In recent weeks, international media have reported growing signs of a possible resumption of conflict between Iran and Israel. Following the 12-day war in June, during which both sides suffered significant losses, the situation in the region remains tense. Iranian officials have declared their readiness for a new military clash, claiming to have more modern missiles ready for use in the event of aggression from Israel. In response, Israel has been strengthening its defensive positions and conducting military exercises, demonstrating its readiness for a possible escalation of the conflict. In light of these events, it is important to consider the prospects for further developments in the situation and the possible implications for international security.
Against this background, STEM presents an interview with Emanuele Ottolenghi, an Italian political scientist and senior researcher at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (Washington), an analyst and expert on the Middle East, Iran and international security.
-What do you think were the main reasons why Tehran agreed to a ceasefire despite the losses and strikes on strategic facilities?
– The most important strategic goal of the Islamic Republic is survival – even more important than the implementation of the nuclear program. After 12 days of war, the Iranian leadership probably came to the conclusion that it is in an extremely vulnerable position not only to external attacks, but also internally. Preserving the regime and stability became a priority against the backdrop of the threat of total destabilization. In the context of growing pressure from the population, economic restrictions and the lack of guarantees of military advantage, the leadership decided to buy time. The ceasefire provided an opportunity to temporarily reduce risks, preserve the remnants of the defense infrastructure and avoid a scenario in which further escalation could lead to an internal crisis and loss of control.
-Can we say that the ceasefire is the result of internal pressure on the Iranian government, or was it imposed from the outside (for example, by the US, Qatar or China)?
-There were both outside and domestic pressures. Iran's traditional allies did not come to its rescue. Its proxies refrained from joining the fight to defend Iran's nuclear program. The regime realized Israeli intelligence had deeply penetrated its ranks. With air defenses gone, Iranian leaders were vulnerable, and Israel's continuing operations would have degraded Iran's capabilities even further. There was definitely fear that the regime was now vulnerable to domestic pressure. Plus, there must be fissures within the regime, given high suspicions of dissent and treason, and the staggering failures of Iran's defenses.
-Why was Israel, despite its technological superiority, also interested in a ceasefire? Were there any signs of "fatigue" on its part?
- Israel probably could not complete its mission without America's intervention. Once America stepped in, it could not continue without American support, and President Trump wanted the war to end. It is also likely that by day 12, the Israelis had achieved most of their objectives.
-How do you assess Qatar's role as a mediator? Why was Doha able to play such a key role in the dialogue between the two tough opponents?
- Qatar is closely aligned to Iran in many ways - support for Hamas, for example. But it is also close to Washington. It could play that role because president Trump wanted an end to the war and Qatar could communicate with both sides. But ultimately, it was probably America's choice to rely on Qatar, whose ability to mediate up to and past American strikes was limited.
-How sustainable is this ceasefire? What factors within Iran itself could trigger its breakdown - pressure from the IRGC, ultra-conservatives, a crisis of confidence? Are there "tension points" that would trigger a missile exchange again at the slightest incident? For example, the activity of proxy groups in Syria, Yemen, Lebanon?
- As you correctly point out, there are numerous things that can still go wrong. Any strike against Israel from proxies could conceivably trigger an Israeli response directly hitting Iran. Now that the taboo has been broken of direct military exchanges between the two countries, Israel may very well decide to go after Iranian targets rather than responding in kind to the Houthis or Hezbollah. More importantly, however, is the possibility that the Iranian regime might jump start nuclear enrichment activities. I do not anticipate this happening soon, but it could happen at some point. Israel might resort to more military action and so might the U.S.
-Does the ceasefire have real legal or political guarantees? Or is it just a temporary pause until the next round of escalation?
- There is no text I am aware of that creates legal guarantees. These are two countries at war where one, Iran, does not recognize the existence of the other, so I doubt legal guarantees, even if they existed, were worth much. However, there are clear political guarantees: the full weight of the President of the United States and the Gulf countries who are likely behind Qatar to support the deal. For Israel, breaking it could probably only happen against the background of a major Iranian violation or the sudden detection of problematic activities to reconstitute the nuclear program.
-What consequences does the ceasefire have for the internal legitimacy of the regime after a period of shock, internet shutdowns and attacks on military facilities? Will the government be able to use the ceasefire as an argument in its favor, declaring a "successful repulse of Israeli aggression"?
- The regime propaganda machine is already in full swing to claim victory. They have initially telegraphed that Israel's cities were destroyed, that the nuclear program survived virtually intact, that its air defenses downed Israeli planes and captured Israeli pilots, and that its missile barrage destroyed the U.S. air base in Qatar. None is true of course. But it's clear that they are afraid. They tightened security inside the country almost immediately after the first attacks and they are rounding up thousands under the pretext of Israel's successful penetration of Iran's security, intelligence, and nuclear apparatus. They will be focusing on repression, to fend off possible unrest and find those who helped Israel. They will also engage in robust propaganda to sow discord among Western public opinion. The fact remains: had they been on the winning side, I am doubtful they would have accepted a ceasefire.
-How do you assess Donald Trump's statement that Iran will no longer be able to restore its nuclear infrastructure? To what extent does this correspond to the real situation inside the country?
- It is too early to tell the full extent of the damage right now. But it appears that, regardless of the impact of America's operation against Fordow, Isfahan, and Natanz, Israel has severely degraded or eliminated many parts of the nuclear weapons' supply chain: personnel with critical knowledge; centrifuge factories; centers involved in the military dimension of the nuclear program; uranium conversion and uranium milling facilities; and more. Whether anything is salvageable under the mountain in Fordow remains to be seen. But I think that President Trump's statements, bombastic as they sound, are closer to the truth than what the regime is trying to portray.
- Can this ceasefire be considered part of a broader geopolitical restructuring in the region, including the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the strengthening of Chinese-Iranian ties? How has this affected the positions of Russia and Turkey - have they increased their influence or, on the contrary, found themselves on the periphery of the process?
- It is too soon to tell. The regime in Teheran will seek to retrench and consolidate its power internally. It aims to survive and rebuild its capacities. It successfully sabotaged Saudi-Israel relations when its proxy, Hamas, launched October 7 - the Hamas massacre of more than a thousand Israelis and the kidnapping of 250 Israeli hostages. Without a resolution to the crisis in Gaza, I doubt the Saudis will be ready to make peace with Israel. However, a negotiated solution for Gaza - unless Tehran tries to spoil it - might actually now be within reach. If that is the case, a Saudi-Israeli detente might follow soon after. As for Russia, China and Turkey: they watched Israeli military might, with US made weapons in full display as it shattered defense systems they either manufactured or use for their own defense. And they saw what America's military is capable of. This will give them all pause.
- Do you consider the option in which the ceasefire is only the outer shell of a deeper transformation: for example, preparation for a change of power in Iran or a redesign of the entire Middle Eastern order?
- I think it is too early to tell. What you describe may be more possible today than it was on June 12. But we are still a long way away and I wouldn't hold my breath. The Iranian regime will not vanish without putting up a fierce fight. That said, its regional influence, after the humiliation Israel inflicted on Tehran both directly and by decimating its proxies, could have some salutary effects on the region already.