STEM presents an interview with Turkish expert, analyst at the Ankara-based Eurasia Studies Center (AVİM) Hazel Çağan Elbir.

-How would you characterize the current political situation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan? How stable is his control over power, given the growing resistance from the opposition and the church?

-Since assuming power through the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has cultivated the image of a reformist leader open to Western engagement. However, the defeat in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, the loss of Karabakh, and subsequent efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan have provoked significant opposition from both political adversaries and the Armenian Apostolic Church. Although Pashinyan’s authority appeared to solidify following a parliamentary majority in the 2021 snap elections, recent protests—particularly following the return of four villages to Azerbaijan in 2024—have escalated, driven by the church and opposition groups.

Pashinyan’s hold on power remains precarious but has not entirely eroded. His administration has successfully countered church-led attempts to destabilize the government, such as the arrest of Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, through the use of security forces. Nevertheless, the church’s considerable societal influence and the opposition’s nationalist rhetoric continue to challenge Pashinyan’s legitimacy. Public discontent in Armenia stems from the loss of Karabakh and perceived concessions to Azerbaijan. While Pashinyan’s reformist agenda retains support among younger and urban populations, his connections with traditional and nationalist segments of society have weakened. The stability of his government depends on economic performance, international backing, and the capacity to mitigate opposition influence.   

-Do you think it is possible to talk about the formation of a new opposition coalition, which includes both pro-Russian and pro-Western forces united by dissatisfaction with Pashinyan's course? Or are these protests fragmented and do not pose a threat?

-The opposition in Armenia is ideologically heterogeneous. Pro-Russian former elites (such as supporters of Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan), nationalist groups, Karabakh clans, and the Armenian Apostolic Church appear united by a shared dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. However, forming a cohesive coalition among these groups remains challenging for several reasons:

Deep divisions exist between pro-Russian factions (including the church and Russia-linked business figures like Samvel Karapetyan) and pro-Western liberals.  The opposition struggles to rally around a unifying leader. Figures like Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan may enjoy popularity but lack the charisma and organizational capacity to sustain a long-term political movement.  While protests, particularly those led by the church, can draw significant crowds, they tend to be localized and reactive. Events such as the return of the Gazakh villages have served as catalysts, but the opposition has yet to develop a broader, coherent strategy.

At present, the opposition does not pose an immediate threat to Pashinyan’s leadership. However, economic challenges or a new external crisis (e.g., renewed tensions with Azerbaijan) could potentially galvanize these disparate groups. The church’s ability to mobilize public sentiment further heightens this risk.

-What is the significance of mass protests led by the church and clergy? How strong is the "church factor" in Armenian politics? Why has the confrontation between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church escalated to the limit right now?

-The Armenian Apostolic Church holds not only religious but also significant societal and political influence in Armenia. As the first nation to adopt Christianity as its official religion in the 4th century, Armenia grants the church constitutional status, recognizing it as a cornerstone of national identity. Armenia is not a secular country. This can be clearly seen from its religion-based constitution.

The church’s role in leading protests against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is not historically unprecedented, but tensions have escalated since the 2020 Karabakh defeat.The church wields considerable influence, particularly in rural areas and among the Armenian diaspora, mobilizing large groups effectively. The 2024 protests in Tavush and Shirak demonstrated this capacity. By labeling Pashinyan a “traitor” and “secularizer,” the church undermines his reformist vision, particularly among nationalist segments of society.

The church views Pashinyan’s normalization policies with Azerbaijan and Türkiye as overly conciliatory and leverages the loss of Karabakh as a national trauma to rally support.  Pashinyan’s remarks referring to the church as a “warehouse” and accusing its clergy of being “criminal oligarchs” are perceived as attempts to curb its political influence. Alleged ties between certain church leaders (e.g., Catholicos II Karekin) and Russia are seen as efforts to counter Pashinyan’s Western-oriented policies. While the church remains influential in Armenian politics, supported by diaspora funding and societal respect, Pashinyan’s interventions—such as the Etchmiadzin operation—aim to limit its power. Secularization trends among younger and urban populations are gradually eroding the church’s dominance.

However, it should be noted that Pashinyan’s primary concern is not the church itself but rather the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF). Another significant but less discussed issue is Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan’s reported connections to Hampig (Harry) Sassounian, who brutally assassinated Türkiye’s Los Angeles Consul General Kemal Arıkan in 1982. Sassounian, a member of the Armenian Youth Federation (AYF) and later the ARF-affiliated Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) terrorist group, has never expressed remorse for his actions. Following his release in 2021, he was quietly permitted to relocate to Yerevan. Another relevant figure is Aram Brunson, who, after progressing from the AYF to the ARF, attempted to manufacture explosives in his dormitory while studying at the University of Chicago. Brunson also conducted reconnaissance on the residences of Turkish and Azerbaijani diplomats, even researching potential penalties for attacks.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s actions against the church are driven not by religious concerns but by apprehensions about terrorism, a concern that is far from unfounded.

