January 23–24 marked what Washington has described as a ‘historic’ event in the Russia-Ukraine negotiations - the first trilateral meeting between the three countries since 2022 held in Abu Dhabi. The talks were precipitated by a meeting in Moscow involving Russian President Vladimir Putin, his two aides and three U.S. representatives, including special envoy Steve Witkoff and U.S. President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner (as has become customary for the American delegation). 

As we have already gathered from countless statements made from all three parties over the course of the past couple of months, Trump’s infamous peace plan is around ‘ninety-percent ready’, with the key unresolved issues concerning territorial disputes. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the main topic of discussions during the recent meeting in Abu Dhabi was territorial demands and concessions (or lack-there-of). More specifically, Donbass - a region that includes Donetsk and the Luhansk oblast. Currently, Russia controls around two-thirds of Donetsk and almost all of Luhansk. And while the U.S. calls for the demilitarisation of Donbass, Ukraine refuses to recognise any territories under Russian control, and Moscow demands the recognition of the reality on the ground, no framework has yet been proposed that satisfies both parties. The talks in Abu Dhabi have proven to be no exception. 

So, let’s take a look at whether the much-touted ‘historic’ meeting lives up to its name.
First, why was the meeting held in Abu Dhabi? The UAE is not a random choice. In recent years, the UAE has positioned itself as a neutral diplomatic hub able to host sensitive talks between actors who otherwise struggle to engage directly. It maintains working relations with Russia, the United States, and Ukraine, while remaining outside the Euro-Atlantic political space that frames the war. This gives all sides political cover, where no one appears to be negotiating on an opponent’s home turf. Its selection also reflects a moment when both Washington and Moscow appear willing to externalise the process away from traditional European channels.

Notably, too, this was not the first time the Middle East served as a venue for the U.S.–Russia diplomacy on Ukraine. Around this time last year, a high-level ministerial meeting took place in Riyadh, involving American officials and their Russian counterparts led by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, though without Ukrainian participation. In that sense, a meeting that does include Ukraine could be described as a breakthrough, though whether it truly deserves that label would depend on the conclusions reached and the wider political context in which the talks are taking place. 
Second, who were the players involved and what does the line-up signal? 
On the Ukrainian side, the delegation was led by Rustem Umerov, head of Kyiv’s National Security and Defence Council and Andrey Yermak’s replacement as the lead negotiator for the peace talks. Umerov was accompanied by Kyrylo Budanov (Head of the Presidential Office) and MP-negotiator Davyd Arakhamia, with Chief of the General Staff Andrii Hnatov joining as the military voice.  

The Russian side was represented  by General Igor Kostyukov, director of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, indicating, as the Kremlin already noted, that the talks would be conducted as a security working group meeting. In parallel, Kirill Dmitriev (RDIF) held separate discussions with Steve Witkoff on the economic track - a sign the negotiations may have been split into two lanes: battlefield/security terms on one side, and sanctions and investment narratives on the other. Witkoff, too, confirmed that working groups would take care of components of the peace plan, including what he named ‘military-to-military’ and ‘prosperity’ or postwar economic recovery. 

From the American side, the talks were attended by Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, along with Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and NATO’s top general, US Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, reinforcing the strategic and defence-oriented character of the meeting. 

So, what do we know about the discussions? According to the New York Times, on the table was a revised 20-point peace plan drawn up by the U.S. and Ukraine, which includes potential territorial arrangements, security guarantees, and post-conflict reconstruction clauses. 

Zelensky, for his part, has offered to withdraw troops by up to 40km (25 miles) from the region to create a free economic zone in Donbas, but with the condition that Russia does the same. And while the proposal for demilitarisation and the creation of a free economic zone in Donbass is a suggestion the Americans have long called for (in exchange for security guarantees for Ukraine), the Financial Times reports that U.S. officials have recently signalled a tighter linkage between the two. According to the paper, Washington has indicated that any U.S. security guarantees would be tied to Kyiv agreeing to a peace settlement, one that would, in practice, require negotiations over control of Donbas. The U.S. has also suggested it could provide additional weapons to strengthen Ukraine’s forces in peacetime if Ukrainian troops were withdrawn from parts of the region. 

