The modern international system has entered a phase of profound transformation, in which the former boundaries between peace and war are blurring, and the stability of the global order is no longer taken for granted. States and alliances face not only growing military risks but also a crisis of strategic thinking, as economic power, technological development, and political influence increasingly become unsynchronized. Under these conditions, the key factor in security is no longer the availability of resources, but the ability to quickly mobilize and coordinate their use.

The weakening of universal rules and institutions, the growth of regional conflicts, and competition between centers of power are shaping a new logic of international relations based on deterrence, demonstrations of resolve, and the redistribution of responsibility among allies. Traditional security guarantees are losing their unconditional nature, forcing states to rethink the extent of their autonomy and the limits of external support.

Regions play a special role in this transformation, where internal crises intertwine with external ambitions, turning local conflicts into factors of global instability. Energy, military technologies, and ideological projects are once again becoming instruments of pressure, not just economic cooperation. This increases the risk of escalation even in the absence of rational interest in large-scale war. As a result, global politics is increasingly moving toward a model in which security is determined not by intentions, but by capabilities and the perception of power. The ability to adapt to this reality, abandon outdated assumptions, and build sustainable deterrence mechanisms is becoming key to preventing systemic crises in the near future.

STEM presents an exclusive interview with Ariel Cohen, a lead expert at the Atlantic Council and Managing Director of Energy, Growth, and Security Program at the International Tax and Investment Center in Washington, D.C.

-In recent years, Europe has been returning to the concept of a hardline defense and readiness for high-intensity conflict. How do you assess this strategic shift from a US perspective? How prepared is Europe for a potential crisis with Russia?

-Frankly, Europe still assumes it has plenty of time to build up its defense potential. European experts and politicians think they have four years, till 2030, to rearm. They may be wrong. As the U.S. begins to put pressure on Europe with regards to the claims to Greenland, Russia may see this as an encouragement to open another front in Europe beyond Ukraine. That is, if the massive losses so far won’t cause Moscow to abandon adventurism and pursue more balanced foreign and security policy.

In terms of rearmament, certain steps are being taken, primarily in the area of ​​weapons modernization, but they are fragmented and often delayed. Germany and Poland are at the forefront of this development. Europe is not a unified state, but a complex association of nation-states, where each participant essentially pulls the blanket over to itself. As a result, any strategic decisions undergo a long and painful process of coordination, compromise, and internal bargaining.

The balance of power within the European Union creates an additional complication. France and Germany remain the key players, and their visions of defense, industrial policy, and strategic autonomy are far from always aligned. The United Kingdom is a separate issue. It left the EU but remains a key NATO member. This strengthens the Alliance's military potential but simultaneously complicates European defense integration outside NATO.

Regional differences in threat perceptions are also significant. Eastern flank countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and the Baltic states—are much more sensitive to Russian intentions than southern flank countries: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and others. These countries have different historical traumas, different economic priorities, and different foreign policy concerns.

Furthermore, there is a conflict of interest in Europe related to the military industry. Each country seeks to preserve its own production chains: its own tank industry, its own aircraft, its own artillery. As a result, we see a paradoxical picture: France has several models of modern combat aircraft, such as Mirage and Rafale, Sweden has its own aircraft, the Grippen, the Eurofighter Typhoon, the TEMPEST and FCAS/SCAF fifth- and sixth-generation projects, and so on. Instead of increasing economic efficiency, standardizing weapons, and focusing on one or two models of tanks and aircraft, each coalition of countries insists on full domestic production.

On the one hand, this is irrational and expensive. On the other, it's understandable: no country wants to find itself in a situation where, at a critical moment, someone from outside can veto or create a bottleneck in supplies. As a result, the process is slow and extremely expensive. Public opinion is an additional factor. In most European countries, the population's willingness to fight, let alone die, for their country is extremely low. The exceptions are Finland, Poland, and perhaps a few other countries.

Another strategic mistake made by Europe is that it still hasn't clearly articulated the need to integrate Ukraine into the European security architecture—perhaps not immediately, but after a ceasefire or peace agreement. Ukraine is not a periphery, but a key element of European security, whether some like it or not.

-Many European countries are increasing their military budgets and strengthening their infrastructure. Is this, in essence, a response to changes in Russian policy or a signal to domestic society?

-It's both. First and foremost, it's a reaction to Russia's behavior in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s demand to change and re-codify security arrangements in Europe, allowing Moscow to dictate terms. But there's a second, no less important factor: the US is gradually retreating from the dominant role it played in Europe after World War II. America is increasingly declaring that Europe must take responsibility for its own security while behaving like an adversary, not an ally, in the Denmark/Greenland case.

