Following the energy shock caused by the war in Ukraine, Europe is reconsidering the very foundations of its energy and transit policy. The focus is shifting from maximum supply volumes to resilience, diversification, and the ability of systems to withstand political and market pressure. In this context, the role of the South Caucasus countries and Turkey has grown significantly—without grandiose statements, but with real strategic impact.

Azerbaijan is increasingly seen as an important element of the EU's new energy security architecture: not as a replacement for the previous major suppliers, but as a source of flexibility, connectivity, and optionality. The Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey nexus, the prospects for Caspian transit, the development of the Southern Gas Corridor and the Middle Corridor, and interaction with Central Asia and the Middle East form a complex but increasingly sought-after configuration.

STEM presents an exclusive interview with Turkish expert, Chairman of the London Energy Club, former Turkish diplomat, and former OECD/IEA senior executive Mehmet Öğütçü.

-How do you assess Azerbaijan’s current role in ensuring Europe’s energy security? Could it become a key EU energy hub in the medium term?

-Let’s be honesty. Azerbaijan is not, and will not become, a systemic pillar of European energy security comparable to Russia in the past or Norway today. But that framing misses the point. In today’s European energy doctrine, Azerbaijan has emerged as a meaningful “marginal security supplier,” and marginal supply now carries strategic weight far beyond its volume.

Since the Ukraine war, Europe’s energy challenge has shifted decisively. The central issue is no longer abundance but resilience. Europe no longer asks who supplies the most gas, but who reduces exposure to coercion, sudden disruption and political leverage. In that context, Azerbaijani gas delivered via the Southern Gas Corridor has acquired real strategic value. Around 13 billion cubic metres flowed to Europe last year, roughly half of Azerbaijan’s total gas exports.

These volumes cannot replace Russia, but they are sufficient to stabilise South-East Europe, support Italy and the Balkans, and—crucially—strengthen the EU’s bargaining position across LNG procurement, storage strategy and contract negotiations.

The question of whether Azerbaijan can become an “energy hub” depends entirely on definition. As a physical gas trading hub comparable to the Netherlands, the answer is no. The corridor’s capacity is constrained, upstream growth is incremental, and the system was never designed for large-scale hub trading. But as a connector hub—linking gas, electricity, future hydrogen-ready corridors and transit diplomacy between the Caspian, Türkiye and Europe—the ambition is realistic. In Europe’s new energy logic, connectivity increasingly matters as much as capacity.

-How does the EU view the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Türkiye link in terms of reliability and energy security, especially when linked to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan across the Caspian?

-From Brussels’ perspective, the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Türkiye axis has quietly moved from the periphery to the core of Europe’s post-Ukraine energy architecture. It is no longer seen as a geopolitical experiment or a symbolic diversification gesture, but as a reliability corridor that fits the EU’s emerging doctrine: fewer chokepoints, fewer monopolies, more routes and more options.

The EU’s assessment rests on three pillars. The first is political diversification. Europe’s overdependence on Russian gas exposed the risks of concentrating supply in a single actor and a narrow set of pipelines. The southern corridor disperses that risk across several sovereign states with overlapping but not identical interests. For Brussels, reliability today is not defined by the absence of tension, but by the absence of monopoly power.

The second pillar is behaviour under stress. Azerbaijan honoured its contractual commitments even during the peak of the 2022–2023 energy shock. Georgia remained a stable transit country despite regional volatility. Türkiye, despite its complex and often transactional relationship with the EU, ensured uninterrupted transit while massively expanding LNG terminals, storage capacity and network flexibility. In Brussels, this operational record counts more than political alignment or rhetoric.

The third pillar is realism. No one in the EU believes the Southern Gas Corridor can replace Russian gas. Capacity limits and capital requirements are well understood. That is precisely why the corridor is framed as structural insurance rather than substitution. Marginal volumes matter disproportionately in tight markets, and diversification strengthens Europe’s negotiating leverage across the system.

When EU thinking extends eastward across the Caspian to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the tone becomes more cautious but remains strategically open. Brussels does not assume that a large trans-Caspian gas pipeline will materialise quickly, or at all. Instead, the EU increasingly favours modular integration: oil and refined product flows, swaps, regional balancing, seasonal optimisation and, over time, electricity transmission and hydrogen-ready infrastructure. What matters is not headline capacity, but whether additional Caspian energy can reach Europe without introducing new geopolitical fragilities.

-In what areas could Azerbaijan and Türkiye realistically implement joint projects in Syria?

-The temptation is always to talk about grand reconstruction plans, but realism dictates a more modest approach. Joint Azerbaijani–Turkish projects in Syria are technically feasible but politically and financially constrained. Success depends less on engineering capacity than on sanctions compliance, security guarantees and governance clarity.

