An interview with Cyril Widdershoven, an expert in global energy markets, geopolitics, and energy and security-related risks, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa regions. He also holds leadership and advisory roles in various international think tanks, including Strategy International and Hilltower Resource Advisors.

-Mr. Widdershoven, you often analyze the links between energy and geopolitics. Which regions do you think will become key pressure points on the global energy market in the coming years?

-In geopolitical and geo-economics’ way of analysis, the main regions to keep an eye on are US-EU-China-Middle East and India. On the other hand, as we have stated in the 1990s already, the Central Asian-Caspian arena is of the utmost importance to most players, as it is in the middle of a Landbridge option not only for Europe-US or China, but increasingly India. Arab governments, especially GCC, but also Iran have set their power projections also towards the latter region, while as historically before, Russia is looking at it either as its backyard or even as part of former Russian Empire.

When now connecting all to the energy spheres, hydrocarbon-renewables or even nuclear, again the old power centers are still there, as especially Middle East (Saudi-UAE-Qatar) but also North Africa is stepping into the renewables game, especially green hydrogen or green power production. These developments could tilt powers slightly, but until now this will not happen before 2040-2050. We are still in a mainly hydrocarbon based economic system, in which major markets either provide or depend on the black gold.

-How do you assess the actions of OPEC+ in the current situation?

-OPEC in general is still trying to organize its powers in the market, looking at an equilibrium to keep demand as high and stable as possible, while not getting bull market with low price settings. OPEC+, which is an instrument or geopolitical power play by Saudi Arabia, UAE and Russia, is part of the latter. Until now it works according to planning, but high investments levels in upstream and downstream by most OPEC members now forces a possible higher production and export level. For OPEC+ this could be a major issue, as higher export volumes while demand is not growing extremely will push prices down. For total revenues of OPEC+ member Russia the latter is far from positive, as revenues will be dwindling. On the other hand, if nothing happens, lower oil prices in general keep Russian crude prices below the West’s sanctions level, so keeps oil flowing legally for Moscow.

At present, if rumors are right, a new onslaught on markets will be happening. Higher export volumes will be a sign of a battle for market share (UAE, Saudi, but also maybe Iran), while most parties are also needing much higher prices to keep their economic diversification costs at bay. Will be a very interesting couple of years for most of them, if there are no new geopolitical conflicts (Ukraine, Iran or possibly Taiwan). Crisis will be a major factor in oil price developments

-What are your expectations for oil and gas prices in the second half of 2025? Which factors will be decisive - the Middle East, China or EU demand?

- There is a battle going on between bears (fully looking at potential negative impact of Trump tariffs, struggling China economy or low investments Europe) and bulls (strong demand still, fledgling supply, potential harsh sanctions on Russia, Iran and potentially global consumers of Russian oil and gas).  At present, even with Ukraine or Iran, prices seem to be stagnating, with a high upwards potential (crisis), but not yet showing. Looking at market fundamentals, demand is still stronger than the production increases. Will be much more interesting to see what refinery markets are doing, as they don’t fall under OPEC agreements. At same time, struggling renewables or power sector investments, could be a major boon for higher hydrocarbon price settings very soon.

Major factors are the European economic situation (Stagnation or growth), China (economy), and the impact of the Trump Tariffs War in the coming weeks, as inflation will hit the USA (main market) while China could be dumping stuff elsewhere. Russia is also on everyone's mind, as its economy is weakening, military successes are no longer there, and instability in Moscow is clearly insight.

-What role do oil and gas play in the foreign policy strategies of players such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran? What are the most acute risks for energy routes now?

