The regional order in the South Caucasus is no longer being shaped at mediation tables; it is emerging from decisions taken quietly and in advance. In this sense, Azerbaijan today acts not as a participant in the balance, but as its architect: not by imposing rules, but by consistently defining the framework within which other actors are compelled to operate. The key question is no longer what Baku says, but which trajectories it renders inevitable.

The foundation of this strategy lies in rejecting political theater in favor of managing the environment. Azerbaijan is deliberately moving away from formats where outcomes depend on external guarantors and is shifting regional dynamics into a functional mode: logistics, connectivity, security, predictability. This is neither a “peace process” in the classical sense nor a new system of alliances. It is a calibration of conditions in which conflicts cease to function as instruments of policy and cooperation becomes a pragmatic choice. The consequence is clear: the room for abrupt strategic reversals by neighboring states is narrowing, even if political rhetoric remains harsh.

Recent contacts in Abu Dhabi were not a diplomatic episode but an indicator of the next phase. Relocating sensitive discussions to a neutral, depoliticized environment signals that Baku no longer requires guarantor capitals. The United Arab Emirates in this context is not acting as a mediator, but as a “clean platform” where decisions can be discussed without the pressure of symbolism and formal commitments. The forecast is straightforward: if this logic consolidates, Brussels and Moscow will definitively lose their exclusivity, and regional issues will increasingly be resolved in formats that do not presuppose public declarations. This sharply reduces the capacity of external actors to influence outcomes through rhetoric and increases the weight of informal understandings.

The military component complements and simultaneously insures this construction. Azerbaijan’s joint exercises are not a signal of readiness for escalation, but a demonstration of interoperability and scenario control. Selectivity is the key element. Azerbaijan cooperates neither indiscriminately nor for display, but only with those partners and in those formats that genuinely enhance manageability and predictability. Cooperation with Turkey anchors a baseline level of military predictability, while engagement with external partners projects regional security beyond Caucasian insularity. The forecast: as the role of peacekeeping mechanisms diminishes, exercises will increasingly function as implicit guarantees — not to “protect,” but to signal that any sharp destabilization would encounter a coordinated response.

The practical consequences of this model are already visible in the behavior of neighboring states. Armenia is gradually losing the space for a strategy built on the expectation of external intervention. The choice will increasingly narrow to integration into the proposed formats or self-isolation with mounting costs. Georgia, despite internal political fluctuations, is likely to preserve its transit rationality, as there is no viable alternative to this function in the coming years. Russia, having lost its monopoly, will be compelled to adapt to the role of one actor among others rather than an arbiter. The EU risks remaining an observer if it continues to prioritize symbolic presence over instrumental engagement.

Over a two- to three-year horizon, this architecture is likely to produce three key effects. First, a reduced probability of sharp military escalation while political frictions persist: conflicts will become “expensive” and unpredictable. Second, the institutionalization of informal rules: even in the absence of formal agreements, it will be clear which actions are considered acceptable. Third, a shift in the center of decision-making from public formats to closed, functional environments where Baku already holds a structural advantage.

This model presupposes a high degree of continuous manageability and precise calibration of subsequent moves. It does not operate automatically and requires active stewardship. Yet it is precisely this quality that enables Baku to retain the initiative and flexibly adapt the architecture to shifting external conditions without revising its foundation. Any major external shock a sharp escalation around Iran, an intensification of global confrontation, or an intra-regional crisis may necessitate a firmer articulation of position. Even then, however, Baku would approach the next phase with an advantage: the architecture is already in place, and what would need adjustment is not the foundation, but the configuration.

Azerbaijan is not offering the region a new order; it is methodically phasing out the old mechanisms of governance. In an environment where guarantees are devalued, decisive importance belongs not to declared influence, but to the ability to predefine the configuration of permissible action.