Interview with political scientist, director of the European Studies program and Associate Professor at the Johan Skytte Institute for Political Studies at the University of Tartu Stefano Braghiroli.

- How do you assess Steve Witkoff’s statement regarding possible U.S. mediation in negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia? How realistic is U.S. involvement in this process, given its current foreign policy priorities?

- To be honest, I am quite skeptical. I don’t see a clear U.S. interest in these negotiations, which are certainly ongoing between the two countries. The main question is: what could motivate Washington to take on a role in this? I believe the key factor is that the U.S. does not view the South Caucasus as a region of its primary interests.

Moreover, given the current trend of normalization between Washington and Moscow, the U.S. is unlikely to actively intervene in a region it perceives, to some extent, as part of Russia’s sphere of influence. The Trump administration has repeatedly demonstrated its adherence to the concept of “spheres of interest,” which makes U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus likely only within the framework of a broader agreement with Russia. In other words, if the U.S. does decide to play a role in this process, it will probably do so with Moscow’s consent rather than unilaterally.

Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that neither Witkoff nor Trump himself has a deep understanding of the situation in the region. The current U.S. administration, particularly its top leadership, does not appear to show much interest in this issue.

- What factors could increase U.S. interest in Azerbaijan, and how might this impact regional peace negotiations?

- There are two key factors that could enhance Azerbaijan’s appeal to the U.S. First, Azerbaijan's strong ties with Israel. The Trump administration has shown exceptional loyalty to Israel, which puts Baku in a favorable position. We have already seen confirmation of this through recent visits and diplomatic engagements.

Second, Azerbaijan’s energy significance. The country's rich natural resources could be attractive to Washington, given Trump’s pragmatic approach to international relations.

Azerbaijan could leverage these two factors to capture Trump's interest in more active involvement. However, even in this case, it is unlikely to happen without coordinating with Moscow. Nevertheless, this strategy could allow Baku to strengthen its position in relations with the U.S., especially considering the traditionally strong influence of the Armenian lobby in Washington.

Thus, Azerbaijan has arguments to draw U.S. attention to the ongoing peace negotiations. Hopefully, this process will lead to greater stability in the South Caucasus and pave the way for normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

- Witkoff compared the situation in the South Caucasus to conflicts in Iran, Russia, and Ukraine. How accurate is this comparison?

- This comparison clearly illustrates how poorly the Trump administration understands regional conflicts. While skepticism is natural, I would be cautious about expecting meaningful and full-fledged U.S. involvement. These conflicts are fundamentally different.

The confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is primarily driven by Russian imperialism and Moscow’s inability or unwillingness to recognize Ukraine as a fully sovereign and independent state. This remains the key reason for the conflict, regardless of the Kremlin's rhetoric.

In the case of the South Caucasus, the primary issue lies in the intersection of borders and ethnic identities, as well as the lasting impact of the Soviet past. However, the roots of the conflict go much deeper, stretching back to earlier historical periods and not just the Soviet legacy.

As for Iran, drawing parallels here is entirely unfounded. Modern conflicts involving Iran stem from the Islamic Revolution and a struggle for regional hegemony, driven by both religious divisions and geopolitical rivalries.

Thus, these conflicts have distinct causes and dynamics. When a high-ranking official claim they are "practically identical," it only highlights a serious lack of knowledge and understanding of the situation.

- What is the main goal of the Abraham Accords, and why is the U.S. interested in expanding them? What are the key geopolitical benefits for Baku in joining the Abraham Accords?

- The primary purpose of the Abraham Accords is to establish a foundation for normalizing relations between Middle Eastern countries, including Arab and Muslim-majority states, and Israel. These agreements are particularly focused on the Gulf region and are designed as a mechanism to gradually integrate more nations into the normalization process. While the number of participating countries remains limited, the ultimate goal is to foster stronger ties between Arab states and Israel.

The core principle of these accords is pragmatism. The countries that have joined—or are considering joining—are mostly pragmatic Arab states that are shifting away from the ideological stance of refusing to recognize Israel in exchange for tangible economic and political benefits. This pragmatic approach defines the essence of the process.

As for Azerbaijan’s potential involvement, the current framework of the Abraham Accords does not formally extend beyond the Middle East. This explains why discussions regarding Azerbaijan’s participation remain speculative. Geographically, Azerbaijan is not part of the region covered by the accords. However, its increasing engagement and growing significance in this context are partly due to the strong support provided by the Trump administration to Israel.