Even that most oil and gas exporters are downplaying the role of hydrocarbons in their foreign policy or power projections, as OPEC always states, “we are not manipulating the market or price….we only want stability”, reality is the opposite. Clearly stated, without oil and gas in these regions or countries, their role would be minimal, only seen as a transit route between Europe and Asia. Mainstream analysis still agrees that power and influence is linked to energy production and exports. Their current economic diversification is paid for and supported by hydrocarbon revenues, as most are still rentier states. The risks are also clear; instability in and around these countries, including the Caspian or Central Asia, will always have a significant role in geopolitics and economic development. Potential unrest in the Arab Gulf (Persian Gulf), Red Sea, Suez Canal, or even Panama Canal will have a major negative impact on all. Crises are to be expected, as Syria is unstable, Hamas is still fighting, Iran is in the crosshairs of the USA and Israel, and a brewing confrontation between the USA and China (Taiwan) or Russia – NATO is still an option to be considered. The Caspian and Central Asia are also still very hot, as conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran and Central Asia, Russia and the Caspian/Central Asia are to be considered too.

-The South Caucasus is becoming part of alternative energy routes. How do you assess the importance of the region for European energy security?

- The idea and the interest are not new, already in place since the 1980s! It is still very viable and of interest to most European players. For Europe’s energy security, especially after the slowdown of offshore wind, solar etc., or the Spain-Portugal blackout, oil and gas are still very hot, and needed not only as a backup system but as provider of energy and products for decades to come. Diversification of European supply is also needed, so Caspian-Caucasus is very hot, maybe even incorporating the KRG region of Iraq and other volumes.

-How viable is the idea of ​​turning Azerbaijan and the Trans-Caspian route (Middle Corridor) into an "energy belt" between Central Asia, the Caucasus and the EU?

- It is viable, economically attractive, or even necessary. However, geopolitics, instability, and power plays by Russia, Iran, and Turkey are interfering with or threatening. Investors and operators that would have their eyes on the region are not amused by the growing instability (Turkish Power Play) or Iran’s potential role or conflicts. Stability or at least a clear geopolitical picture and power support by mainstream countries (USA, France, Italy, Germany, or even the Netherlands/UK) should be addressed. Trump’s USA MAGA approach is not helping the Caucasus at present.

-How do you assess the balance between the oil export model and Azerbaijan's plans for a "green transition"? Is a "dual" energy route possible for Baku? How competitive can Baku be as an exporter within the framework of the European Green Deal?

- A dual approach is needed, as investors always state…you need to spread your risks to get high rewards. A dual energy route is an option, but should not be tilted towards renewables before price settings, long-term contracts and possible other options are being assessed. Hydrocarbons are clear, known and have a huge commodity market behind it. Renewables, especially green hydrogen or ammonia, are still little babies, without the strength, volume or even financials to break into new markets. Without a commodity market systemology, they will stay small, and very expensive. Demand will be almost until competitiveness has increased. Still, Baku should link to the EU Green Deal or 4sure to the EU CID (Clean Industrial Deal) and other programs.

-Do you think energy is becoming a tool of new generation diplomacy? Which countries are using it most successfully as a lever of influence?

-Energy is politics is money is power. Without energy simply the world comes to a standstill, nothing works or moves. Diplomacy since the 18^th century has been ruled by energy, you can even state before this also, as wood/coal was a major source for the economic development of a region or country. Until now, main players are USA (largest), Arab countries (Saudi, UAE, Qatar) and Russia. The latter would be breaking or destroyed without its energy revenues and power play. The support of China is partly based on Russian energy diplomacy. Most non-Western countries (India, Arabs) like Russian oil so don’t push an anti-Putin power position.

The Caspian (Baku etc.) also has its energy politics and foreign policy. Oil and gas, potentially renewables, make it a hotspot for the rest of the world.

-What are the prospects for multilateral energy cooperation between Azerbaijan, Turkey, the Gulf countries and the EU? Could instability in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea contribute to the growing role of alternative routes passing through the South Caucasus?

- Stability in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea is good for all, as it will drive prices down. At the same time, it needs to be linked to real stability and not a Trumpian approach of investments and economic friendships (or some even state a mafia style). Cooperation on energy will be a leading factor between Middle East/Caspian region and the rest of the world (USA, EU, China, India). Bilateral and multilateral cooperation is needed, but this time taking into account a real Nation First approach, it should be having advantages (long-term) for all sides, not a lobsided approach as we had before.