Thus, we see a confluence of three factors: the Russian factor, the American strategic shift, and the domestic need to build an independent defense system.

It's also important to understand the economic context. Europe's combined gross domestic product is approximately $24 trillion, while Russia's GDP is, at best, $2.5 trillion. Europe's potential is colossal. The problem isn't money, but the feeble political will, the failure of an effective policymaking apparatus, the lack of ability to mobilize, and snail’s pace of technological advancement.

-The United States is demonstrating growing uncertainty about its security guarantees for Europe. How does this affect NATO and the strategic thinking of European countries?

-Europe must take a sober look at the real world. Unfortunately, for a long time, it lived in the illusion that wars were no longer possible, that the use of force was a thing of the past.

The Americans are now telling Europe directly: "Guys, you're rich, you have a lot of people. More people live in the European Union than in the United States. Your gross domestic product was greater than that of the United States 20 years ago, but now it's less. So get up off your knees, take care of your own security, and build your defenses."

In the event of a serious conflict, the United States might come to the rescue, but only in a critical situation, as it did in both world wars. Or it might not. Trump's pressure is forcing Europe to think about independent security. This could stimulate the emergence of a new strong player aligned with the United States, or, conversely, if Europe fails to cope, existing threats—from Russia and its southern neighbors—will intensify.

-How do you assess the likelihood of a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO in the next 5-10 years? Which scenarios seem most likely?

-Unfortunately, the likelihood is growing. Russia has effectively abandoned its path toward European integration. Let me remind you: Russia had a huge European gas market, which it voluntarily abandoned. Yes, liquefied natural gas is still being sold, but the European Union is stated to be ready to give that up as well.

Essentially, at the behest of one man and a small circle of elites, Russia has broken a 300-year-old historical course of interaction with Europe, initiated by Peter the Great. Russian elites have always been part of European civilization—culturally, economically, and mentally. Now they're abandoning this, but the question remains: how does Russia intend to become part of the East Asian. China-centric civilization? The last such experience was during the Golden Horde over 700 years ago. I don't think such an attempt will be successful.

Speaking of scenarios, there are several. The first is further escalation and rising tensions. The second is periodic attempts at détente: visits, negotiations, tactical concessions. The third is local incidents, for example, on the Polish border or in the Baltic region, which, however, if common sense is used by both sides, will not escalate into a full-scale conflict.

-The United States is shifting its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region. To what extent does this undermine European security and increase Europe's dependence on its own deterrence capabilities?

-The United States is currently focused on strengthening its position in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific region. Washington will likely not stop at Venezuela. Trump is already talking about Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, and Mexica.

If a major war does occur, such as around Taiwan, it will be an extremely destructive conflict. I don't rule out the use of nuclear weapons and new types of weapons, such as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) strikes, but I sincerely hope and even pray that it doesn't come to that.

Europe, however, is capable of mobilizing and deterring Russia if Moscow understands that it faces a consolidated Europe with nuclear potential and powerful conventional armies, primarily those of Poland, Germany, and France, as well as the nuclear potential of France and the UK, and perhaps, in the future, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Turkey, as well.

Russia has already paid a colossal price for the war: according to various estimates, up to a million killed and wounded, including 150,000-200,000 fatalities. Why does Russia need another war with Europe? There is no rational answer. No one intends to destroy Russia—that's a myth used to prop up the regime. Ukraine, too, had no intention of attacking Russia. On the contrary, Moscow was confident they would take Kyiv in three days and all of Ukraine in three weeks. The reality turned out to be different. The rational solution is peace agreements and the search for forms of reconciliation.

- To what extent is the United States capable of maintaining a balance between its Indo-Pacific priority and its obligations to its European allies?

- The United States' priority remains Latin America, the Western Hemisphere, and the Pacific region. Many people are concerned about the US-Europe friction around Greenland. But balance is only possible if Europe strengthens its own defense.

-Iran remains an important player in the Middle East and in the energy sector. How do you assess the current threats Iran poses to regional and global security?

-Iran is in a state of systemic crisis, possibly terminal. Even if the protests are temporarily suppressed—Velayat el-Fakih, the Ayatollah regime has exhausted itself. In Lenin's classic definition, "those at the top cannot, and those at the bottom will not." The people refuse to accept a continuation of the current course, and the elites are incapable of responding to the economic, military, and diplomatic challenges they themselves have created.