- Why have contacts between Azerbaijan, Israel, and the U.S. intensified at this particular time?

- The Trump administration has demonstrated a much stronger and more decisive support for Israel. In this context, Azerbaijan, which has traditionally been one of Israel’s key allies and partners in the region, can play two significant roles.

First, Azerbaijan can align with this new trend and, given the right incentives from the U.S., continue strengthening its support for Israel, remaining essentially the only reliable ally of the Jewish state in the region.

Second, from a broader tactical perspective, Azerbaijan could help expand the geographical scope of the Abraham Accords, using them as a platform to facilitate normalization efforts beyond the Persian Gulf. This could elevate the process to a more global level, extending normalization efforts not only to additional Arab countries but also beyond the Arab world.

- Is there a possibility of resistance from third countries such as Iran or Russia?

- In this case, resistance from Iran can be expected, as it has traditionally been opposed to strengthening ties between Israel and Muslim countries. Russia, on the other hand, is likely to exercise a certain degree of caution, as it continues to adhere to the concept of spheres of influence.

At the same time, any initiative by Trump requires careful analysis. It remains unclear whether this is part of a well-thought-out strategy or merely spontaneous ideas put forward without deep consideration. However, if a larger plan is indeed behind this, it likely aligns with the broader picture of U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Interestingly, after one of the phone conversations between Putin and Trump, the White House press release included a statement that Iran should not threaten Israel's existence. This indicates that the issue is being discussed and may become a subject of negotiations.

The question of Trump's future actions regarding Iran also remains open. So far, Washington's rhetoric has been strictly confrontational, but as seen in the case of North Korea, Trump’s policy direction can change rather quickly. It is possible that at some point, Trump might attempt to establish dialogue with Tehran to reach certain agreements.

Nevertheless, in general, it can be assumed that Iran will be strongly opposed to the expansion of the Abraham Accords' influence. Russia, meanwhile, is likely to take a wait-and-see approach, assessing how it affects its strategic interests.

- Russia is advancing in the Kursk region and in the occupied territories, while Trump seems interested only in ending the war at any cost. What leverage did the U.S. have over Moscow, and how could it have changed the course of negotiations?

- When discussing the situation in Ukraine and the current attempts by the Trump administration, it is clear that Trump is firmly demonstrating his desire for a quick peace. He appears to care little—or not at all—about what has traditionally been called a just peace. This is confirmed by numerous statements, including those by Witkoff, which make it evident that the U.S. is focused on achieving peace regardless of its substance, as well as on normalizing relations with Russia. These are two entirely clear priorities.

At the same time, Ukraine’s resistance is increasingly becoming an obstacle to achieving these goals. One of the main issues with this approach is that Russia would likely pay a minimal price, while Ukraine would suffer the greatest losses.

We have already seen how the Trump administration approaches negotiations. Essentially, the U.S. had two key levers for negotiations with Russia: Ukraine's NATO membership and the country's territorial integrity. Of course, this did not mean that Ukraine was guaranteed to join NATO in the short term or retain all its territories. However, these issues could have served as important tools for exerting pressure on Moscow.

- What are your predictions regarding the further development of the situation in Ukraine? What are the possible scenarios for ending the hostilities?

- We see that the Trump administration effectively abandoned both key levers even before negotiations began. This indicates that Trump's main goal is to conclude the negotiation process as quickly as possible. In this situation, if Ukraine attempts to resist such an outcome, there is a risk that it could simply be sidelined from negotiations. As a result, it would have to confront Russia in even greater isolation. The U.S. wields significant influence over Ukraine and can pressure it into negotiations regardless of how much this aligns with Kyiv’s interests.

The main issue, which affects not only Ukraine but also the entire region—including the South Caucasus, the post-Soviet space, and the broader geopolitical landscape—is that if the world accepts a situation where two great powers decide the fate of a third country without its meaningful participation, this would effectively mark a return to the Cold War-era concept of spheres of influence. Essentially, it would mean that power takes precedence over the norms of international law.

- Given the current circumstances, how likely is it that Europe can independently take the initiative and continue supporting Ukraine without Trump's involvement? Does it have the necessary resources and political will, especially if peace efforts fail?

- Europe is currently trying to do two things simultaneously. First, it is working to establish a unified position on supporting Ukraine, with a few exceptions such as Hungary (led by Orbán). Overall, the EU remains consistent in its support for Ukraine. Second, Europe is actively rearming itself, recognizing the growing disengagement of the U.S. from regional issues.

