On February 12, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Overchuk, a figure known for overseeing Russia’s engagement in the South Caucasus, signaled Moscow’s intention to begin negotiations on restoring two key railway links in Armenia, a move that could reshape regional connectivity across the South Caucasus.

The proposed restoration would reconnect Armenian rail infrastructure with Azerbaijan near Yeraskh and with Turkey near Akhuryan. The railway sections planned for restoration are relatively short, approximately 1.6 km and 12.4 km, but their strategic significance could be considerable. Overchuk noted the project would allow Russia to establish rail links with Azerbaijan and Turkey, providing access to Mediterranean ports, with Iran, and opening routes toward the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Interesting, too, was the Deputy PM’s insistence that Russia’s involvement comes at the request of the Armenian side, highlighting what he described as Yerevan’s continued trust in Russian technical expertise and infrastructure capabilities.

Overchuk’s comments came against the backdrop of a sharper message from Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova earlier that day, who warned that Armenia risks becoming a ‘testing ground’ for unproven American technologies, a remark reflecting Moscow’s growing unease over Yerevan’s increasing cooperation with the United States.
Zakharova also questioned Armenia’s decision to consider U.S. nuclear technology for 9 billion dollars, arguing that some of the small reactor technologies proposed by Washington currently exist only “on paper.” 

She also suggested that, in reality, it would be Armenia, not the United States, that would bear the primary financial burden of any such projects, and questioned the transparency of proposed financing mechanisms, warning that the depiction of these initiatives in some media outlets as unprecedented U.S. investment may be misleading.
Of course, such statements should be viewed within the broader context of intensifying U.S.–Armenia engagement,  including Vice President JD Vance’s visit to Armenia, in which the two sides signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, alongside recent developments surrounding the implementation of TRIPP.

Before we dig into why these developments are a clear source of consternation for the Russian side, we must first look at the existing economic and logistic ties between Russia and Armenia.
The narrative of Armenia “turning away” from Russia obscures a more complicated economic reality. Since 2022, Armenia has simultaneously moved politically westward while becoming more embedded in Russia-linked trade flows. Record trade volumes and re-export activity effectively repositioned Armenia as part of Russia’s alternative logistics ecosystem under sanctions pressure.  

By 2024, bilateral trade volumes were approaching or exceeding the $10–11 billion mark in multiple reporting windows, while Russia’s share in Armenia’s total foreign trade rose above 40 percent. Even amid subsequent fluctuations, Russia has remained by far Armenia’s largest economic partner, still accounting for roughly 40 percent of the country’s total external trade. By contrast, Armenia’s trade with the European Union hovered slightly above the $2 billion mark by 2025, showing modest growth from the previous year but remaining structurally limited relative to trade volumes with Russia and the EAEU space.

Part of this Russia-Armenia surge has been linked to re-export activity. At its peak, re-exports reportedly accounted for up to 80 percent of Armenian goods sent to Russia - a significantly higher share than observed in other partner countries. While this trend inflated trade figures, it also reinforced Armenia’s role as an intermediary node within Russia’s reoriented supply chains.
And, in light of the increasing political deteriorations between Moscow and Yerevan, one would assume that such a trajectory might lead to an imminent strategic rupture between the post-Soviet allies. In reality, however, the Armenian government seems to avoid any serious steps that would formally dismantle the core pillars of the relationship. 

Although subject to minor civilian protests and government dissatisfaction, the question of closing Russia’s 102nd military base in Gyumri has not been placed on the policy agenda. According to the existing framework, the base will continue to operate until 2044. Armenia continues to operate within the institutional frameworks of the EAEU and the CIS, structures that, albeit being described as ‘rubber-stamp’ institutions, continue to underpin the country’s economic integration and formal diplomatic ties with Russia.

Energy infrastructure might explain why. Russia remains deeply embedded in Armenia’s energy system. Gazprom Armenia, a wholly owned subsidiary of Gazprom, controls the country’s gas import and distribution system and supplies the overwhelming majority of Armenia’s natural gas. Russian companies are also directly involved in Armenia’s nuclear energy sector, including modernisation and life-extension work at the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, a Soviet-built facility that continues to generate roughly one-third to 40 percent of Armenia’s electricity. 

Transport infrastructure reflects a similar long-term structural integration. Armenia’s railway system is operated by South Caucasus Railway, a 100 percent subsidiary of Russian Railways (RZD), under a concession agreement signed in 2008 for 30 years, with options for extension. The concession also covers infrastructure maintenance and investment planning, which may effectively embed Russian operational control into Armenia’s core logistics network well into the late 2030s.

Another topic of consternation is Armenian engagement with the EU, particularly in light of the Armenia-EU Partnership Strategic Agenda signed in late 2025. Russian officials have explicitly expressed dissatisfaction with such developments. Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk has warned that even public discussion of EU integration is already generating negative spillovers in Russia–Armenia economic relations, suggesting that potential losses could reach up to $6 billion -  a substantial figure relative to Armenia’s overall economic size.

He has also argued that deeper integration with EU markets would likely come at the expense of access to EAEU markets. In his public remarks, Overchuk warned that a rupture with the EAEU could translate into sharp increases in energy and food prices in Armenia, alongside a potential collapse in Armenian exports of up to 70–80 percent - estimates that reflect Moscow’s broader view of the economic risks of Armenian reorientation.

In this context, the development of TRIPP remains a test case for whether Armenia can expand its connectivity options while preserving, or at least managing, its structurally embedded economic relationship with Russia.
Russian officials have already signaled that Moscow is not prepared to be excluded from emerging regional transport frameworks. Senior Russian diplomats have stated that Moscow is ready to consult with Yerevan on the parameters of possible participation in TRIPP, emphasizing Russia’s existing structural role in Armenia’s railway management, border security presence, and broader regional transport negotiations.  

At the same time, Armenian officials have sent mixed, but largely restrictive, signals regarding Russian involvement. Armenia’s parliamentary leadership has described TRIPP as fundamentally an Armenian-American initiative, with some senior officials saying they cannot realistically envision Russia playing a direct role in the project’s core structure. While Yerevan is careful not to exclude Russia from regional economic cooperation, TRIPP itself is not currently designed as a multilateral platform involving Moscow. 

For now, Armenia is not exiting Russia’s economic orbit, but it is attempting, for the first time in decades, to operate within multiple overlapping economic and geopolitical systems simultaneously. Whether this balancing strategy proves sustainable will depend not only on Armenia’s domestic reforms and external partnerships, but also on how willing Russia is to engage in the next phase of South Caucasus economic integration.