After World War II a war-torn world, desperate for a just and lasting peace, bet everything on institutional mediation. International and regional organizations were set up to smooth out conflicts, prevent escalation and offer peaceful ways. The UN became the universal platform for collective security and diplomatic horse-trading. NATO functioned as a military-political containment tool within a broader balance of power. The OSCE was designed as a regional mechanism for dialogue, early warning and conflict settlement.

Despite their different mandates, all these bodies shared one core job which is to act as intermediaries, laying down rules, procedures and forums to manage disputes.

Today that illusion is being systematically dismantled by reality. Mechanisms built to contain conflict have turned out to be too slow, too formal and ultimately too weak to impact the moves of the main actors.

Over the last few years regional power balances have shifted beyond recognition. The old equilibria that global institutions relied on have simply dissolved. New centers of influence have consolidated power through direct military presence, economic leverage, and ad-hoc multilateral coalitions born out of immediate necessity. States that once had to run everything through multiple layers of approval no longer wait for collective guarantees yet they act on the strength of the moment and their ability to defend their interests directly.

The role of regional actors has exploded. Back in the 2000s analysts were already warning that countries with local military muscle, economic weight, or strategic geography would increasingly ignore UN decisions and major blocs like NATO. Regions are acquiring their own political and economic gravity, while formal multilateral structures are more and more reduced to spectators. Conflicts are now settled not through negotiated rules but through the capacity to maneuver, evade external pressure and mobilize local power resources.

The Karabakh conflict is one of the clearest illustrations. The OSCE Minsk Group, tasked with resolving the dispute on the basis of international law and UN resolutions, existed for nearly thirty years without ever bringing the sides closer to a political settlement. The format survived mostly out of inertia rather than effectiveness.

After the Second Karabakh War it lost all relevance and was effectively dissolved, which is a stark demonstration that classic mediation cannot adapt to a changed balance of power and regional realities.

The same pattern is visible in the Russia–Ukraine war. The conflict had been simmering since 2014, yet its scale and momentum still caught much of the world off guard and once again proved that traditional mediation mechanisms no longer function. The UN is bogged down in bureaucracy, the Security Council is paralyzed by vetoes, NATO, being a military alliance, is structurally limited in mediation and settlement roles, and the EU has failed to produce a unified, effective response to a full-scale war on its own continent.

Making matters worse, the new U.S. security doctrine puts Washington’s own interests and homeland security first. America has effectively stepped back from directly managing European conflicts. Donald Trump’s repeated calls for others to take responsibility for their own security have left Europe staring down threats and instability on its own.

As global intermediaries lose clout, regional alliances and coalitions built not on formal procedures but on raw pragmatism, power and interests are taking center stage. These groupings form around the current distribution of strength, economic ties, and the most plausible future scenarios. They are flexible, fast to adapt and capable of reallocating resources on the fly.

This is no longer just about rising influence but is a complete reconfiguration of regional relational architecture. In Eurasia Turkey has long pursued an assertive foreign policy rooted in military capability, economic footprint and national identity. It has strengthened its hand in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus. Beyond direct military engagement, Ankara pushes strategic transport and energy corridors, deepens ties and forges alliances. Its partnership with Azerbaijan has long transcended symbolic friendship as Turkey supplied critical defense systems and drones during the Karabakh conflict and has since become an indispensable transit route for Caspian energy and logistics.

The same logic drives the growing convergence between the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan has steadily positioned itself as a key connecting and coordinating hub, becoming a full participant in Central Asian leaders’ consultative summits. This shows how states are building durable links based on geography, transport potential, and aligned strategic interests.

Straddling the Caspian and the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan has effectively turned itself into a regional bridge, linking Central Asian economies to external markets and infrastructure.

This alignment is happening outside the old global mediation frameworks through practical coordination in formats like the Organization of Turkic States, joint infrastructure initiatives such as the Middle Corridor and synchronized logistics chains. The emphasis here is not on political declarations but on tangible transport and trade corridors that directly boost regional autonomy and reduce reliance on outside power centers. By rethinking regional policy these countries are laying a new, practical foundation for cooperation grounded in large-scale shared projects where strategic interests find concrete expression.

The South Caucasus itself merits special attention. With the Karabakh issue resolved and the first steps toward dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia, space is opening for more pragmatic regional interaction. We are not yet talking about rapid deep integration or swift political rapprochement. However, persistent regional instability is forcing states to look for points of contact. Geopolitical pressure from major external actors, turbulence in the Middle East, uncertainty around Iran and the erosion of previous security guarantors make isolation an increasingly untenable strategy. Even limited cooperation in transport and energy already serves as a tool to lower vulnerability.

Restoring frozen regional connections and opening transport links can transform the South Caucasus from a zone of rivalry into a transit hub integrated into global routes.

For Azerbaijan this means expanded logistics reach and a stronger role as regional coordinator. For Armenia it offers reduced dependence on a narrow set of external partners and an exit from isolation. For Georgia it reinforces its position as the region’s transport and trade backbone.

Crucially, this prospect is emerging not under pressure from international mediators or within imposed formats, but as a direct consequence of the shifted balance of power and a sober reading of risks. The region has come to understand that in the current conditions stability depends not on great powers from outside, but on the ability of states themselves to build workable (even if limited) mechanisms of interaction.

Zooming out, what we are witnessing is not merely a crisis of individual institutions but the collapse of the familiar logic of world politics. Universal rules that once seemed to apply everywhere no longer function uniformly across regions.

Foreign policy is increasingly built not around resolutions and declarations but around very concrete assets: routes, ports, energy flows, supply chains, cables. These shifts are already being captured in academic analysis. The Global Neighbours Policy Brief introduces the term multipolar anarchy – a new type of international order in which traditional institutional structures are steadily losing their regulatory power. In their place regional orders and competing centers of influence are rising. States, especially middle and small powers, increasingly rely on regional alliances, flexible formats and coalitions of convenience.

In this framework global organizations cease to be the primary source of guarantees. They are being replaced by pragmatic, regionally tailored models of security and cooperation designed for specific threats and future scenarios. It is these models that determine who remains resilient in crisis and who stays dependent on external decisions. The capacity to keep functioning when the surrounding environment turns volatile has become a critical asset.

In that sense, great-power politics without intermediaries is rapidly becoming the new normal. The world has not become more peaceful. It has become far more fragmented. Decisions are increasingly made not on universal platforms but at the regional level. Wherever strength and self-interest align, new resilient hubs are forming, and they, not the old centers, will call the shots in global affairs from now on.