STEM presents an interview with American political scientist, former CIA and US State Department analyst Paul Goble.

- Mr. Goble, how do you assess the strategic significance of the meeting in Washington for the entire South Caucasus? Can we say that this summit has become a new stage in reformatting the regional architecture of security and economic cooperation?

 -Beyond doubt, the declaration coming out of Washington changes the dynamics of all the countries in the South Caucasus and those further afield in Central Asia, Iran, Russia and the West with interests there. But while that is true, it is also the case that the declaration left many issues unresolved, including the details of the Zangezur Corridor, and so many of the countries in the greater region are even now figuring out how to exploit or derail the Washington declaration.  Central Asian countries welcome this, China is ambiguous, while Russia and Iran are opposed to the realization of the corridor plan. Within Armenia, many are opposed as well, a pattern that gives Moscow ample opportunity to meddle; and in Georgia, some including former president Sakhashvili think that the new corridor will work against Tbilisi's interests. In short, this is a step forward; but it is hardly the last word on the geopolitical competition in the south Caucasus.

-What key signals, in your opinion, did this summit send to Moscow? Given Russia's traditional role in the region, can we expect that it will perceive the agreements reached as a challenge to its influence and what might its response be?

- The Washington declaration sent three key signals to Moscow: first, Russia has been sidelined at least for a time as a mediator on the post-Soviet space; second, NATO in the person of Turkey is moving in; and third, Russia will now have to decide how close it wants to ally itself with outcast Iran and how much China will decide to make the best of this or go through Iran.  My guess is that China will take the longer view and seek to find a way of using the corridor for its own purposes.

-The meeting in Washington took place in the context of increasing rivalry between global powers. How do you think Iran and China, which also have interests in the South Caucasus and closely cooperate with some countries in the region, will react to the results of the summit?

- Iran has now said that it will use force to prevent an American controlled corridor just north of the Arax River; and Chinese commentators have indicated that Beijing will seek to exploit the corridor while also thinking about whether it needs to develop more corridors across Iran, something that would put it at odds with Europe and the US.  I think it may plan to develop such corridors but not in the near term.

-Turkey is a strategic partner of Azerbaijan and an important regional player. How can the agreements reached in Washington affect Turkish policy in the region, especially in the context of transport and energy projects?

- Turkey and NATO are at least as big winners from the Washington meeting as Azerbaijan. I see Ankara using the corridor to promote its influence not only in the Caucasus and against Iran but to solidifying its position in Central Asia. A win-win for Turkey.

-One of the most discussed topics remains the Zangezur Corridor. How do you see its future? Can international support for this project accelerate its implementation, and how will this change the balance of power in the region, including the reaction of Iran, which is wary of this route?

- It is going to take several years to build the entire corridor in the best of circumstances. A road may go through quickly, rail and pipelines somewhat less so.  And a major question is just how far north of the Arax will the corridor pass. Most people would like to see it further removed from Iran than just right across the Arax. But the Arax route is flatter and construction could be quicker. The further north, the more difficult the terrain and the longer and more expensive the project will be to complete.

- Do you think the Washington summit is a signal that the United States intends to play a more active role in the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and if so, will this be able to displace or at least weaken Moscow's role as a mediator?

- I hope that this is an indication of a new trend in American policy rather than a one-off target of opportunity. If it isn't, then the accord will mean far less not only to the region as a whole but to both Baku and Yerevan.

- Do you think it is possible that China and Russia will begin to secretly coordinate their actions in the South Caucasus in order to prevent the strengthening of the positions of the United States and Turkey, especially on the Zangezur Corridor issue?

- Moscow will certainly seek to have that happen; but the West will know that as soon as it occurs – and China will pay a price. I think China will move very slowly if it concludes that the Americans are in for the long term.

- In your opinion, can this summit become a starting point for a broader format of regional cooperation, which will include other countries of the South Caucasus, and, possibly, the states of Central Asia via the Caspian Sea?

- Again, I hope so; but we will have to see. US policy in 2025 has moved from one issue to another so quickly that it is difficult to see what Washington will to after any major move.