Medieval political philosophy has no answers for the 21^st century. Isolation, lack of investment, aggressive global and regional policies—threats to destroy Israel, hatred of the United States, support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Shiite groups in Iraq, antagonism toward Azerbaijan—have driven Iran to a dead end. As a result, Israel and the United States have begun striking Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

What happens next? Trump gave Tehran a respite, but it is conditioned on the Ayatollah following Washington’s directions. He most likely will refuse and will face escalating domestic challenges. I don't consider myself an Iran expert and don't want to speculate. Without an organized force, a clear program for the future, and strong leaders, the protest movement has little chance. Under these conditions, the regime, unfortunately, can hold on, but for a limited time.

-Mass protests and internal discontent with the government continue in Iran. How much of a threat do these events pose to regional security, and could they escalate into a crisis impacting global energy markets?

-Iran exports about two million barrels per day, primarily to China. If these supplies were to disappear tomorrow, some would be replaced by Saudi Arabia, other OPEC countries, and Russia. Therefore, this would not cause a global imbalance. Today, oil prices have fallen from $64 to $60 per barrel. Even a rise to $70–$80 in case of a broader conflict in the Middle East would not be catastrophic.

For the US, this is even less of a problem: U.S. today is pumping 14 million barrels a day. Shale production is high, plus access to Venezuelan oil is possible. Venezuelan production is currently less than a million barrels per day, but it will grow—perhaps not to three million, but to two to two and a half million. I don't see a global market collapse unless Iran attacks Persian Gulf oil production, including Saudi Arabia.

- Will Iran be able to do this?

- It's difficult to predict. But if the US decides to strike, it will be so powerful that Tehran will no longer be able to disrupt Persian Gulf oil production.

- Following Tehran's recent announcements about resuming uranium enrichment, how do you assess the risk of a collapse in the nuclear deal and the possible consequences for the US, Europe, and regional allies?

- For the regime, this is suicidal. Continuing to enrich uranium and attempt to produce missiles is a complete disregard for reality. In June, during the 12-day war, America and Israel neutralized Iran's air defenses in 12 days, bombed targets without restriction, and demonstrated the Iranian leadership's inability to build a crisis response system, even for domestic problems like protests or a water crisis. They continue to do what has already proven to be pointless and expect a different result. This is the definition of insanity.

-In the context of the renewal or modification of the Abraham Accords: how does Israel's cooperation with Arab countries affect the balance of power in the region and the US position? To what extent might the signed Abraham Accords affect Europe's energy security, given Iran as a potential threat or partner?

-The Abraham Accords were signed during Trump's first term in office, and they were undoubtedly a positive step. They created a kind of "security belt" from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf. This is a strategically sound decision. Today, we see that Kazakhstan has joined the process, and it will not stop there.

In other words, theoretically, this security belt could extend from Morocco to the Tien Shan mountain ranges in Central Asia. But there is resistance—from Qatar, Turkey and Iran. Saudi Arabia's position remains unclear: it has disagreements with the UAE over Yemen and Somalia. Therefore, the future of the Abraham Accords will only be positive if new countries join them, such as Uzbekistan and other regional states, or if Saudi Arabia ultimately decides to join this pro-Western, pro-American bloc.

-So, could the US use this as a tool of influence?

-Absolutely. Saudi Arabia's accession to defense agreements could have been linked to specific requests: nuclear reactors, modern weapons. America has carried out a kind of "decoupling" here, separating geopolitics from technology. Furthermore, a show of force regarding the Iranian nuclear program—whether its temporary neutralization or potential permanent destruction—reduces Iran's incentives to interfere in regional affairs. This strengthens the concept of security from the Atlantic to China's borders, and this is a very important positive development.

-And what about Israel's relations with Turkey?

-There's a nuance here, too. Israel and Turkey have no territorial disputes. Improving relations, which have always been pragmatic and well-considered, could help strengthen regional stability, including in Syria and Lebanon.

-Is there potential for expanding the Abraham Accords to countries in the South Caucasus or Central Asia, and how would this affect the role of Azerbaijan and Turkey?

- Turkey and Qatar are currently opposed to expanding the agreements. But if their position changes, expansion is possible. Turkey has historically maintained good relations with Israel and the Jewish community.

Iran's internal regime is also important: if the Islamic Revolutionary Guards leave power, a more anti-clerical regime will emerge, relations with Israel will improve, which will impact other regions.