Electricity is the most promising entry point. Grid stabilisation, substation rehabilitation and distribution upgrades deliver immediate humanitarian and economic benefits while keeping political exposure low. Fuel logistics and border-adjacent supply chains are also realistic, particularly where Türkiye already has operational reach. Reconstruction enablers such as cement, steel, modular housing, water pumping and small-scale generation for hospitals and municipal services make sense if projects are phased, geographically limited and carefully structured.

The binding constraints are well known: who controls territory, how contractors are protected, whether financing and insurance pass OFAC and EU compliance tests, and whether there is a recognised authority able to sign and honour contracts. Under current conditions, incremental, modular infrastructure is far more realistic than national-scale energy projects.

-What role can Azerbaijan play in the Middle East? Can it become a bridge between the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia?

-Azerbaijan’s comparative advantage is not power projection into the Middle East, but connectivity. Baku’s strength lies in quietly linking systems that do not always trust one another. In energy, this means steady Caspian supply complemented by selective swaps and blending arrangements that are commercially useful and geopolitically stabilising. In transit, Azerbaijan anchors the Caspian crossing of the East–West chain, where ports, ferries, rail interfaces and customs efficiency matter more than grand strategy.

Diplomatically, Azerbaijan has positioned itself as a transaction-friendly convenor. It can connect Gulf capital, Turkish logistics and Central Asian resources in settings where discretion is valued and politics are sensitive. This role aligns well with Brussels’ growing emphasis on resilience and pragmatic connectivity rather than ideological alignment.

-What are the common energy interests of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and how promising is Caspian cooperation?

-Their shared objective is straightforward: reducing dependence on a single export route and a single geopolitical gatekeeper. The Caspian offers that optionality, though it is not a panacea. Oil and refined product flows across the Caspian are already practical and scalable. Gas is more complex. Large-scale trans-Caspian pipelines remain politically sensitive and capital-intensive. In the near term, swaps, regional balancing mechanisms, electricity transmission and corridor-based financing are simply more realistic. Over time, clean-energy trade and hydrogen-ready infrastructure may prove more transformative than gas alone.

-What does “energy balance” mean today for Türkiye and Europe? Has EU diversification truly worked? Can the Southern Gas Corridor play a bigger role?

-Energy balance today means managing four objectives simultaneously: security, affordability, emissions and sovereignty. For the EU, diversification has been substantial. Russian pipeline gas has collapsed from pre-war dominance to a marginal share, replaced by LNG, demand reduction and alternative pipelines. Yet diversification has come at a cost: higher volatility, infrastructure stress and political tension over residual Russian LNG flows.

For Türkiye, balance means optionality. Ankara has deliberately invested in LNG terminals, underground storage and pipeline flexibility not only to secure supply but to monetise geography. Türkiye’s ambition is not merely to consume gas, but to extract commercial and strategic value from being a crossroads.

The Southern Gas Corridor can contribute more, but only at the margin unless expanded. Its true strength lies in route diversity and contractual reliability. It should be understood as a permanent insurance mechanism rather than a replacement corridor.

-What is the strategic significance of the Absheron field for Azerbaijan and Europe?

-Absheron matters precisely because it is incremental. Its first phase strengthens Azerbaijan’s domestic supply base and improves system resilience, freeing up other volumes for export. But it cannot offset the loss of Russian gas to Europe. The scale gap is simply too large. Absheron’s value lies in flexibility, resilience and marginal export capacity—not transformation.

-What is the real share of Russian gas in Europe today, and where is the trend heading?

-The direction of travel is unmistakable. Russian gas has fallen from roughly 45 percent of EU imports before the war to low-teen percentages by late 2025. Pipeline flows are now marginal, while LNG has become the residual channel, albeit under increasing political pressure. EU legislation and policy momentum point toward a full phase-out of Russian gas by 2027, with LNG targeted first and pipelines to follow. The transition will be uneven, but the strategic intent is clear: dependency on Russian energy is no longer considered acceptable risk.

-What role does Türkiye play in the Middle Corridor, and what must be done to fully launch it?

-Türkiye is the western anchor of the Middle Corridor. Without seamless integration into Turkish railways, ports and customs systems, the corridor remains an idea rather than an EU-grade route. The challenge today is not vision, but execution. Institutional friction must be reduced through digital customs, predictable tariffs and joint governance mechanisms. Infrastructure bottlenecks at Caspian ports, rail ferries and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars interfaces must be addressed with discipline rather than slogans.

What has changed since 2022 is that Brussels no longer treats the Middle Corridor as a geopolitical concept. It is increasingly framed as an investment proposition and a resilience asset. Cargo volumes have multiplied since the war, and if governance reform keeps pace, the corridor could become a permanent feature of Eurasian trade.

Azerbaijan and Türkiye will not reshape Europe’s energy system on their own. But together, they shape its margins—and in today’s fragmented energy order, it is the margins that increasingly decide outcomes.