STEM present the interview with Georgian political scientist, expert on international relations and regional security, former Deputy Minister of Defense of Georgia Giorgi Muchaidze.

- Amid the reformatting of regional logistics, Russia has proposed that Georgia consider participation in the North-South transport corridor. Do you consider this an attempt by Moscow to draw Tbilisi into its zone of influence through the economy? How realistic is it for Georgia to integrate into this architecture without compromising its course towards Euro-Atlantic integration?

-It is certainly not in Georgia's national interest to participate in projects promoted by Russia — a country that occupies 20% of its territory and has, for decades, sought to isolate the South Caucasus from the West and bring the region under its control. The North–South Transport Corridor is not merely an economic initiative; Georgia's participation in this project would constitute a political statement — one that aligns the country with Russia amid its ongoing brutal aggression in Ukraine and the West's continued efforts to curb the Kremlin's economic and military capabilities through robust sanctions. If such a step is taken by Ivanishvili's regime, it will further distance Georgia from its Euro-Atlantic integration path.

 - How do you assess Georgia's current foreign policy positioning against the backdrop of increasing geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus between the West, Russia, Turkey, Iran and China? What is Tbilisi's strategy in the context of the new multipolarity?

-Firstly, it is important to underline that the legitimacy of the 2024 parliamentary elections — and, by extension, the rule of Georgian Dream — is recognized neither by the West nor by a significant portion of the Georgian electorate. The unlawful imprisonment of opposition leaders, brutal beatings and prosecutions of peaceful protesters, and ongoing attacks on NGOs and critical media all point to a captured state. Its institutions no longer serve the national interest, but rather the interests of the Georgian Dream (GD) party and its honorary chairman, Bidzina Ivanishvili, in remaining in power indefinitely. Anti-Western propaganda that blames the West for provoking conflict with Russia, the so-called "foreign agent" law, and deliberate efforts to eliminate pro-Western opposition — all set against a reconciliatory tone toward the Kremlin and rapid autocratic consolidation — make clear that GD is not pursuing a balanced, multi-vector foreign policy, but is instead charting a pro-Russian course.

 - The internal political crisis in Armenia is deepening: Pashinyan's confrontation with the church, the opposition and the Karabakh electorate is intensifying against the backdrop of cooling with Moscow. To what extent is unstable Armenia beneficial to Russia and how does this affect the balance of power in the region? Is Georgia becoming more vulnerable against the backdrop of this turbulence?

-Both in Armenia and Georgia, numerous pro-Russian actors operate across different sectors of society. Among the most influential institutions is the Church, which — since Soviet times — has been consistently and effectively infiltrated by Soviet and later Russian security services. Russian-made billionaires of local origin often have ties to the Kremlin and serve as instruments of Russia's hybrid warfare across all three South Caucasus countries.

Armenia's rapidly deepening cooperation with the EU and the West more broadly, along with its ongoing normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, increases Yerevan's chances of breaking free from Russia's sphere of influence and reducing its dependence on Russian military presence. To prevent these trends from materializing, Moscow is resorting to its long-favored tactic of control through managed destabilization, aiming to increase its leverage in Armenia and potentially replace Pashinyan's government with a more pro-Russian regime.

Increased Russian influence in the South Caucasus would not only endanger Georgia, but also make Azerbaijan more vulnerable to Moscow's destabilization strategies.

 - Many experts note that Russia is losing control over Armenia, but is trying to compensate for this by increasing its influence on Georgia. Is it possible to talk about restarting the "Russian game" in Tbilisi through soft power and infrastructure proposals? Where, in your opinion, are the "red lines" for Georgian foreign policy in relations with the Kremlin?

-In Georgia, power is already concentrated in the hands of Bidzina Ivanishvili — a Russian oligarch of Georgian origin — who, since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has become openly anti-Western. In November 2024, against the will of the vast majority of Georgians, his GD party suspended the country's EU integration process. The United States sanctioned Ivanishvili in December 2024. According to the U.S. State Department, his actions "have enabled human rights abuses and undermined the democratic and European future of the Georgian people for the benefit of the Russian Federation." In February 2025, the European Parliament followed suit, overwhelmingly adopting a resolution on Georgia that called on the European Council and EU Member States to impose extensive sanctions on Ivanishvili, his family members, and other enablers of the Georgian Dream regime. The resolution also expressed serious concern over Russia's growing influence in Georgia and the ruling party's increasingly hostile anti-Western rhetoric.

