Interview with Klemens Fischer, Professor of International Relations and Geopolitics at the University of Cologne, Board Member and Senior Advisor at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES).

- How similar are the current leaders of the US, Russia and China in their territorial ambitions, and what are their key differences? Which of the three leaders – Trump, Putin or Xi – has the greatest chance of becoming a defining figure in world politics in the coming years?

- At first glance, the leaders of Russia, China and the US seem very similar, but a closer look reveals a number of important differences. What they have in common, of course, is that they have enormous domestic power, which allows them to be equally robust in foreign policy. All three aspire to power and are prepared to pay a high price for it. But the differences are worth noting. Xi no longer has to worry about re-election, as he has de facto been confirmed in office for the rest of his life. Putin can rely on his system and be elected president for as long as he likes. Trump, on the other hand, has only this second term and cannot become president for a third time because of the US constitution.

In terms of personality, these three presidents are also very different: Trump, the strident one, favours actionism; Xi, the quiet one, favours time; Putin, the icy one, favours his army. Ukraine unites all three. Trump is playing the economic card to avoid military involvement. Putin relies on the mathematics of war, as long as he can replace losses more effectively. For Xi, Ukraine is the blueprint for the reintegration of Taiwan. They are all similar: they oppose minority rights, see military operations as a legitimate means, and are not afraid to threaten their opponents. Putin and Trump must end the war together or lose face. Xi, the quiet one, is different. He runs his country with an iron fist, he buys the favour of others, he observes. Putin's dependence means he is not a threat, and Xi does not expect Trump to intervene economically or militarily.

Trump will be remembered as a divider, not as the man who restored America to its former greatness. Putin may be expanding Russia, but he depends on China's goodwill and US military restraint. That leaves Xi. He is leading China on a long march to world economic leadership, which is real power.

- Will Trump, as the president of a democratic country, be able to implement his territorial ideas, such as buying Greenland or incorporating Canada into the US?

- The territorial integration of Canada can definitely be ruled out. In the case of Greenland, it is very possible that the US will massively expand its influence, but neither a purchase nor a cession of territory is likely.

- What economic instruments do the US and China use to expand their influence? Is it possible to say that China's economic expansion is more effective than Russia's military strategy?

- The US under Trump is currently trying to exert maximum pressure on the global market with tariffs and import and export restrictions. This strategy may work in the short and medium term, but in the long run this economic approach will not achieve its goals such as reducing inflation and strengthening the American auto industry. China is still reacting moderately and can afford to play for time, given its strong consumer market and export capabilities; the white elephant in the room is Taiwan, although it is likely that the Trump administration will use economic protection mechanisms rather than military ones. Chinese expansion is more efficient and effective because it is not geographically bound. Economic measures and trade can be applied globally and at any time. Russia's military strategy is basically limited to the operational area of the army, at best extended by military alliances such as with North Korea.

- The Ukrainian conflict has become a defining factor in geopolitics in recent years. How will it affect the world order and the balance of power between the US, Russia and China?

- There are three plausible scenarios. In the first, Russia defeats the Ukrainians and extends its territorial control at least to the Dnieper. This would not literally achieve the original objective of the war, but Ukraine would no longer be a free and independent state. In this case, China could conclude that there would be no serious and robust reaction from the West if Beijing were to realize its grip on Taiwan. In either case, the US would be seen as the loser and would no longer be able to act as a global protector.

In the second scenario, a deal would be struck between Moscow and Washington to end the war in Ukraine in such a way that Russia would occupy the conquered territories but not march on, backed by guarantees from the US and Europe. This would allow Trump to fulfil his electoral promise and appear as a peacemaker, while Putin - with a subsequent redefinition of the war's objective - could appear as a victor. China, on the other hand, would benefit in that it could assume that it would also get away with a Trump-style 'deal' in the event of an invasion of Taiwan.

In the third scenario, Russian troops do not quickly break through the Ukrainian front lines, and there is no deal between Moscow and Washington.

The war in Ukraine would continue, with Russia's military superiority winning out in the long run. And again, the US would have a difficult time on the world stage, having to continue to support Ukraine in order to save face, and Trump would not be able to fulfil his election promise. Although Putin would achieve his war aims after a few months or even years, he would also have to live with the consequences of the war (high human and material losses, economic difficulties) and, above all, with an ever-increasing dependence on China. China, on the other hand, would emerge from this scenario in a better position, as the US would at least be politically weakened and Russia's dependence would increase. It would also be able to resolve the Taiwan issue more easily.

- Can Taiwan become an analogue of Ukraine for China? What scenarios are possible regarding its future?

- This question depends very much on how the Ukrainian conflict develops. As long as China sees no compelling reason to conquer Taiwan militarily and integrate it by force, it can be expected to exert increasing pressure, but primarily through economic and diplomatic means.

- Is a new "Yalta Peace" possible, where the leading powers divide spheres of influence, as after World War II?

- Such a scenario cannot be completely ruled out. Its implementation will largely depend on the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and the further redistribution of forces in the international arena.

- What key conditions can Washington offer Moscow to reach a compromise on Ukraine? What could be the long-term consequences of a possible agreement between Russia and the US for European security?

- Trump's offer to Putin is a very personal one, basically proposing to revive the Cold War world. In this bipolar world, the US and Russia would dictate the world order. But this bipolar world would actually be a tripolar one, given China's influence in Russia and its economic power vis-à-vis the US.

In any case, Europe will have to take care of its own security in the future. Prime Minister Starmer's Ukraine initiative has clearly shown that this is not possible without the UK and should not be planned without the British.

- What place does the South Caucasus, in particular Azerbaijan, occupy in Trump's policy from your point of view?

- Judging by the first weeks of the second Trump administration, the main geopolitical focus of the United States is on the Pacific region. US foreign, economic and defense policies are primarily aimed at containing China and strengthening its position in the Indo-Pacific space.

This means that while the United States will not withdraw from other regions of the world, its activity in them, at least in the medium term, will be minimized. The South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, is unlikely to become a priority area of ​​American policy. However, Washington will most likely maintain a strategic interest in the region in terms of energy security, transit routes and containing Russian and Iranian influence.

Relations with Azerbaijan will be built primarily around energy cooperation, the stability of transport corridors and the possible role of Baku in the balance of power between Russia, Turkey and Iran. However, more active US involvement in regional processes should not be expected, since the main diplomatic and military resources will be focused on the confrontation with China.

-How do you assess President Macron's proposal to expand the French "nuclear umbrella" to all of Europe? What advantages and risks do you see in this initiative?

-In principle, it is a step in the right direction. However, France's nuclear arsenal is far from sufficient to provide a sustainable deterrent, so it would be welcome if the UK were to join this initiative. This would also prevent France from having a monopoly on military and political power in Europe in the defense sector.

-What steps can Germany take in response to the proposal to expand the French "nuclear umbrella"?

-Relatively little will change for Germany, which does not possess its own nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic renewed its claim at the time of reunification, when the Two-plus-Four Treaty between the two German states and the four victorious powers stipulated that Germany must not possess nuclear weapons in times of peace. Germany is also a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, the French initiative would provide Germany with an additional shield in addition to the U.S. pledge, which remains in place.

-What are the prospects for further cooperation between European countries in the field of defense after Macron's meeting and speech in London?

-Basically, very good. However, the real icebreaker initiative came from Sir Keir Starmer, the British Prime Minister, who convened a summit in London after the two meetings in Paris hosted by President Macron failed to produce concrete results. Strengthening European defense capabilities will probably only be possible if all European states work together; limiting it to EU member states may prove insufficient in the medium to long term.