr OBE (Order of the British Empire), Honorary Fellow of the International Centre for Defence & Security (Tallinn, Estonia), Associate Fellow, Russia & Eurasia Programme (Chatham House, London)

- In your opinion, what role does Azerbaijan play in the reshaping of Eurasia's security architecture after 2022? Is it possible to speak of the emergence of a neutral bloc between Russia and the West, and what role could Baku play in such a scenario?

-Azerbaijan is now compelled to consider the new opportunities and constraints emerging from the dramatic geopolitical shifts of this decade.

One major factor—regional in nature—is the outcome of the most recent Karabakh conflicts. These culminated in the political dissolution of what Armenia refers to as “Artsakh”, the decisive defeat of Armenia.

A second and much broader factor is the ongoing geopolitical and geoeconomic impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine, which affects not only the South Caucasus but has global significance.

It is difficult to overstate how profoundly the Ukraine war has reshaped Russia’s strategic priorities—and, by extension, its capacity to project power elsewhere. This realignment has implications for every actor in the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan.

Should the war end on favourable terms to Russia — or conversely, if Russia suffers a conclusive defeat, there will be significant repercussions across the region. In this wider, evolving environment, the dynamics established before 2020–2022 do not provide a reliable basis for prediction.

What I don’t see is any realistic basis for the formation of a formal ‘neutral bloc’ within Eurasia. We are left with neutral and non-aligned states, like Azerbaijan, navigating emerging possibilities and limitations, while remaining fundamentally driven by national interests and a state-centric approach. And then of course there are formally aligned states, members of the CSTO, but they too are largely pursuing national interests, and in a decidedly pragmatic manner.

The third factor is the return of Donald Trump, who is pursuing a far more aggressive variant of the objectives that emerged in his first presidential term. The first of these objectives is uncontested mastery of North America, from Greenland and the Arctic waters of Canada to the Isthmus of Panama. The security of the southern US border takes precedence over everything else. The second priority is ‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia — more than that, the establishment of new partnerships, centred on business. From this perspective, the Ukraine war is seen as a pernicious distraction. But Trump does not know how to end it, and he is incapable of understanding why Russia’s victory over Ukraine matters more to Putin than a transformed relationship with the United States.

The third is the redistribution of US military power from NATO to the Far East, as well as realignment of relations with Europe. Like Putin, Trump refuses to regard Europe as a ‘power’. Instead, he sees it as a trading bloc, and, from this perspective, as an antagonist. The ideological certainties of this administration are matched only by its ignorance. Some of the principal players in this administration do not even know where the South Caucasus is. Azerbaijan is simply not in its field of vision.

- Azerbaijan demonstrates notable foreign policy flexibility—maintaining cooperation with the European Union, Türkiye, Israel, Russia, and Iran. Can such a multi-vector approach ensure long-term sustainability in the context of rising confrontation between global power centres?

- No, because the overarching reality is global instability, and under such conditions, especially in a region like the South Caucasus—which has strategic importance to at least two key players, Russia and Türkiye—it would be hazardous to speak of long-term stability.

Any stability that does exist should be regarded as temporary. And if Azerbaijan aims to transform temporary stability into something more durable this will require vigilance, alertness, adaptation and hard work.

There are no guarantees. Azerbaijan finds itself in a highly complex and challenging geopolitical environment. Fortunately—regardless of the views one holds on the country’s current authorities—Azerbaijan's leadership, in my view, approaches these challenges with realism and pragmatism. They are acutely aware that the country must define its national interests and scope for independent action within a broader context shaped by much larger powers.

-How do you assess the current strategic situation in the South Caucasus after the de facto change in the status quo in Karabakh?

-The South Caucasus has never been a hub of stability, and it is unlikely to become one. Admittedly, there are positive as well as negative dynamics in play. For example, the relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan is broadly positive. The strategic alliance between Türkiye and Azerbaijan is of fundamental importance. It offers protection to Azerbaijan and must be taken into account by others. The Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan relationship adds a Central Asian dimension and is a factor of stability in itself.

One lesson of the 2020 Karabakh war is that both Türkiye and Azerbaijan demonstrated that it is now possible to wage and win war in the South Caucasus—a region traditionally seen as part of Russia's sphere of influence—without Russia’s involvement or approval. That is a major change, but it might not be permanent.

This shift does not in itself create a foundation for long-term stability. The relationship between internal and external factors remains crucial. Georgia is currently in a state of political turmoil, and the outcome will have geopolitical consequences. Azerbaijan, for its part, has enjoyed a high degree of internal stability since 1993, but it was ruthlessly imposed and must be ruthlessly enforced. We cannot assume this will continue forever. Moreover, whilst the Russian factor has receded for now, two Russian axioms remain pertinent: ‘He who seeks to control the North Caucasus must control the South Caucasus’. ‘Armenia can live with Russia or not at all’.

There is no such thing as permanent stability, certainly not in your neighbourhood. A war between Iran, Israel and the United States will upset all calculations.

- What are the realistic scenarios for NATO or the European Union (EU) to engage in security issues in the South Caucasus without undermining the regional balance?

- Taken together, Russia’s successful war against Georgia in 2008 and the latest Karabakh wars of 2020/2023 have effectively removed the West from the scene. The one exception — and it is a big one — is energy supply and transport. Even with that exception, the West’s role today is much diminished. NATO is conspicuous by its absence. (On 4 June, after 23 years of partnership, Georgia announced the closure of its NATO/EU information offices). The last remnant of formal EU influence in the region, the OSCE’s Minsk Group, has effectively vanished. Although Türkiye might be seen as an important part of the West, in the South Caucasus, it does not act as part of the West. It acts as Türkiye.

