Since the early 2010s, Russia has witnessed a systematic tightening of living conditions for migrants, particularly those from Central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
This trend is evident both in official migration policy and in everyday societal attitudes. The escalation of repressive measures by state authorities, the growth of ethnic hatred, and the de facto impunity for acts of violence have created an environment in which migrants find themselves in a vulnerable and dependent position.
Since 2021, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs has intensified the practice of random inspections, raids, and detentions of migrants. According to the human rights center "Civic Assistance," the number of such operations has increased by more than 40% compared to 2018. Detentions often occur without sufficient legal grounds: even migrants with valid work permits and temporary registrations have their documents confiscated, face extortion, and are threatened with deportation. In the spring of 2023, large-scale raids were conducted at construction sites in Moscow, resulting in the detention of hundreds of migrants, many of whom held legal status but were nevertheless subjected to administrative pressure.
Simultaneously, a stigmatizing rhetoric portraying migrants as a potential threat is gaining strength. According to a 2022 Levada Center study, 60% of Russians express negative attitudes toward migrants, and nearly half believe that migrants "undermine Russian culture." These views are actively propagated through media and social networks, especially in the context of criminal incidents involving foreigners. For instance, a high-profile crime in 2023 in St. Petersburg, allegedly involving Tajik nationals, prompted a series of federal news segments emphasizing the ethnic background of the suspects, thereby exacerbating public tensions.
Particular attention should be paid to the intensified stigmatization of Azerbaijanis living in Russia in recent months. Despite their long-standing integration into Russian society and significant contribution to the economy, the wave of repression following the tragic events in Yekaterinburg on June 27, 2025, has taken on the character of a targeted ethnic campaign. The conflict led to the deaths of two Azerbaijani men—brothers of prominent journalist Seyfaddin Guseynli—and several others were injured. Nearly a month later, a sweeping wave of detentions continues, often lacking clear legal justification.
One recent example includes the arrest of Azerbaijani entrepreneur Elvin Shukyurov, accused of participating in the illicit production of counterfeit alcohol in Pervouralsk. However, human rights activists and representatives of the Azerbaijani diaspora point to the absence of reliable evidence and interpret the case as part of the broader pressure campaign against the ethnic group. Although formally framed as a crackdown on illegal business activity, such measures are increasingly viewed through the lens of ethnic profiling, especially in the context of rising interethnic tensions and selective law enforcement.
Anti-Azerbaijani rhetoric and actions by Russian law enforcement inflict not only direct harm on individual citizens but also undermine the foundations of bilateral relations between Russia and Azerbaijan.
Russia is home to hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis, many of whom are citizens, entrepreneurs, and students. Under current conditions, they report feeling unsafe, facing frequent police checks, societal condemnation, and economic pressure. It is important to note that the bulk of labor migrants traditionally come from CIS countries. As of the end of 2024, the leading countries of origin were Uzbekistan (23.3%), Tajikistan (16.7%), Kyrgyzstan (10.4%), and Belarus (9.5%). Based on these figures, approximately three million migrants in Russia originate from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.
Russia’s current migration policy exhibits not only a regional but also a distinctly centralized character. It increasingly reflects a dual approach: on one hand, the overt recruitment of foreign labor to offset demographic and workforce deficits; on the other, a growing repressive stance, ethnically selective stigmatization, and political instrumentalization of migrants.
A telling example is the initiative by authorities in Sverdlovsk Oblast, where, according to Deputy Governor Dmitry Besedin, plans are underway to attract up to one million labor migrants from India. The rationale cited is an acute labor shortage in metallurgy and mechanical engineering, attributed both to the mobilization of part of the workforce for military purposes and to younger generations' reluctance to work in industrial sectors. Besedin referred to this as the result of an “ideological mistake” of the past, effectively blaming cultural and educational trends. In this context, labor migration becomes not merely an economic necessity but a political tool—an attempt to offset the consequences of militarization through external labor resources.
Symbolically, a new Indian Consulate General is set to open in Yekaterinburg to coordinate labor migration. Simultaneously, there is mention of possible recruitment from Sri Lanka and even North Korea—a country under international sanctions and known for its forced labor practices. This broad geographic scope of migration policy indicates the Russian government's willingness to tap into any labor source, including extremely vulnerable and dependent populations.
In light of this, serious concerns arise that migrants may be used not only for economic purposes but also within a politico-military agenda. Independent media have previously reported cases of coercion of migrants to sign military contracts, under threats of deportation, loss of documentation, or physical violence. Reports have surfaced of beatings of migrants who refused to enlist. While these claims have not been officially confirmed, the growing number of such incidents documented by human rights organizations suggests that coercive pressure on vulnerable ethnic groups is a real and escalating issue.
Economic pressure on migrants continues to mount. In July 2025, the Russian State Duma passed a law increasing state fees for foreign nationals and stateless persons. One of the key changes was more than a twofold increase in the fee for residential registration. These measures significantly raise the cost of legalizing one's stay and effectively limit migrants’ access to lawful employment.
Of particular concern is the transfer of authority over the issuance of work visas for foreign nationals from migration services to the Federal Security Service (FSB). This shift reflects the framing of labor migration not as an administrative or economic matter but as an issue of national security. Under this model, the FSB gains virtually unrestricted access to applicants’ personal data, including communications in messaging apps and on social media. Such practices threaten both the right to privacy and the fundamental guarantees of data protection.
Russia’s migration policy is becoming increasingly one-sided, characterized by systematic tightening of control measures, discrimination, and repression targeting migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus. This strategy not only exacerbates internal social tensions but also seriously damages Russia’s bilateral relations with several regional states, including Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics.