Interview with the founder of the Mikhailovsky Intellectual Club Vladislav Olenchenko

-Trump is obsessed with the idea of ending the war in 100 days. To what extent is Ukraine ready for an agreement, given Zelensky's ban on negotiations with Putin? 

- Donald Trump, both during his election campaign and after his inauguration, has highlighted Ukraine as one of the central issues of his foreign policy. A frequency analysis of his statements shows that this topic has been mentioned even more often than the issue of illegal migration in the U.S., indicating his particular interest in the situation in Ukraine. 

Ukraine views this insistence with caution, as there is already a bitter experience where the actions of the previous Biden administration did not align with its stated intentions. 

At the same time, key questions remain unclear: the conditions for ending the war, the terms of a ceasefire, and who will bear the costs of reaching a quick agreement. These questions do not yet have definitive answers, and therefore, the attitude towards them remains wary and cautious. 

Nevertheless, despite these concerns, there is an understanding that Ukraine’s high level of dependence on the U.S. forces it to make certain concessions. While such steps may be unpleasant from an emotional perspective, they are rationally justified. A significant part of society realizes that in order to maintain constructive and productive relations with a key partner, Ukraine will have to make compromises.

-Given Trump's initial steps in power and his statements regarding Russia, are expectations in Ukraine for the current administration more or less positive compared to Biden's tenure?

-Comparisons with the previous Biden administration, both deliberate and spontaneous, have already become widespread. It is evident that the style and pace of Trump's administration differ significantly from Biden's approach, which was characterized by slow reactions and even inaction on several important issues. However, it is important to note that both Trump and Biden avoid direct confrontation and strategic conflict with the Russian Federation. All statements about sanctions and pressure on Russia still fit within the strategic interests of the U.S., which is preparing for a tougher confrontation with China. 

Keeping Russia within its sphere of influence remains crucial for the U.S. in the context of this global standoff. The U.S. does not want to push relations with Russia to the point of no return, as this could result in a Russia-China alliance against America, which is a critical factor in U.S. foreign policy. 

After Trump's return to the White House, there has been a rise in optimism in Ukraine, especially following the long Democratic rule and the events that have become evident. Open facts about how the Biden administration effectively contributed to strengthening Putin's regime—especially since 2014, when Russian aggression in Crimea began—left Ukrainians with the impression that Biden's administration created a regime of maximum favorability for Russia. Even the full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not change the U.S. approach, leading to disappointment in the previous administration’s policies. 

Nevertheless, optimism in Ukraine exists, albeit cautiously. We have learned to be realists and do not build false hopes of absolute support from our partners. Ukrainian society understands that disappointments and betrayals are possible in international relations.  We do not see the U.S. as an unconditional ally, recognizing that America has its own interests, which at times may prevail over moral obligations toward Ukraine. 

At the same time, support from the American people remains significant. Americans actively support Ukraine materially, through information channels, media, social networks, as well as through the efforts of the diaspora and cultural initiatives. However, as practice shows, not all-American politicians share this position, making Ukraine’s optimism more cautious than confident.

-If Russia categorically refuses any compromise, what are Ukraine’s prospects for restoring its territorial integrity by military means?

-Ukraine has long grown accustomed to the fact that Russia’s word is worthless. Agreements with Russia, even those documented on paper, hold no real value. This has become evident not only to Ukraine but also to anyone who might have previously doubted it. Even in the 19th century, it was noted that Russian agreements were worth less than the paper they were signed on. That is why any commitments, compromises, or statements coming from Russia are not taken seriously in Ukraine. What matters far more are Moscow’s actual actions. 

We analyze Russia’s internal resources, its economy, and the Kremlin regime’s ability to continue sending tens of thousands of soldiers to their deaths. These are more significant factors than any loud statements. 

It is clear that without support from the U.S. and Western allies, Ukraine will not be able to restore its internationally recognized borders on its own in the coming years. The disparity in economic capabilities, military-industrial potential, and human resources makes such a task unrealistic. However, no one in their right mind expects an immediate liberation of all occupied territories. This process may take not just years, but decades. 

In this regard, Azerbaijan serves as an illustrative example. For over 20 years, it systematically built up its strength, mobilized resources, and implemented long-term projects, which ultimately enabled it to reclaim its occupied territories within internationally recognized borders. This path is gradually becoming Ukraine’s dominant strategy. Society is beginning to understand that the war to reclaim its territories may require not only military efforts but also strategic patience, systematic state strengthening, and competent resource management.

-Do you believe that Zelensky has entered history and will forever remain a symbol of Ukraine’s struggle? 

-This is an interesting and multifaceted question. However, there is no doubt that Volodymyr Zelensky has already etched his name in history—not only in Ukraine but also globally. It is hard to imagine 21st-century history books describing the events of the 2020s without mentioning his name. 

Zelensky has become a symbol of struggle—that is a fact. Despite the presence of skeptics and the mistakes that have been made, some of which have been corrected while others remain unresolved, he continues to demonstrate determination in fighting. 

His stance remains unchanged: Ukraine will not accept a ceasefire on any terms, especially those dictated by Putin. It is precisely this resilience that keeps Zelensky a symbol of resistance and Ukraine’s fight for independence.

-How could history have unfolded if Zelensky had accepted the U.S. proposal and left Ukraine in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion?

-It is often said that history does not operate in the subjunctive mood, and speculating about what could have been is pointless. However, for analytical purposes, this approach is unacceptable. Studying key decisions at historical crossroads, their consequences, and possible alternative scenarios is an essential part of analysis. It allows us to reassess the past, identify mistakes and successful moves, which in turn strengthens the system or the individual player. 

One source for such analysis is Bob Woodward’s book "War", published shortly before the elections. It is evident that the book was written in the interests of the U.S. Democratic Party and the Biden administration, portraying their team in a favorable light. However, despite possible bias, the book contains important facts. 

In particular, Woodward describes the events of the Munich Security Conference in February 2022. At that time, Zelensky reminded the world that under the Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine had asked the guarantor states for consultations regarding the threat to its territorial integrity. The West ignored this request. Meanwhile, according to the book, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris held a closed-door meeting with Zelensky and his chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, where she stated that the Ukrainian president would either be killed or arrested and that he should therefore prepare an evacuation plan, appoint a successor, and form a government-in-exile. 

Thus, instead of preventing a violation of international law and borders, a key international player was effectively pressuring Ukraine’s legitimate president to leave the country. This was, in essence, an ultimatum that implied capitulation. 

Had Zelensky succumbed to this pressure, Ukraine would undoubtedly have fallen under occupation. But would that occupation have been successful? Most likely not. The Ukrainian people would not have accepted it without resistance. From the beginning of the war, the effect of the Maidan and the Great Patriotic War came into play: the country was not fully prepared for the invasion, defensive lines were not fortified, and the army was not entirely ready. However, the people did not wait for orders from above. In the first days weapons were massively distributed to civilians in Kyiv, self-defense units were formed, and ordinary citizens, alongside the military and special forces, prevented the enemy from breaking through Irpin, destroyed a dam, and blocked key invasion routes. 

The enemy relied on psychological pressure, expecting Ukraine to surrender, as had happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Hungary in 1956. But that scenario did not work. Ukraine demonstrated its readiness to fight. 

One cannot underestimate Zelensky’s role in this. Yes, his team made mistakes, and not everything was done correctly, but the very fact that he remained in the country provided a powerful boost to the morale of Ukrainian society. People saw that their legitimately elected president was standing his ground and ready to fight for the country. This factor played a crucial role in organizing resistance and uniting Ukrainians in the face of the threat.

-Do you consider it appropriate to hold presidential elections in Ukraine before the war ends? What are Oleksiy Arestovych's chances in the upcoming elections, given his ambitions and political alignment with Trump? Will Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who has the highest level of public trust in Ukraine, run for office?

-On the one hand, the principle of power rotation through elections is a cornerstone of a democratic state. The president must be re-elected, and leadership must be renewed. On the other hand, there are periods when such mechanisms become less relevant, as temporary leaders who do not see themselves in office after their term may lose motivation to defend the country. 

The war with Russia is not just a political crisis but a matter of life and death—not only for Ukraine’s top leadership but for the entire Ukrainian nation. 

Historical experience clearly demonstrates the cost of failing to fight for statehood. One of the most tragic examples is the Holodomor, orchestrated by Soviet authorities in the early 1930s, when millions of Ukrainians perished from famine. At that time, amid international indifference and betrayal by potential allies, the Ukrainian people paid a terrible price for their independence. 

Ukraine is well aware that occupation by Moscow means mass repressions, deportations, labor camps, and millions of deaths. This is why the majority of Ukrainians categorically oppose holding presidential elections before the war ends. 

Nevertheless, the discussion about the future presidency has already begun, especially in light of potential shifts in international politics. Notably, leaked media reports suggest that Trump’s plan includes pressuring Russia into a peace agreement. If this plan is implemented and Ukraine agrees to the proposed conditions, the political process and elections may take place in the fall of 2025. 

The most likely candidate at the moment appears to be Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who enjoys significant public support. Oleksiy Arestovych has also declared his readiness to run for office. However, sociological surveys indicate that his disapproval rating is extremely high. 

It is particularly interesting that Arestovych, despite not holding key government positions, has managed to accumulate a level of public disapproval comparable to long-standing political figures such as Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. This phenomenon can be attributed to his controversial statements and communication style, which provoke strong reactions from society. 

It remains an open question whether Volodymyr Zelensky will seek a second term. His moral and emotional exhaustion may influence his decision. However, his stance on a potential successor, should he choose not to run, will also be a crucial factor. 

Thus, Ukraine’s post-war future is not only a matter of territorial integrity and security but also of its internal political structure. The timing and process of the elections will depend on developments at the front and international diplomacy.

- How will the end of the war between Ukraine and Russia affect the countries of the South Caucasus, and specifically Azerbaijan?

- Although the war between Ukraine and Russia is geographically distant from the South Caucasus, its impact on the region is evident. High-level political contacts and economic ties, especially in the energy sector, continue to develop actively. Despite certain frictions, Azerbaijan remains within Ukraine’s sphere of interest, and its policy of maneuvering between global power centers is understandable. Small countries are forced to balance their positions, avoiding direct confrontation with larger powers unless absolutely necessary. 

Another important aspect is that Azerbaijan demonstrates a purposeful and systematic approach to resolving national issues. Over the past 20 years, it has methodically worked toward achieving its strategic goals, which commands respect. While some may criticize the lack of leadership change, the implementation of long-term strategies requires stable elites with a clear vision of the future. Without this, democracy that lacks a national core can turn into a chaotic system incapable of protecting state interests. 

It is difficult to predict how the end of the war between Ukraine and Russia will affect the South Caucasus. History shows that when Moscow loses one war, it seeks to start another, redirecting its freed-up resources to a new front. Today, Ukraine ties up a significant portion of Russia’s military and economic power, forcing it to focus on the current conflict. This provides the nations of the South Caucasus and other regions with room for maneuver and a temporary respite. 

However, once the war ends, Russia may once again turn its attention to other regions, advancing its expansionist policies under fabricated pretexts. At the Pan-European Union forum, Karl von Habsburg described Russia as a classic colonial empire that has subjugated numerous nations. The South Caucasus has traditionally been within Moscow’s sphere of interest, and historically, the Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to establish puppet regimes in the region. 

Ukraine is not only defending its independence but also undermining the foundations of Russia’s imperial structure. As long as the Kremlin maintains a colonial mindset, no nation—whether in the South Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Siberia, or the Volga region—can feel truly safe. Any temporary lull merely signals the accumulation of resources for future aggression. 

As long as Moscow retains its imperial model of governance, the world will always face the risk of a new dictator emerging—one who seeks war to maintain their grip on power.

- What emotions define Ukrainian society today? In 2022, there were many narratives of pride, while in 2023—uncertainty and instability.

- Ukrainian society is experiencing a range of emotions. In 2022, there was more reason for optimism. As noted in Bob Woodward’s book, by early autumn 2022, Ukraine had virtually crushed the Russian army. Had it not been for the intervention of the Biden administration, Putin’s elite units would have been either destroyed or taken prisoner. 

In the south, only two bridges remained for retreat, and eliminating the encircled 30,000-strong Russian force was merely a matter of time. A similar situation unfolded in the north of the Kharkiv region, where a 15,000-strong Russian grouping was pushed to the border following Ukraine’s lightning-fast counteroffensive. Such a military collapse could have broken the backbone of the Russian authorities and triggered a power shift in the Kremlin. 

However, the Biden administration prevented this scenario from materializing, citing the risk of a Russian nuclear strike. Ukraine was temporarily restricted in receiving weapons supplies, prohibited from using long-range missiles, and left uncertain about further Western support under the pretext of avoiding escalation. 

This decision significantly affected public sentiment: it became clear that Western partners, particularly Washington, were not interested in a complete military defeat of Russia but preferred a controlled conflict with measured aid. This strategy prolonged the war and forced Ukraine to operate under constant shortages of ammunition, insufficient air cover, and limited military equipment. 

By 2023, it became evident that Ukraine was facing a new reality: the front had stabilized, large-scale offensive operations without proper support had become impossible, and U.S. military aid was effectively frozen for eight months. Despite this, Ukrainian command made a series of tactical decisions that prevented overly risky operations, such as breaking through dense minefields without adequate artillery support. 

Since early 2024, Russia has launched systematic nighttime strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. This has led to power outages, water supply disruptions, and heating shortages, worsening the humanitarian situation in the country. Ukrainian society is exhausted by war, but anger and determination to fight have only grown stronger. 

Even if circumstances force Ukraine to sign some kind of ceasefire agreement, it is clear to everyone that it will be only a temporary measure. History has shown that any agreements with Moscow lack long-term validity. Therefore, Ukraine recognizes the necessity of a prolonged, hard-fought military confrontation and is preparing for it on moral, material, organizational, financial, and technological levels. The country understands that as long as Putin’s regime exists, the threat will not disappear. Ukraine must be ready to defend itself by force for as long as necessary.

- What is the resilience of Ukrainian society? How long are Ukrainians willing to endure the war?

-Ukraine is at war not by choice, but because there is no alternative. This is an existential struggle—either we fight, or we cease to exist. History has already taught us lessons: over a hundred years ago, after World War I, the civil war, the Spanish flu, and millions of casualties, many grew weary and believed they could surrender, but that only led to new tragedies. 

We know what happens when we stop fighting. We have already witnessed Bucha, we have seen Mariupol—wiped off the face of the earth along with its residents, women, and children, along with the drama theater where innocent people sought shelter, only for it to be barbarically bombed. And then we saw the Kremlin awarding medals to its murderers for these crimes. 

That is why the question of how long Ukraine is willing to endure this war is irrelevant. Ukraine will fight until the aggressor is defeated, until the Moscow regime collapses, and until the nations of the region are freed from its oppression. 

However, war should not be fought under conditions of constant resource shortages. Western partners promised support, they guaranteed our security when Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal. They themselves are the architects of the modern international order, built on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

If they want to preserve this order, they must not merely declare support but ensure that violators of international law cannot continue their aggression with impunity. This includes sanctions policies, military assistance, and mechanisms to force the aggressor into capitulation and reparations for the damage inflicted. 

Unfortunately, we have not seen such determination from the current U.S. administration or its predecessors. It is difficult to hope that a new administration in Washington will change its approach. Partial support is possible, but we do not yet see the willingness to confront the Kremlin directly or take decisive steps to contain its aggression. 

But regardless of the external situation, Ukraine will continue to fight. If we lack weapons, we will fight with what we have. But that does not mean our partners can allow the situation to deteriorate to such an extent. If the international community truly wants to preserve a world order based on the rule of law, it must do everything in its power to ensure that the aggressor cannot wage war for as long as it pleases.

- How do Ukrainians define the victory they believe in? In October 2022, about 60% of Ukrainians stated that victory meant returning to the 1991 borders. Does this rhetoric still hold today?

-President Zelensky set a clear narrative back in 2022: Ukraine has no choice but to fight for the liberation of its territories. This is not just a political stance—it is a matter of adhering to international law. There are recognized borders, and there is an obvious aggressor who no longer hides behind "little green men" as in 2014 but has openly invaded foreign territory, attempting to annex it and incorporate it into its own state. 

The demand for full territorial liberation is not merely a political slogan; it is Ukraine’s legal right. According to the Constitution, the president is obligated to defend the integrity of the state, and his position on this matter is entirely justified. 

However, despite its determination, Ukrainian society has already realized that achieving this goal in the coming years will be extremely difficult without clear and unequivocal support from key allies. 

Ukraine will have to move toward this objective gradually, much like Azerbaijan, which spent over 20 years systematically working toward restoring its territorial integrity. Ukraine is carefully studying this experience and will undoubtedly follow a similar path. 

A national consensus has already formed: Ukraine will reclaim its land—not necessarily quickly, but for as long as it takes. No one is willing to gift the occupiers the territories they have seized or recognize their loss. This is not about fanatically sacrificing millions of lives for a piece of land, but about the understanding that until the enemy is expelled, until it is held accountable for the destruction and the victims, the country will not rest. This is no longer just a political issue—it is a fundamental principle of the nation.

- The recent meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Davos was an important event, especially in the context of discussing the transit of Azerbaijani gas to Europe through Ukrainian infrastructure. How do you assess the outcomes of this meeting?

- Ukraine recognizes the necessity of maintaining stable relations at the level of states, governments, and personal contacts between leaders. It is also important to strengthen ties between nations, despite possible disagreements or diplomatic nuances. Even considering President Aliyev’s meetings with Vladimir Putin, Ukraine pragmatically and soberly assesses the prospects of cooperation with Azerbaijan. 

If economic cooperation in the energy sector can bring benefits to both sides—Ukraine as a transit country and Azerbaijan as a gas supplier to Europe—then such a project deserves attention. 

However, alongside the positive aspects, there are also certain concerns. Some experts express fears that under the guise of Azerbaijani gas, Russian gas may once again be supplied to Europe. 

Such a scheme is categorically unacceptable for Ukraine. The country has already experienced the bitter dependence on Russian energy resources and has repeatedly faced manipulations regarding the gas issue. Russian gas has become a symbol of geopolitical pressure and a tool of blackmail, dating back to the times of President Viktor Yushchenko, when gas agreements were used to subordinate Ukraine’s interests to the Kremlin. 

Ukraine will closely monitor the details of any potential agreement to ensure it does not contradict national interests. If anyone attempts to resume supplies of Russian gas to Europe under the guise of Azerbaijani gas, this will provoke a highly negative reaction within Ukrainian society. 

In this context, cooperation with Azerbaijan should be based on transparency and a clear understanding of strategic risks to avoid hidden schemes and prevent Moscow from strengthening its energy influence in Europe through bypass mechanisms.