It is a mistake to assume that just because the EU, NATO, or the United States are powerful, they are seeking to expand their influence. They are not looking for trouble. They have enough trouble in Ukraine, not to say Russian asymmetric (so-called ‘hybrid’) warfare in Europe.

Nevertheless, the problems posed by the Russia-Ukraine war do not end in Europe. The war, and the ensuing sanctions regime, have created an acute Western interest in bypassing Russian trade routes in Eurasia. One direct outcome is the growing attractiveness and feasibility of the so-called Middle Corridor—which avoids the Northern Corridor and also circumvents the Suez Canal. Complicating and possibly contradicting this is the Trump factor. If you regard China as the ‘main enemy’ and Russia as a potential partner, then the Middle Corridor is not an attractive focus of investment.

Therefore, my view is that the Russia-Ukraine war is bringing the South Caucasus back into the West’s field of vision despite its own wishes. Last month, in May, your country was reminded of this in a direct way by the UK, which has now sanctioned several Azerbaijani entities in connection with the Russian oil trade. I think this came as a surprise in Baku. Azerbaijan, has long managed to walk a fine line—neither openly defying Western sanctions nor antagonizing Russia—but this is now becoming more difficult.

So the role of the West is no longer fixed. Where previously it was possible to pursue a well-calibrated multi-vector policy between Western partners and Russia, that enterprise is becoming more complicated.

— In your opinion, is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) capable of becoming an alternative regional mechanism in the context of fragmentation of global alliances? Given the strengthening of the Ankara-Baku link, could this develop into its own collective security system?

— I think this conclusion would be exceeding the art of the possible. All countries in the region—including those in Central Asia—are indeed seeking to chart more independent courses. This trend is largely driven by the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as the increasingly negative perception—internationally and regionally—of close ties with Russia. But there are other reasons as well.

Kazakhstan, in particular, which enjoys strong relations with Azerbaijan, exemplifies this shift. As a result, the Turkic states of Central Asia—and indeed all Central Asian states—are exploring and expanding their capacity to act more autonomously. However, it's important to note that these developments are still rooted primarily in national interests, rather than collective ones.

For example, it remains the case that the intensity of ties between Moscow and individual Central Asian capitals exceeds the level of coordination between the national capitals themselves. And we should not overlook what is perhaps the most significant external actor in the region, China.

Since 2019, trade between Central Asia and China has surpassed trade with Russia—and is now approximately double in volume. Moreover, China is steadily emerging as a significant presence in the South Caucasus. When it comes to the Middle Corridor, China is not just a participant—it is central to its realization.

In many respects, China remains an indispensable partner for Russia in its confrontation with the West. But China will not defer to Russia. It acts firmly in line with its own national interests. The South Caucasus is a region where China's interests diverge from more often than align with those of Russia. It is highly motivated to develop global trade routes—especially those linking it to the West—that are not dependent on Russian infrastructure. And it will not seek Russia’s approval.

In fact, China’s ‘no-limits partnership’ with Russia is determined to avoid any form of dependency. In the South Caucasus, China’s interests are expanding in a purposeful, steady, and, so far, predictable manner. As this factor becomes more prominent, countries in the region—Azerbaijan included—will need to recalibrate their foreign policy strategies accordingly.

I believe Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policy elites will need to cultivate new areas of expertise and experience. The China factor will become more important, perhaps more demanding and in time, perhaps it will even become onerous. Until quite recently, there were only two external powers whose interests Azerbaijan was careful not to cross: Türkiye and Russia. Now, China is increasingly becoming part of that equation—while Russia, arguably, is beginning to fade from it.

— Do you think that Russia's influence in the South Caucasus is in irreversible decline, or is Moscow adapting to new realities through hybrid tools?

— In anticipation of the expanded war in Ukraine, Russia made a deliberate decision to recalibrate its security posture in the South Caucasus. This involved a partial withdrawal and a willingness to accept the loss of primacy in areas where they once had it. Nowhere was this more clearly demonstrated than during the November 2020 Karabakh war and the subsequent military operations of 2023.

Yet, despite this retrenchment, Russia managed the situation skilfully, securing a settlement with Azerbaijan—and perhaps more significantly—with Türkiye that met and even strengthened some of its core interests. As I already mentioned, where security and ‘peacekeeping’ were concerned, it largely removed the West from the scene.

In my view, this is not a picture of irreversible weakening. It may reflect a temporary adjustment rather than a transition to long-term decline—particularly if Russia were to emerge victorious from its war in Ukraine. In this case, Moscow would undoubtedly seek to reassert itself as a dominant force in the South Caucasus. That wouldn’t happen overnight. But in this eventuality, you should expect Russia to behave with greater self-confidence than it does now.

So Russia’s fortunes must remain a permanent focus of attention in Azerbaijan. As I said earlier, we are living in a world that is unpredictable, increasingly unstable, and also dangerous.

There are no guarantees of ‘permanent stability’ anywhere. This presents a major challenge—not only for President Ilham Aliyev but also for anyone who might succeed him, as well as for Azerbaijan’s broader foreign, security, and defence elite. The expertise and skills developed to navigate the current complex geopolitical landscape might no longer be sufficient in the years to come. Adaptation will be essential. And the crucial question is whether Azerbaijan’s current elites are capable of adapting.