In this discussion with Julian Chifu, an expert and political scientist who also served as an advisor to the Prime Minister of Romania, delve into Romania's role within the European Union and NATO. Throughout the conversation, Mr. Chifu shares his insights on Romania's strategic position in Eastern Europe, particularly in relation to its contributions to NATO's defense posture and its involvement in ensuring regional security. The conversation explores Romania's role in the security and political dynamics of neighboring countries like Moldova, including its efforts to support energy security and the diversification of energy sources, as well as its involvement in addressing the political status of regions such as Gagauzia.

What is Romania's role in NATO's defense strategy in Eastern Europe at the present stage?

-  Romania is not the only country in NATO; NATO has a strategy at the level of the entire alliance. However, some parts of that strategy specifically relate to the countries on the Eastern Flank, including my own country, Romania. Romania hosts several international military units and a divisional-level command, contributing to NATO’s defense efforts. Additionally, it provides other strategic assets and common facilities for the alliance.

 To what extent does France's statement about its intention to deploy thousands of troops to Romania for the upcoming Dajan Spring-25 military exercises this year mark a significant moment in NATO's preparations to counter potential threats from Russia? Overall, do you see Russia’s current policies as a threat to NATO and Romania itself?

-Okay, let’s take it step by step. France is contributing troops, as are many other NATO countries. This exercise has been planned in advance, so I wouldn’t single out one particular country.

Regarding Russia, yes, Russia represents a threat to my country, to the Eastern Front, to NATO, and to countries worldwide. Russia has violated international law and launched a war of aggression against one of its neighbors, Ukraine, denying its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

This situation goes beyond just Ukraine—it’s not only about landlocking Ukraine or attempting regime change in Kyiv. Russia’s goals extend further, posing a direct threat to NATO.

Russia has also issued strategic demands—essentially ultimatums—since December 2021, targeting both the OSCE and NATO. These demands seek to roll back security arrangements to an earlier era, reasserting a sphere of influence over the entire post-Soviet space and former communist states. Furthermore, Russia aims to secure veto power over European security matters.

These objectives have been explicitly stated by Russian officials, including President Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and, most vocally, Dmitry Medvedev. These intentions are well-documented and have been discussed at various levels.

 

What role will the construction of NATO's largest military base in Europe at Mihail Kogălniceanu Airport play in strengthening Romania's position as a strategic hub for alliance forces? How is the implementation of this project progressing? Do you think this will enhance Romania’s standing within NATO?

The base already exists—it's a common facility that belongs to the Romanian Army and has been in place for a long time. It’s not something newly created.

Secondly, it has been extensively used in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, serving not only Romanian troops but also allied and third-country forces, particularly from the U.S.Thirdly, there is indeed an expansion plan for the base. The Romanian state, the U.S., and NATO have all contributed financially to this project. This expansion will increase both the area and capacity of the base, allowing it to accommodate a larger number of troops along with their families, providing them with all necessary infrastructure and services.

Ultimately, while this is primarily a Romanian project, it functions as a common NATO facility, although it is not governed solely by Romanian regulations. Its development significantly enhances Romania’s role within NATO, strengthening the country's strategic position within the alliance. It is an important asset that Romania brings to the table, contributing to the overall security framework and NATO’s collective posture in the region.

In July 2025, the current term of the Moldovan Parliament will expire. And also today, the Romanian President said that he will resign. What are the forecasts for the election results, and what are the Romanian expectations? Because the situation in both countries, Moldova and Romania, will change. Are there any risks of the ruling party losing its monopoly, and how could this affect the country's political future and its relations with Bucharest?

Okay, so there are several issues in your question. The first one is about the resignation of the President. It happens in order to prevent the far-right, which has pushed this campaign, from claiming any kind of victory. This has already been announced, so it is just a gesture to remove one issue from the table and leave the far-right without a purpose, without a subject. The Parliament will decide on the timeframe.

And yes, it seems obvious, based on several polls, that the party of Mrs. Maia Sandu, which has been re-elected, will not have a majority. It will have a plurality of votes, but it will need a partner to form a coalition. There are several options according to the current polling: one is to team up with a pro-European party, group, or alliance to form a majority; another option is to create a broader coalition, leading to a more complex political balance. And yes, this depends on different perspectives—if the electorate votes in favor of a pro-European majority and if it can be formed, then it will be relatively straightforward to establish a government and continue on the European path. If a broader coalition is needed, governance could become more challenging.

And, of course, there is a third option—though less probable—where pro-Russian, anti-European, neutralist, and other opposition parties join forces to isolate Maia Sandu’s party. In such a case, the situation will be much more difficult because even though Moldova has enshrined its European path in the Constitution following the referendum, we have seen examples where, despite such legal commitments—like in Georgia regarding EU and NATO accession—the government can still take a different direction. So, it is not an absolute guarantee that just because this path is in the Constitution, a government opposing it cannot try to reinterpret or undermine it.

In any case, the most credible scenario is that Maia Sandu’s party will share the majority with another pro-European party or alliance and will continue the EU path, albeit at different speeds depending on who joins the coalition.

In Romania, even the pro-Russian parties do not recognize that path. In Republic of Moldova, we do have. We have a former president and we have the socialists who are sharing those ideas.

