STEM presents an interview with Cyril Widdershoven, an expert in global energy markets, geopolitics, and energy and security-related risks, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. He also holds leadership and advisory positions in various international think tanks, including Strategy International and Hilltower Resource Advisors.

— What political signals did Turkmenistan aim to send during the President’s visit to Rome, and to what extent do these signals reflect real changes in the country’s foreign policy course and its model of cooperation with the European Union?

-The visit of the President of Turkmenistan to Rome on October 24 had a distinctly pragmatic and transactional character. The key political message that can be inferred from the negotiations is that Turkmenistan is demonstrating its readiness for structured and long-term cooperation with one of the leading economies of the European Union, while emphasizing that such cooperation will be conducted strictly on Turkmen terms. This was not a signal of liberalization or a sharp shift in foreign policy; rather, it was a careful affirmation of the "openness without concessions" model.

Substantively, the meeting was focused on transforming bilateral relations into concrete opportunities for commercial deals. Energy occupied a central place — both existing projects and potential future agreements. At the same time, the agenda was not limited to hydrocarbons: issues of cybersecurity, transport infrastructure, and industrial cooperation were also discussed. It is important to note that the emphasis was not on immediate gas supplies to Italy or Europe, but on creating a sustainable basis for concrete commercial interaction — including optimization of fields, infrastructure development, and expansion of the presence of the Italian company ENI. In this sense, the visit can be seen as a credible and well-thought-out transition to a more practical form of cooperation, rather than a declarative gesture.

— Why is Turkmenistan of interest to Italian energy and engineering companies today, and what specific technological and commercial niches make this cooperation mutually beneficial in the long term?

-Turkmenistan’s attractiveness for Italian businesses arises from several factors simultaneously. First and foremost, there are large but still underdeveloped hydrocarbon reserves. Alongside this, the country offers a wide range of opportunities for optimizing mature, so-called brownfield fields. For Italian companies, this means a significant and long-term "workscope" — the volume of work where accumulated technical and engineering expertise can be effectively applied.

Particular value lies in the opportunity to monetize Italian experience in enhancing production at mature fields, modernizing onshore facilities, compressor stations, processing systems, metering, measurement, and automated control systems. These areas are traditionally strengths of Italian contractors and operators.

Another factor is the emphasis on Italy’s presence in Turkmenistan since 2008, with investments amounting to billions of dollars. This is not accidental: it gives Italian participants a sense of their own significance and embeddedness in Turkmenistan’s energy landscape, reinforcing the perception of Italy as a reliable and long-term partner.

From Ashgabat’s perspective, Italy represents a convenient and dependable partner within the EU. Cooperation with Rome is perceived as less politicized and less subject to geopolitical maneuvering compared to several other European capitals. At the same time, Italy sees Turkmenistan as a potential additional supply route and a reserve project option for the future.

— How can Italy’s interest in Turkmenistan be characterized — is it a strategy spanning decades with long-term investments, or a set of specific projects with manageable risk, oriented around the existing model of state control of the energy sector?

-Italy’s interest in Turkmenistan cannot be reduced to a single dimension — it is both long-term and targeted. Strategically, Rome relies on an existing portfolio of long-lived assets, primarily ENI’s presence in the Nebit-Dag region. The Italian side openly declares its intention to deepen these ties and expand cooperation.

At the same time, Italy’s approach is clearly selective and directly tied to Turkmenistan’s model of hydrocarbon sector management. This involves strong state control through structures such as Turkmenneft, Turkmengaz, and specialized state agencies. Italy deliberately focuses on Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and service contracts with clearly defined boundaries, avoiding fully open competitive licenses.

This model makes Turkmenistan attractive as a "growth partner": the volume of work is clearly defined, politically supported, and institutionally insulated. For ENI and other Italian companies, this means manageable risk and a predictable environment, which is an important factor in investment decision-making.

— What role does Nebit-Dag play today in Turkmenistan’s energy strategy and ENI’s activities?

-Nebit-Dag represents a mature onshore oil province and contract area, serving both as a stable production base and a practical "training ground." It is not currently considered a national growth driver. ENI operates this asset, having invested around $2 billion, with the main focus on optimizing production through work on a large stock of wells and carrying out numerous recovery operations.

The attractiveness of Nebit-Dag lies in its "low-drama engineering value." Major discoveries or rapid production growth are not expected here, but stability and predictability make this asset important. In the Turkmen context, Nebit-Dag should be seen as a kind of "test format" — a stable onshore PSA with a proven foreign operator that serves as a risk mitigation model. Italian participation here effectively acts as a foothold for possible larger projects in the future.

— Does Italy realistically need Turkmen hydrocarbons today, or is Turkmenistan for Rome more of a strategic option and diversification element rather than a source of immediate supply?

-From the perspective of current needs, Italy does not have an acute need for Turkmen hydrocarbons. The country has already significantly diversified its molecular supply sources. However, Italian energy strategy traditionally builds around creating optionality.

Turkmenistan fits well into the architecture of the South European gas market, which already includes Caspian flows via Azerbaijan and Turkey, LNG supplies, and North African resources. In this context, the Turkmen direction is considered an additional strategic option. At the same time, current analysis indicates that the most realistic supply route to Europe remains swap schemes via Iran and Turkey. Direct routes to the Italian market have not yet been established.

In a broader perspective, Turkmenistan could become part of the European energy portfolio. However, at this stage, it is not viewed as a supplier capable of replacing other sources in the short term. Its role is rather potential and deferred over time.

— What infrastructure and political barriers currently prevent Turkmenistan from directly entering the European market, and how effectively can bypass routes through Iran and Turkey work?

-The key structural limitation remains the lack of physical infrastructure, primarily the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which could directly connect Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan and the Southern Gas Corridor. In parallel, there are serious questions regarding financing and uncertainties about future EU demand. Building new large-scale gas infrastructure faces limited access to funding and political risks, especially given European policies aimed at reducing gas consumption.

At the same time, the EU is simultaneously seeking to reduce dependence on Russian gas, which will require partial replacement of volumes in the long term. Another complication is regional geopolitics: the influence of Russia and Iran, as well as their potential opposition to new routes, especially against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis and shifts in global policy.

In the short term, Turkmenistan is forced to rely on bypass solutions — primarily swap schemes through Iran and Turkey. These routes allow the delivery of limited volumes but remain vulnerable to price disputes, sanctions risks, transit issues, and overall instability.