Interview with political scientist, member of the Institute for Complex and Innovative Studies at the University of Waterloo, fellow at the Canadian International Council, and former senior research fellow at the Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University, Robert Cutler.

- How do you assess the current state of the international system? In the context of global rivalry between the US, China, and Russia, which scenarios do you consider most likely in the next 5 years?

-The global system continues to undergo structural transformation, as well as by increasing contestation over norms, influence, and institutional legitimacy. As the United States and the China–Russia–Iran axis pursue overlapping and often incompatible agendas, their rivalry is no longer bounded by clear rules. Consequently, it plays out through economic policy tools, information warfare, and indirect competition in transit regions and emerging markets.

This rivalry will increasingly define the strategic environment, particularly through competition in technological standards, economic statecraft, and networked regional influence. Russia's invasion of Ukraine constrained its power-projection elsewhere, but it remains a disruptive actor with outsized influence in regions such as the South Caucasus and Central Asia. In the next five years, the economic conflict especially between the U.S. and China will deepen, as each tries to hobble the other's economy. Goods from China tariffed by the U.S. will flood the developing countries, bankrupting some of their domestic industries. The EU's eurozone will also come under pressure, and sooner rather than later.

A condition of bifurcation may continue to emerge, where parallel institutions, value systems, and connectivity frameworks coexist uneasily. This fragmentation will be marked by competition over logistical corridors, critical infrastructure, and digital sovereignty, particularly in transit regions such as the Caspian and Central Eurasia.

Barring some unexpected resolution of the U.S.–China confrontation, a full systemic crisis will arrive in the early 2030s, leading to the dissolution of the current international system during the early/mid-2040s. A dozen years of what looks like chaos will then follow (like the dozen years after the end of the Cold War) before the successor international system slowly begins to take shape from the bottom up, with top-down constraints imposed by the interests and the power-projection capabilities of the remaining global and regional powers.

- What challenges do small states face today in the context of increasing geopolitical polarization? Do they have real room to maneuver?

-The capacity of small and medium powers to navigate this bifurcation will define the operational realities of the international system. In the present context, where strategic ambiguity is often harder to sustain, small states in general face renewed pressure to declare their loyalties. With notable exceptions like Azerbaijan, the intensification of geopolitical and geoeconomic fault lines significantly complicates life for small powers that seek to balance among competing blocs without incurring reputational or material costs.

However, this pressure also creates space for strategic creativity. Countries with coherent foreign policy strategies and diversified external ties can sometimes act as brokers or connectors. Azerbaijan is a case in point. The real challenge for small states lies in the cultivation and maintenance of institutional resilience and diplomatic agility. Without those, the margin for maneuver or "strategic hedging" narrows considerably.

- How do you assess the post-conflict situation in Karabakh and the prospects for sustainable peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia?

- The immediate military phase of the conflict over Karabakh may have concluded, but the political and psychological dimensions remain unresolved. Azerbaijan has restored territorial integrity, while Armenia is readjusting its internal governance as well as its foreign policy orientation. The emotional legacies of the war, combined with unresolved border and transit issues, continue to generate uncertainty.

In this context, peace is not simply the absence of war but the construction of mutual confidence. For that to happen, both sides must navigate difficult domestic politics while engaging clearly and consistently in international processes. External actors can facilitate a solution, but they cannot impose one that would be durable. The region is standing now at a crossroads; the choice is between materializing a faith in the construction of new cooperative structures and risking a reversion to cycles of distrust and instability.

- How has Azerbaijan's position on the international arena changed after the events of 2020 and 2023?

-Azerbaijan has emerged from the recent phase of conflict in a strengthened geopolitical position. Its assertive diplomacy and restoration of control over Karabakh have enhanced its leverage. Baku is now more than a regional player: it is increasingly viewed as a connector state with agency in multilateral formats, including in the context of Europe's search for energy diversification and regional transport resilience.

At the same time, Azerbaijan has fallen under greater scrutiny. Its long-term regional vision is unclear, at least to those outside the region. This should be articulated with diplomatic sensitivity on the basis of the country's growing strategic weight. The window is open for Baku to shape a stable post-conflict order, but doing so will require careful management of both domestic development and international perceptions.