Can Europe handle both tasks at the same time? It can certainly try. However, it is clear that Europe cannot instantly replace the U.S., nor can it take a fundamentally different stance on Ukraine than the one defined by Washington. The reason is simple: the EU lacks the resources to support Ukraine alone in its confrontation with Russia without American assistance.

Thus, Europe's ability to act on Ukraine is constrained by the framework set by the Trump administration. The EU may attempt to secure the best possible terms for Ukraine within these negotiations. Alternatively, if Trump and Putin (possibly with Ukraine’s participation) reach some form of agreement, Europe could play the role of a guarantor—providing military and financial support to Ukraine and deploying peacekeeping forces to prevent Russia from exploiting favorable terms of the deal. However, the EU is not in a position to completely disregard Washington’s approach and pursue an independent Ukraine policy separate from the U.S. This is the objective reality at the moment.

- Given the expected reduction of the American presence in Europe, how do you think this will affect the global influence of the U.S. and its ability to maintain order on the international stage?

- The U.S. is increasingly doing two things. On one hand, it is alienating its allies, threatening them, and using aggressive rhetoric towards them that was previously uncommon. It is distancing itself from certain regions (i.e. Europe) or, at the very least, showing a tendency to do so.

One the other hand, Washington is increasingly thinking in terms of spheres of influence. When it comes to negotiations on Ukraine, regardless of their outcome, Russia is likely to gain more than it deserves. This confirms that Trump’s view of international relations is based precisely on the concept of spheres of influence. In this sense, his policy represents a step back from the traditional U.S. role as a global leader.

Trump may say whatever he wants, including slogans about "Making America Great Again," but in reality, the country is abdicating its global role. Washington’s policy is becoming more isolationist. The U.S. is, in effect, relinquishing its hard power. If NATO weakens and loses credibility, this will impact US hard and soft power. We have already seen how, under Trump, institutions like USAID, Voice of America, and other tools of soft power have deteriorated.

- How do you assess the role of China and Russia amid the decline of U.S. influence on the international stage? How will this change global dynamics in the coming years?

- Naturally, in such a situation, other powers begin to take advantage of the vacuum left by the U.S. And, of course, the first country to recognize this and act accordingly is China.

Another important point is that China is closely watching how the U.S. handles Ukraine. This sends a clear signal to Beijing—regardless of Washington’s statements, the U.S. may be unwilling or unable to protect, for example, Taiwan. If the U.S. effectively "abandons" Ukraine, China may conclude that it can do the same with Taiwan. This is especially significant given that supporting Ukraine is much easier than defending Taiwan, both geographically and militarily.

Yes, we are witnessing the growing role of Russia and China on the global stage, while Europe is becoming increasingly isolated. However, this is only part of a broader trend in which global and regional powers are striving to expand their influence.

- Is the formation of a new multipolar world order possible? What key challenges could lead to a global crisis in the coming years?

- In light of everything said, its formation is becoming increasingly likely, as the U.S. gradually retreats and begins to acknowledge (and embrace) what it had refused since the end of the Cold War—the existence of spheres of influence. We see this in negotiations with Russia, and we are likely to see something similar in relations with China. Interestingly, just recently, the U.S. administration itself started using the term "multipolar world"—this was discussed, in particular, by Vice President Vance and other officials.

The point is that if the U.S. abandons its global role and starts promoting the concept of a different world order, it is quite unexpected in terms of its own interests. The post-world war and especially post-Cold War world order was created by Washington to maintain American hegemony. Typically, it is those who seek to challenge the dominant power, not the power itself, that fight against the existing order. Therefore, if the Trump administration continues to implement its current priorities, the world will indeed become multipolar. However, it is still unclear how this will align with U.S. interests.

Moreover, a multipolar world could be one where nondemocratic, authoritarian states—ranging from China to Russia—play a greater role. This will create new threats for Europe, which, in the event of weakening ties with the U.S., will find itself in a more vulnerable position.

At the same time, this could push the EU towards a more active geopolitical role. If the world becomes more complex, dangerous, and unpredictable, Europe will have to act much more decisively. As the former Prime Minister of Belgium once said: " There are only two types of country in Europe: small countries... and countries which are small, but don’t yet know that they are. ."

Even countries like Germany, Italy, and France will remain relatively small on the global scale. In the face of growing threats, the only thing Europe can do is stay united and minimize risks in this complex and chaotic world. How effectively the EU will be able to meet this challenge is a topic for another discussion.