The interview given by President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev indeed allows for a reconstruction of the country’s principal foreign policy orientations for 2026, functioning as a quasi-programmatic document that combines an assessment of the outcomes of 2025 with forward-looking projections for the near term. At the core of this vision lies a commitment to multi-vector diplomacy, a deliberate effort to balance the interests of major centers of power while simultaneously deepening cooperation both with individual states and with entire regions. Azerbaijan demonstrates a clear readiness to leverage its geostrategic position, transport and logistics potential, and energy resources not merely as economic assets, but as instruments of political influence, while deliberately avoiding rigid alignment with any single geopolitical axis.

Particular emphasis is placed on the future of U.S.–Azerbaijani relations. Notably, the 907th Amendment—long regarded as a symbol of constraints and mutual distrust—is identified as a key marker in this context. The pragmatization of Washington’s approach observed in 2025 is interpreted by the Azerbaijani leadership as a window of opportunity. In this regard, the pragmatism of the current U.S. administration and the establishment of a joint working group tasked with drafting a strategic document suggest the potential institutionalization of bilateral dialogue in 2026. Should this process continue in a gradual and consistent manner, bilateral relations are likely to move beyond ad hoc cooperation toward a more stable and durable framework, grounded in converging interests in energy security, regional stability, and transit corridors.

Another major priority for 2026 is the peace agenda in the South Caucasus, closely linked to large-scale infrastructure projects. Central to this agenda is the concept of the Zangezur Corridor, which in the Azerbaijani interpretation is not merely a regional initiative, but a component of a broader transregional transport and logistics architecture. The President underscores that the issue at stake is not simply the reopening of communication routes, but a qualitative transformation of the region’s geo-economic structure. The potential restoration of what is essentially a Soviet-era route connecting Russia to Iran via the chain Russia–Baku–Agbend–Armenia–Nakhchivan–Julfa–Persian Gulf would effectively create a second branch of the North–South Corridor while simultaneously serving as an additional axis of the Middle Corridor linking East and West.

Under such a scenario, Azerbaijan would not merely function as a transit hub, but would acquire the capacity to act as a system-forming link connecting north and south, east and west within a unified logistical framework.

Closely associated with the opening of the Zangezur Corridor is the prospect of expanding direct connectivity with the ports of the Persian Gulf and, more broadly, the Middle East. Potential access to major ports in Iraq, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia would integrate Azerbaijan into transport networks closely tied to some of the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves and to key junctions of Asian and European trade flows. In the long term, such integration would strengthen Baku’s negotiating position in energy policy, facilitate diversification of export routes, and reinforce the country’s role as an indispensable transit and logistics partner.

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and the format of consultative meetings with Central Asian countries are also identified as priorities for 2026. Here, a significant qualitative shift is evident, as issues of defense cooperation have entered the agenda. Azerbaijan’s proactive role in promoting military cooperation among Turkic states reflects the emergence of a new understanding of security, one in which collective identity is reinforced through defense-industrial and military-technical collaboration.

This development adds additional layers of resilience to the broader architecture of Turkic integration and creates the conditions for the emergence of a framework capable of acting as an autonomous actor in regional security. In practical terms, this may translate into an increase in joint military exercises, the harmonization of doctrinal approaches, and diversification of arms procurement. Central Asia was already a focal point of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy in 2025; in 2026, this focus is expected to shift toward more in-depth, specialized, and project-based cooperation.

Azerbaijan’s position on the Middle Eastern conflict, clearly articulated in the interview, reflects a deliberate attempt to avoid direct involvement in the region’s complex, multi-layered crises. The assertion that Arab affairs should be resolved by Arab states themselves signals a carefully calibrated restraint and a rejection of any role that could be interpreted as imposed mediation or interference. At the same time, this stance serves as a message to external actors and partners that Azerbaijan prefers to concentrate on its immediate regional priorities, avoiding the dispersion of political and military resources on issues associated with high reputational and strategic risks.

The Chinese vector of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is acquiring increasingly substantive content. Record-high trade turnover exceeding four billion U.S. dollars, reflecting growth of more than 20 percent, points to a qualitative expansion of the economic foundation of bilateral relations. Even more significant, however, is the extension of cooperation beyond trade into the sphere of military-technical interaction. The initiation of dialogue and practical steps toward the establishment of joint production facilities—partially reflected in demonstrations at the military parade—signal a new level of trust and strategic partnership. The confidential nature of certain projects underscores their sensitivity and long-term orientation. Looking ahead to 2026, the Chinese dimension may emerge as one of the key drivers of modernization within Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex and as an important pillar in the diversification of the country’s defense partnerships.

In sum, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy for 2026 is taking shape as a system of interrelated vectors. On the one hand, the institutionalization of relations with the United States continues, involving an actor geographically distant yet central to the international system. On the other hand, the regional agenda is gaining momentum, anchored in transport and logistics megaprojects capable of fundamentally redefining Azerbaijan’s geo-economic role. Simultaneously, China is evolving into a critical partner not only in trade, but also in the military-technical domain, reinforcing the multipolar character of Baku’s external relations. By 2026, Azerbaijan positions itself not as an object of great-power competition, but as an autonomous subject capable of extracting resilience and strategic advantage from contemporary geopolitics through the construction of its own partnership configurations.