STEM presents an interview with Chinese political scientist, Senior Research Fellow at the China Center for Globalization, Founder and Chairman of China Cities Bluebook Consulting, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Business Ethics at the University of International Business and Economics, and Chairman of Asia Narratives Channel, Einar Tangen.

- How do you assess the evolution of the SCO over the past two decades - from a regional security structure to a potential anti-crisis bloc with global ambitions? In the context of the current transformation of the global system, what is the unique role of the SCO compared to Western alliances like NATO or the EU?

- In an era where global power is no longer monopolized by a single pole, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has emerged not as a counterweight, but as a counter-model. Over two decades, it has evolved from a regional security pact into a sprawling Eurasian platform that now represents over 40% of the world’s population and nearly 30% of global GDP. As one analyst aptly put it, The SCO doesn’t seek to dominate - it seeks to harmonize.

Taken in conjunction with the BRI and BRICS the three represent a new model for multipolarity that relies on pragmatic values rather than rigid ideologies.

Unlike Western alliances, such as NATO or the EU, the SCO’s ethos is rooted in non-interference, consensus-building, and respect for sovereignty. This makes it uniquely suited to navigate the complexities of a multipolar world, where cooperation must often precede confrontation. SCO is about solving internal threats like extremism, separatism, and terrorism whereas NATO thinks the problems come from exterior ideological differences.

- India has once again blocked Azerbaijan's application for full membership in the SCO. How do you interpret this move? Is this a manifestation of a bilateral conflict based on Azerbaijan's relations with Pakistan - or, more broadly, a sign of growing contradictions within the SCO itself as a platform with competing strategies? And how do Beijing and Moscow react to such intra-group competition?

- India’s recent veto of Azerbaijan’s membership application reveals the internal contradictions of a bloc that houses competing national strategies. While some interpret this as a bilateral spat over Azerbaijan’s ties with Pakistan, it also signals deeper tensions within the SCO’s consensus model. Yet, Beijing and Moscow have responded with strategic restraint—proof that quiet diplomacy remains the SCO’s strongest currency. India, meanwhile, confronted by Washington's rhetoric and actions is moving closer to its BRICS and SCO partners.

- How realistic is the scenario in which Azerbaijan and Armenia join the SCO simultaneously, as was the case with India and Pakistan? Given the cooling of relations between Armenia and Russia and Azerbaijan's deepening integration into Chinese-Eurasian initiatives, what are the chances that Baku, and not Yerevan, will become the first representative of the South Caucasus in the SCO?

- The idea of Armenia and Azerbaijan joining the SCO simultaneously, echoing the precedent set by India and Pakistan, is tantalizing but improbable. Azerbaijan’s growing integration into Chinese-led Eurasian initiatives, including a 43% surge in trade with China in 2023, positions Baku as the more likely candidate. Armenia’s cooling ties with Russia only reinforce this trajectory. China's recent signing of a strategic cooperation agreement with Armenia signals that dialogue and a, desire for peaceful consensus is its main driver.

— Who benefits more from Armenia and Azerbaijan joining the SCO: the countries themselves, gaining access to economic and political platforms, or major players (China, Russia, Iran), consolidating influence in yet another strategic region?

-The answer is both. For Armenia and Azerbaijan, SCO membership offers access to economic platforms and diplomatic legitimacy. For China, Russia, and Iran, it’s a strategic extension in a region that bridges Europe and Asia. In a multipolar world, influence is not seized, it’s invited.

—Can the SCO be viewed as a tool for promoting the Chinese concept of "soft power" and multipolarity as opposed to the unipolarity of the United States?

-The SCO also serves as a vessel for China’s soft power and its vision of multipolarity. Through scholarships, infrastructure loans, and cultural exchanges, Beijing has woven a web of soft power cooperation that contrasts sharply with the coercive optics of Western diplomacy. China’s soft power doesn’t build walls and threaten—it builds bridges and goodwill.

—How are the interests of China and Russia balanced within the SCO, especially against the backdrop of their economic asymmetry and Beijing's growing influence in Central Asia?

-Balancing China and Russia within the SCO remains delicate. While Beijing’s economic clout is undeniable, Moscow’s strategic depth and historical ties in Central Asia ensure it remains a co-pilot, not a passenger. The recent Russian endorsement of the SCO Development Bank—once resisted—signals a pragmatic convergence, while the announcement of another energy pipeline deal signals a long-term commitment.

—Is Iran's recent accession a sign of the region's geopolitical drift from the West?

-Iran’s accession in 2023 marked a geopolitical pivot away from Western institutions. Tehran’s embrace of SCO mechanisms, including exploring de-dollarized trade settlement systems, reflects a broader Eurasian drift. Iran didn’t turn east—it was pushed.

—Can the South Caucasus become a "bridge" between the SCO Eurasian project and the Belt and Road Initiative? What risks and opportunities does this create for Azerbaijan?

-Azerbaijan’s role in the Middle Corridor and its infrastructure assets like the Port of Baku make it a natural bridge between the SCO and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Yet unresolved tensions with Armenia pose risks. Stability, not symbolism, will determine whether the South Caucasus becomes a connector or a chokepoint.

—How can tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan be resolved within the SCO, given the presence of Iran, Russia, and China's potential interest in route stability?

-Can the SCO help resolve the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict? Possibly. With Iran, Russia, and China all invested in route stability, the bloc offers a neutral platform for dialogue. The success of such efforts will depend on the political will of the parties and the willingness of the powers involved to act as mediators.

- How do you assess the influence of Turkey, which is striving for strategic autonomy and is interested in interaction with the SCO through the Organization of Turkic States?

-Turkey’s growing engagement through the Organization of Turkic States adds another layer of complexity. Its strategic autonomy and infrastructure leadership position as a complementary—not competing—actor. Turkey speaks the language of Turkic solidarity, but it listens to the rhythm of Eurasian pragmatism.

- Given the growing confrontation between China and the United States, and India's rapprochement with the West, will the SCO become an arena for hidden rivalry between New Delhi and Beijing?

- India’s deepening ties with the West and China’s rivalry with the U.S. may turn the SCO into a subtle arena for strategic competition. Yet recent signs of thaw—like resumed flights and trade—suggest that even rivals can cooperate when the stakes are regional.

- What steps can the West (US, EU) take in response to the strengthening of the SCO, especially in regions where interests overlap - for example, in the South Caucasus or Central Asia?

- As the SCO expands its footprint, the West must recalibrate. Ignoring the bloc risks strategic irrelevance in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Constructive engagement—through infrastructure partnerships or diplomatic outreach—may be the only viable response.

- What possible scenarios for the development of the SCO do you see by 2030? Can it become the core of an alternative international order - or will it remain a regional forum without real leverage?

- Looking ahead to 2030, the future of SCO hinges on institutional depth, internal cohesion, and its ability to mediate—not just manage—conflict. The SCO’s strength lies not in its size, but in its silence, it listens before it leads.