How is the Republic of Moldova shaping its energy security policy considering its historical dependence on Russian gas? It was a huge problem. What role does Romania play in the diversification of energy sources and in reducing Moldova's economic vulnerability?

 In the case of the Republic of Moldova, they knew and wanted to detach from Russia’s dependency, and they have done so in regard to gas. Yes, we helped. We helped directly through the construction of pipelines that enable this. After that, the same company won the auction and is now managing the distribution of gas in the Republic of Moldova—West Mold Transgaz, as it is called.

That is one point. They now have a company that buys gas on the European market and brings it into the Republic of Moldova.

Regarding electricity, there is also a very important interconnection. We succeeded in supplying them with 80% of their domestic electricity needs when they faced problems due to Russian attacks on power plants in Ukraine, which could no longer provide energy. We supported them, and at the same time, two additional power lines are under construction to fully meet their electricity needs—of course, at market prices, at EU prices.

There is another part of the story, which concerns Transnistria. The Republic of Moldova, under the official authorities in Chișinău, and Transnistria have followed different paths, especially since Transnistria has been receiving Russian gas without any payment. At some point, this type of interdependency changed dramatically when Russia decided to cut off gas supplies, not honoring the contract between the Republic of Moldova and Russia for the gas that was supposed to be delivered to Transnistria.

Then, on January 1st of this year, Russia blocked the transportation of its gas via Ukraine. Now we are in a situation where the EU made an offer to the separatists to support them—an offer that was rejected on the basis that Russia would supply gas via a Hungarian company.

Another issue is that part of this gas was used to generate electricity at Moldavskaya GRES, a thermal power plant in the separatist region, and then sold to the right bank at significantly lower prices compared to market rates. As you correctly understood, the separatists never paid for gas—they just received it. Now, some form of compensation is necessary.

The Right bank is well-prepared to face any type of crisis. The problem lies in what happens on the Left bank (Transnistria) . The EU found a solution and offered 64 million euros to cover heating and gas needs for domestic consumption, including schools and hospitals—but not for economic activities, as all those companies must purchase gas at market prices.

At this point, even today, there was an understanding, but the separatists responded that they do not need assistance and will wait for Russian gas. They thanked Russia for the gas, and an agreement was reached allowing transportation via the Republic of Moldova.

Gagauzia is also a very interesting topic in international law. How does Romania view the future of Gagauzia? Even though Gagauzia is not part of Romania, it is located in Moldova. What possible scenarios exist for addressing issues related to the region's autonomy and its integration with Moldova’s statehood?

Gagauzia is part of Moldovan statehood. The Bashkan of Gagauzia is a member of the government of the Republic of Moldova. Gagauzia itself cannot survive without allocations from the government of the Republic of Moldova to support it because it is a region covering less than 3% of the territory and home to just 1% of the population. So, in reality, it is a tiny region inhabited by Turks with a Christian background who were resettled there during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. At that time, they were allowed by the Romanian authorities to settle in that area.

After the independence of the Republic of Moldova in 1992-1994, they initially followed the path of Transnistria, attempting a kind of separatism. However, it did not materialize. In the case of Gagauzia, there is a law on special status, which establishes how it is self-governing and defines its relationship with the state of the Republic of Moldova.

Romania’s position is that it is up to the Republic of Moldova to decide how to handle this issue, but there is no separatist threat similar to that of Transnistria. It is nothing of that kind.

Additionally, the authorities in Comrat—so, the regional authorities that are elected—are always monitoring negotiations with the separatist region of Transnistria in an attempt to replicate and extract similar advantages that Transnistria might negotiate with Chișinău. But once again, Gagauzia is not an issue on the table and has nothing to do with separatism in the way that it happened with Transnistria.

 

In which areas might Romania’s future position differ from the broader agenda of the European Union? What topics could become points of disagreement between Bucharest and Brussels? Because for some countries now, the rhetoric is changing, and there is growing confrontation between the EU and certain member states?

 No, I would say none. And that is because, for any point on the EU agenda, each and every member state must vote. So, actually, we cannot talk about the EU versus Romania or the EU versus any other country because, for an issue to become part of the EU agenda, it requires the approval of all member states, including Romania.

So, in reality, there is no such thing as "Bucharest versus Brussels" or any other capital versus the EU. It is simply a matter of how a particular government acts at a certain time. It happened with Poland at one point. It is happening with Hungary now. And recently, Slovakia has taken a different stance overnight due to election results. There are always skeptics or political forces that want to change the rules they initially agreed to, voted for, and embraced.

Sure, this could be a problem, and the European Union, particularly the European Commission, has all the necessary mechanisms to address such situations when a country decides to deviate from commitments it previously made. Governments change, and political perspectives may shift, but that does not mean a country can unilaterally change international agreements and treaties it has already committed to.

In such cases, breaching international law is not an option because treaty succession means that a new government does not have the right to discard international agreements each time there is a political transition. No. Governments must abide by the agreements they have signed, and any changes can only be made within the framework of policies they introduce while respecting existing commitments.

That is why there is no real possibility of a major rift, especially in Romania’s case, where we already have a coalition government that was voted in just a few months ago—two months ago, to be precise. Any changes would be marginal at best, certainly not ones that could fundamentally challenge EU policies in which we are fully engaged.