- What role do Turkey and Iran have in the region, and how does this affect the balance of interests between Russia, the EU and China?

-Turkey has significantly increased its presence across the South Caucasus and into Central Asia. Its partnerships, most notably but not only with Azerbaijan, give Ankara a leading voice in regional developments, including those related to infrastructure and defense. This expanded footprint positions Turkey as a balancing actor, especially in areas where Western institutions have limited traction.

Iran's role is more reactive, though no less important. Tehran sees the South Caucasus through the lens of border security and geopolitical containment. It seeks to prevent "encirclement" and does not like any corridor projects that would diminish its own transit significance. The behavior of these two regional powers introduces another layer of complexity to the broader Eurasian balance. Russia, China, and the EU must continuously adjust their approaches in response.

- What is the strategic importance of the Zangezur corridor, and what consequences could its opening have for the transport architecture of the region?

-The Zangezur corridor has become a symbol of geopolitical and logistical reconfiguration. If realized with mutual participation, it has the potential to streamline east–west trade flows further, by directly connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan and Turkey, while also improving access to Central Asia for European and Anatolian markets. It could strengthen the Middle Corridor and reinforce the logic of Eurasian connectivity beyond traditional north–south routes.

- Can we talk about the formation of a new regional alliance between Azerbaijan, Turkey and the Central Asian countries (for example, within the framework of the OTS/Turkic Council)?

-The Organization of Turkic States is evolving into a more structured framework, with aspirations that go beyond cultural affinity. It does not yet constitute a strategic alliance in the military sense, it functions increasingly as a platform for political coordination, economic harmonization, and infrastructure development. Azerbaijan and Turkey are at the forefront of this evolution, with Central Asian countries deepening their participation.

- How do you see China's role in Central Asia after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and against the backdrop of the Belt and Road Initiative?

-China’s role in Central Asia, following the U.S. exit from Afghanistan, now approximates strategic entrenchment rather than partnership. The Middle Corridor, while framed as logistical infrastructure, functions increasingly as a delivery system for Chinese modes of control—surveillance, data capture, and administrative replication. Procurement opacity conceals technologies modeled on Beijing’s domestic regime: centralized telecoms, algorithmic monitoring, and smart-city grids operated by state-linked firms.

These are not neutral instruments. They instantiate vertical dependency. The telecom architecture routes data toward Chinese oversight; surveillance systems reflect Xinjiang's internal security logic. Through infrastructure, China builds bureaucratic interfaces that tether local systems to its own. The objective is integration under conditions favorable to Chinese authority—political, technical, and normative. What arrives as development embeds control. Central Asian actors continue to confront a China that does not hesitate to narrow their sovereignty. China has merely added the silent architecture of its exported systems to the menu of its instruments.

- Is competition for influence in the region between China, Russia and the West intensifying, and in what form is it manifesting itself?

-Yes, the competition has broadened beyond traditional military or ideological fronts. What we see now is a contest of infrastructure models, value propositions, and institutional templates. Russia continues to rely on legacy relationships and regional security frameworks. China promotes development-oriented engagement. The West, particularly the EU, is increasingly present in the connectivity and governance space.

This competition is most evident in how different countries in the region position themselves within and across multiple overlapping partnerships in diverse economic sectors: energy, digital networks, and transport corridors, to name only three. This competition is less a zero-sum rivalry than a multidimensional tug-of-war where influence comes from access, investment, and normative persuasion. The result is a region marked by plural allegiances and layered dependencies.

- How do you assess the security of transport and energy corridors passing through the South Caucasus and Central Asia, especially against the backdrop of instability in Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East?

- Corridor security in the region is a function of both geography and geopolitics. The South Caucasus remains relatively stable but not immune to disruption, particularly if diplomatic tensions escalate. Central Asia’s transport corridors are increasingly valuable, but they pass through zones where institutional capacity varies. Also in Central Asia, external shocks—for example, from Afghanistan or the Middle East—can still have ripple effects.

That said, efforts are being made to fortify the resilience of the corridors' infrastructure through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The Middle Corridor has especially seen renewed attention from European and Asian actors. Technical improvements alone are, however, insufficient. Political coordination and strategic foresight are necessary to guarantee that these corridors remain not only open but also reliably secure, particularly in the current, rapidly changing global environment.