STEM presents an exclusive interview with Hooman Majd, an Iranian-American author and journalist specializing in Iranian politics and society. He is the author of several books, including the bestseller The Ayatollah Begs to Differ, and has been published in leading international media outlets such as The New York Times, The New Yorker, and Newsweek. He also served as a translator and informal adviser to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami during his visits to the United States and UN sessions.

- In 2024–2025, we are witnessing a paradox in Iran: on the one hand, the absence of large-scale street protests, on the other, a deepening crisis of trust between society and the state. Can we say that the Iranian system has shifted its emphasis from ideological legitimacy to managed apathy as a form of stability?

-There are elements within the leadership that remain strongly ideological, but the prevailing sentiment after the suppression of the Woman, Life, Freedom (WLF) movement was that the system should adopt a more pragmatic stance on social issues. This partly explains why some of the demands of the WLF movement, such as relaxing strict dress codes for women, have had a lasting impact. In a sense, the WLF movement achieved a measure of success, demonstrating that the state is willing to prioritize social stability over rigid ideological enforcement. Yet this managed apathy comes at the cost of growing societal distrust, which could become a latent source of instability if left unaddressed.

- After the events in Gaza and the sharp deterioration of the regional situation, Iran has found itself simultaneously strengthened and vulnerable. Where, in your view, is the line drawn between Iran's strategic influence and the risk of being drawn into a direct regional confrontation?

 - I think that since the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel, Iran has actually become more vulnerable than strengthened. While it has managed to reinforce certain regional relationships, particularly with neighbors in the Persian Gulf, it has simultaneously seen the weakening or loss of some of its most crucial allies, including Syria and Hezbollah. Hamas itself has also been significantly weakened and can no longer pose a meaningful threat to Israel in the event of a wider regional conflict, as was evident in June 2025. Consequently, Iran’s strategic influence is under strain, and the risk of direct confrontation with Israel—and potentially the United States—remains high. In this context, Iran is walking a fine line between demonstrating power and overextending itself in a volatile region.

- You personally served as a translator and advisor to Presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad. In your opinion, has the internal logic of decision-making in Tehran changed over the past two decades, or is the system still reproducing itself?

 - To clarify, I was not an advisor to Ahmadinejad, and my translation work at the UN was primarily to document the experience for a story I later published in The New York Observer. I did, however, serve as a translator and informal advisor to President Khatami, including accompanying him on a private visit to the United States in 2006. One of the key challenges Iran faces is that its system largely reproduces itself: it adapts occasionally—such as after the Green Movement, the JCPOA, and the WLF protests—but these adjustments are tactical rather than structural. Fundamentally, the system has remained consistent since the 1980s, which contributes to widespread public dissatisfaction and a sense of stagnation within society.

-Barring a scenario of sudden upheaval, which forms of Iran's evolution do you consider most likely: gradual authoritarian stabilization, internal systemic transformation, or a prolonged "status quo with degradation”?

 -Predicting Iran’s trajectory is inherently difficult, and all three scenarios remain possible. Gradual authoritarian stabilization could occur if the leadership prioritizes control and security over reform, while systemic transformation seems unlikely without the Supreme Leader’s willingness to endorse profound change. The "status quo with degradation"—a slow erosion of institutional and social cohesion—might be the default path if no significant adjustments are made. Ultimately, the direction will largely depend on leadership decisions, domestic pressures, and regional dynamics over the next decade.

 -Iran remains a country with a strong cultural, intellectual, and historical identity. Do you see forces within the country today that are capable of formulating an alternative project for Iran in the future—not only political but also civilizational?

-Absolutely. There are forces within Iran, particularly within the reformist movement, that are capable, democratic-minded, and prepared to contribute to the country’s evolution. Some of these actors have even shifted into opposition roles due to arrests and restrictions, demonstrating a willingness to challenge the system constructively. Beyond politics, these groups also have the potential to articulate a civilizational vision for Iran, rooted in its rich cultural and intellectual heritage, that could guide the country toward more inclusive and forward-looking governance.

-You've been explaining Iran to Western audiences for many years, dispelling stereotypes. What is the main myth about Iran today, in your opinion, that prevents the international community from adequately understanding the developments in the country?

 - A central misunderstanding in the West is the underestimation of how deeply nationalistic and prideful Iranians are. For example, the 12-day war in 2005, initiated by Israel and ended with the United States using bunker-busting bombs on Iranian targets, was intended to provoke anti-regime uprisings. Instead, Iranians largely rallied around their nationhood rather than the flag of the government or calls from the exiled crown prince for revolt. Many Western observers assume that Iranians want the regime gone at any cost, but in reality, most desire change on their own terms, through domestic efforts. In the event of external conflict, the majority of Iranians are likely to unite in defense of the country rather than cheer foreign interventions against the state.

-Discussions about the country's northwestern regions, including Tabriz and other Azerbaijani-populated areas, periodically appear in the Iranian media. Why, in your opinion, does this topic resurface during periods of regional turbulence and then fade into the background?

 - Iran has a sizable Azeri population concentrated in the northwest but also present in Tehran, and the current president, Mahmoud Pezeshkian, is of mixed Azeri-Kurdish heritage. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, is also of Azeri background. Unlike some Kurdish groups, Iran’s Azeris have not agitated seriously for independence or self-determination since World War II. However, given Iran’s multi-ethnic composition—Persians, Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis, and Azeris—there is always a latent concern that foreign powers might attempt to exploit ethnic divisions. Media attention on Azeri or other ethnic issues often serves to reinforce national unity, emphasizing the enduring multi-ethnic cohesion of the Iranian state rather than promoting separatism.

-It's often emphasized that this isn't about separatism, but social and cultural issues are raised, framed in a political light. Where is the line drawn between domestic social issues and their external politicization?

-I’m not entirely sure I have a clear answer to this. Social and cultural issues in Iran are often deeply intertwined with identity, religion, and tradition, which makes separating them from politics difficult. At times, domestic debates are amplified or misinterpreted by external actors, turning ordinary social discourse into perceived political crises.

 -Some analysts believe that external actors may interpret internal Iranian processes differently than those seen within the country. Is it possible that Washington or other capitals view the Azerbaijani factor in Iran differently than they do within Iran itself? What is more dangerous for Iran now: real external threats or distorted interpretations of its internal processes abroad?

-Certainly, foreign capitals often interpret internal Iranian dynamics differently than the reality on the ground. However, at this moment, I would argue that real external threats are far more dangerous than misperceptions. Distorted interpretations can complicate diplomacy, but they do not have the immediate and potentially catastrophic consequences that direct military, political, or economic threats from abroad pose. In practice, Iran must manage both, but external pressures are the more urgent concern at present.