While territory continues to be a point of contention, post-conflict security guarantees, or at least those between the U.S. and Ukraine, appear to have made some progress. “For us, security guarantees are primarily bilateral security guarantees with the US. The document is 100% ready. We expect our partners to be ready with the date and place when we will sign it,” Zelensky said at a news conference in Lithuania.

In another article, the Financial Times went further, arguing that Zelensky’s willingness to engage in negotiations with Russia is partly driven by a desire not to antagonise Trump. This interpretation is potentially reinforced by Zelensky’s unusually sharp speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he criticised European states for failing to act decisively and in unity to defend their own continent, relying on taken-for-granted U.S. support. “Instead of taking the lead in defending freedom worldwide, especially when America’s focus shifts elsewhere, Europe looks lost trying to convince the U.S. president to change,” Zelensky said.

All of this is unwrapping at an interesting time in Ukrainian domestic politics, which must be taken into account. Two important changes have taken place since the sprawling corruption scandal in Ukraine’s energy sector.

The first was the appointment of General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the country’s military intelligence agency, as his new chief of staff, replacing Andrey Yermak, who was forced to resign in 2025. Budanov, as many have noted, is an accomplished and pragmatic interlocutor. He oversaw high-risk operations ranging from special forces actions in Crimea to naval drone strikes against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, while also successfully negotiating prisoner exchanges and managing relations across different factions within the Trump administration.
Importantly for Zelensky, Budanov has not been implicated in corruption scandals, which makes him a credible figure for peace negotiations in Abu Dhabi. And, unlike Yermak who pledged to join the frontlines after stepping down but never followed through, Budanov has real-battle experience, a factor that will likely resonate among exhausted soldiers. 

Recent opinion polls reinforce the decision to appoint Budanov, ranking him among Ukraine’s three most trusted public figures. One survey even suggests that, in a hypothetical runoff excluding former armed forces chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Budanov would outperform Zelensky.
Chatham House, in this regard, has put forward an interesting suggestion. They argue that, by bringing a potential political challenger into his administration, Zelenskyy is seeking to neutralise Budanov as an external rival if elections (repeatedly pushed by Washington) take place. At the same time, the move allows Zelenskyy to share, and potentially shift, responsibility for any failure in peace talks.

The second change in administration was the appointment of Mykhailo Fedorov, head of the Ministry of Digital Transformation since 2019, as the new defence minister. Announcing the move, Zelenskyy said the reshuffle reflects a “two-track strategy”, strengthening Ukraine’s hand in peace negotiations while accelerating technological scaling should the war continue.
Chatham House also argues that Fedorov’s appointment indicates an effort to scale up Ukraine’s domestic defence production. Having led government digitalisation, the Army of Drones project, and procurement reforms, Fedorov signals a move away from reliance on slow Western arms supplies and toward sustaining a ‘war of attrition’. This also helps Ukraine’s EU accession case,  particularly in light of the European Defence Industry Programme, where €300 million has been set aside to fold Ukraine’s defence sector into the broader European framework.”

The reshuffle in Zelensky’s administration, which comes amid renewed American pressure on Ukraine to accept a peace deal, appears to reflect a belief in the Ukrainian government that the war might go on for longer than expected,  and that it must invest in its growing status as a military powerhouse,

This pressure is also unfolding against a broader strategic backdrop. With the New START nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia set to expire in 2026 and no successor agreement in place, Washington is facing the prospect of losing the last remaining mechanism governing its strategic nuclear relationship with Moscow. Initially signed in 2010 and extended once until February 2026, New START has put legally binding limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, while providing verification mechanisms that reduce uncertainty about each side’s arsenal.

Analysts from Ariel Petrovics warn that the collapse of New START would leave the United States grappling with simultaneous uncertainty over both Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities, a scenario that would complicate U.S. strategic planning and conflict resolution. In that context, the push to stabilise at least one front in the confrontation with Russia takes on added urgency, and may have been a topic of discussion during Witkoff and Kushner’s visit to Moscow. 

With the next round of trilateral discussions set to take place in the same location on February 1, there is little reason, for now, to expect a decisive shift. The Abu Dhabi format may well continue to serve as a useful channel for managing pressure and signalling intent, but the gap between the parties’ core positions remains wide. Whether these talks evolve into a genuine pathway toward settlement, or simply formalise a new phase of prolonged negotiation, will depend on how much political cost each side is ultimately willing, or able, to absorb.