Thus, some red lines have already been crossed by the Georgian Dream. Others may soon follow: restoring the diplomatic relations with Russia and joining the "3+3 Regional Cooperation Platform"; suspension of Georgia's NATO integration process; and the opening of the Trans-Caucasian railway line, connecting the South Caucasus to Russia via Georgia's Russian-occupied Abkhazian region.

- After the end of the armed conflict in Karabakh, Baku is actively promoting the concept of a "post-war World" and regional integration. At the same time, Armenia is actually turning to the West. Do you think that Georgia can become a platform for the formation of a new regional architecture - outside the zones of influence of Russia and Iran? Or is such a scenario still unachievable?

- It is in Georgia's core national interest to enhance regional cooperation among the three South Caucasus republics and to establish an appropriate framework for such interaction outside the spheres of influence of Russia and Iran. However, this goal appears unachievable under the rule of Georgian Dream, as Ivanishvili's party is increasingly pivoting toward Russia and effectively acting as its proxy, while simultaneously deepening ties with the Iranian regime.

- Russia is actively increasing its military presence in Abkhazia, using South Ossetia as a channel for illegal trade and influencing the region's energy infrastructure. Could the strengthening of the Russian military component on the southern flank once again transform Georgia's foreign policy from pragmatic to defensive?

- As long as Georgia remains under the rule of Georgian Dream, one should expect it to continue pivoting toward Russia and consistently adopting positions designed to avoid irritating the Kremlin.

- What risks does the rapprochement between Armenia and the West in the format of bypassing Russia pose for Georgia, in particular, in matters of military cooperation with France and the EU? Will this not lead to increased conflict in the region, into which Georgia will be forced to be drawn, despite its position of "moderate neutrality"?

- I would not describe Georgia's current situation as "moderate neutrality." It is more accurately characterized as a distancing from the West and democracy, and a return to the Russian orbit. Rapprochement between Armenia and the West — and the increasing presence of Western influence in the region — serves Georgia's national interests, as the United States and Europe have been the crucial actors balancing Russia's power in the South Caucasus since the end of the Cold War, preventing its complete dominance.

 - How do you assess the prospects for a regional format of three countries - Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey - in the context of Armenia's geopolitical isolation and lost trust in Russia? Is this union capable of developing into something more than just a transit and energy partnership?

-The regional cooperation format between Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey has already yielded fruitful results, and its further enhancement — including infrastructure development and modernization — would benefit all three countries. Military cooperation among this trio can also be deepened.

As for Armenia, I do not believe that isolating one of the South Caucasus countries serves the region's security and prosperity interests — especially now that the Karabakh conflict has been largely resolved. A small, isolated country will always seek a powerful external patron, and in Armenia's case, that patron is far more likely to be Iran or Russia than anyone else. Therefore, it would be both prudent and mutually beneficial to create an alternative regional cooperation format to the "3+3 platform" — one that includes Armenia and ensures appropriate engagement by the West instead of Russia.

 - Do you think that in the context of Russia's protracted war against Ukraine, the countries of the South Caucasus have received a "strategic window of opportunity" to reorient their foreign policy? Who took advantage of this and how?

-It is becoming increasingly evident that, with its attention and resources focused on Ukraine, the Kremlin lacks the capacity to steer developments in the South Caucasus according to its preferences. Another no less significant shift is the so-called “Zeitenwende” moment in the West — a full realization that Russia is determined to dismantle the rules-based international order and aggressively assert its spheres of influence in Europe and beyond. With the United States becoming more inward-looking, this has pushed the European Union to assume a more geopolitical role, opening a "strategic window of opportunity" for Georgia to pursue fast-track EU membership — a path that, unfortunately, Ivanishvili's regime has refused to follow.

This shift has also created a faster EU integration opportunity for Armenia. After losing the war over Karabakh — and with it, trust in Russia as a protector — Prime Minister Pashinyan's government now views Russia's weakness and increased Western interest as a unique chance to resolve longstanding regional disputes, normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and exit Moscow's sphere of influence.

Russia's failure to admit responsibility or offer adequate compensation after shooting down an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft — as well as following the deaths of two Azerbaijani citizens at the hands of Russian police — has further opened Baku's eyes. Moscow is increasingly seen not as a trustworthy partner, but as a power that continues to treat its smaller neighbors as vassals. Now is the moment to resolve all outstanding issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan through Turkish and Western engagement — without Russian mediation — thereby further reducing Moscow's influence in the region.