On January 17, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Moscow for an official visit.* The centerpiece of the visit was the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Russia and Iran.  

Russian President Vladimir Putin described the document as groundbreaking and noted that the two countries share similar positions on most foreign policy issues.  

An interesting detail of the agreement is that, according to the Iranian Embassy in Moscow, its text was prepared by the Iranian side and coordinated over the course of three years. This indicates the complexity of the negotiation process. Moreover, during this period, dramatic developments occurred both in and around Iran, which undoubtedly influenced the work on the text.  

The same applies to Russia, which, over the past three years, has been engaged in the conflict in Ukraine and an unprecedented confrontation with the West.  

It is well known that both sides are currently actively involved in conflicts, maintain close military-technical cooperation, and oppose the West to varying degrees. However, neither Tehran nor Moscow intends to become formal allies.  

They have only agreed that if one side is subjected to aggression, the other will not provide any assistance to the aggressor. In addition, the two countries will enhance cooperation between their intelligence services and strengthen collaboration in the areas of security and defense.  

Media reports also note that the Iranian side refused to recognize Crimea and Donbas as Russian territories. The parties chose not to specify this issue and limited themselves to reaffirming their mutual recognition of each other's territorial integrity.  

*As is known, there is also a territorial dispute between Iran and the UAE over islands in the Persian Gulf. Their ownership by Iran was also not specified.*

A key area of cooperation between the two countries is energy. The sides have positively assessed the progress of the joint project to construct two new nuclear reactors at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran, carried out by Rosatom. Additionally, Vladimir Putin suggested that, upon the realization of the gas pipeline project to Iran, the supply volume could eventually reach 55 billion cubic meters of gas per year.

According to the Russian Ministry of Energy, the pipeline from Russia to Iran will pass through Azerbaijan. Negotiations are in the final stage, and the issue of cost is currently being resolved.  

It seems that the new pipeline will begin at existing main gas pipelines in Russia and will either end at Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf or extend into Pakistan and India.  

In Azerbaijan, a pipeline of at least 50 km with several compressor stations should be built. Iran, which produces 260 billion cubic meters of gas annually, does not need the pipeline. During the winter, the northern regions of the country do experience a shortage of gas, and the Russian side may replace it with swap deliveries. However, the total volume of consumed fuel is unlikely to exceed 7-8 billion cubic meters of gas. Therefore, it can be assumed that the ultimate goal of the pipeline construction is to launch the Iran-Pakistan pipeline, with the goal of accessing the Indian market.

In general, the conclusion of the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement" has an obvious regional context. Article 12 of the Agreement provides for cooperation to prevent destabilizing interference by third countries in the Caspian region, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East, as well as exchanging views on the situation in other regions of the world. Article 13 gives special attention to cooperation in the Caspian region.

In this regard, it should be noted that Iran is the only country that has not ratified the Caspian Convention. It can be assumed that the implementation of the provisions of the document will contribute to its ratification in the foreseeable future.

Closer coordination between the parties in regional affairs may imply the implementation of practical steps to prevent a reduction in the role and influence of Moscow and Tehran in the mentioned regions. For players like Armenia, which seeks to actively participate in Western alliances, this may mean that in pursuing its pro-Western course, it could face practical opposition from Russia and Iran. At least at the declarative level, both sides clearly indicate their readiness for a such step.