-How does public disappointment in the normalization process with Türkiye and Azerbaijan affect the internal legitimacy of the government? Has this become a "mobilization point" for nationalists and former Karabakh elites?

- Armanian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan (e.g., attending President Erdoğan’s inauguration in 2023 and visiting İstanbul in 2025) have generated significant disappointment within the Armenian diaspora. These developments have become a rallying point, particularly for nationalist groups and former Karabakh elites.

The loss of Karabakh and the return of the Gazakh villages have led to Pashinyan being labeled a leader who “surrendered national territory,” tarnishing his reformist image from 2018. Former Karabakh elites and nationalist groups perceive normalization as a “betrayal of national honor,” a narrative echoed by the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The Armenian diaspora, particularly influential lobbies in France and the United States, has criticized Pashinyan for deprioritizing the recognition of the “genocide” in his foreign policy.

The normalization process has served as a unifying theme for nationalists and Karabakh elites. However, their inability to form a cohesive movement has allowed Pashinyan to retain some room for maneuver. Public opposition to normalization could diminish if economic improvements and security assurances are perceived.   

-Armenia is actively demonstrating a course towards rapprochement with the West. How do you assess the reality of these steps: is this a temporary tactic of putting pressure on Russia or a fundamental reorientation of foreign policy?

- Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s steps toward closer ties with the West (e.g., the deployment of EU missions in Armenia, joint military exercises with the United States, and security cooperation with France and India) appear to mark a turning point in Armenia’s foreign policy. However, the nature of these steps remains contentious.

Pashinyan has strengthened relations with the West at a time when Russia’s influence has been weakened by the Ukraine conflict. The increase in EU mission personnel in Armenia (reaching 209) and the appointment of defense attachés to NATO/OSCE missions underscore this shift.

This approach combines tactical and strategic elements. Pashinyan is leveraging the West to reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, though he is not pursuing a complete break. Armenia’s economic and security reliance on Russia makes full disengagement unfeasible. Nonetheless, Pashinyan’s softened stance on the “genocide” agenda and efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye align with a Western-oriented vision.

This represents a cautious realignment. Pashinyan aims to use Western economic and military support to exert pressure on Russia, but geopolitical realities—such as Russian military bases and Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union—limit a complete pivot. Notably, Pashinyan’s absence from the recent Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting further highlights this shift.

-It is often said that Armenia wants to "come out of Russia's shadow", but is this objectively possible, given the dependence in the security and economic spheres? How do you assess the potential of this transformation?

-Armenia’s dependence on Russia, particularly in security (Russian military bases, membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization) and economic spheres (energy imports, Eurasian Economic Union), remains profound. While Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s rhetoric of “emerging from Russia’s shadow” garners support among the Armenian public and in the West, it faces significant practical challenges.

Russian military bases are viewed as a security shield against Türkiye and Azerbaijan, a role even Pashinyan acknowledges. Armenia’s energy and trade sectors are heavily reliant on Russia, and while Western investments are increasing, breaking this dependency in the short term is difficult.

In the medium term, deeper economic integration with the West and energy diversification could reduce this reliance. However, Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and Armenia’s geographic position make a complete break unrealistic. Pashinyan’s strategy focuses on reducing dependency while pursuing a more balanced, multi-vector foreign policy.   

-What role do you think France and the United States play in Armenian domestic politics? Are their actions limited to supporting civil society, or are we talking about deeper intervention?

-France and the United States are increasingly playing an active role in Armenia’s domestic politics. Historically, France, home to a significant Armenian diaspora, has provided both diplomatic and military support to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. For instance, arms sales to Armenia and participation in EU missions have bolstered France’s influence. However, France’s anti-Azerbaijan stance complicates the normalization process.

The United States supports Armenia’s democracy and reform agenda, with joint military exercises and economic aid reinforcing Pashinyan’s pro-Western strategy. Nevertheless, U.S. involvement in Armenia is primarily driven by a focus on regional stability and counterbalancing Russia.

Both countries engage through civil society projects and support for democratization, which also aim to strengthen Pashinyan’s reformist image. Rather than deep intervention, their influence aligns with geopolitical interests. Russia perceives these actions as Western support for Pashinyan and responds with counter-moves, often through the Armenian Apostolic Church.   

-Can we say that Pashinyan is betting on a "new Armenia" without Karabakh - more secular, more open to the West, but with the loss of some of its traditional supports? How sustainable is this approach?

-Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s vision of a “new Armenia without Karabakh” aims to build a more secular, Western-oriented, and reformist nation. This vision seeks to move beyond the trauma of Karabakh’s loss and position Armenia as a regional “crossroads of peace.” However, this approach carries both opportunities and risks.

Pashinyan enjoys support from younger generations and urban liberals, but his ties with nationalist groups, the Armenian Apostolic Church, and the diaspora have frayed.

The success of his vision hinges on economic recovery, financial support from the West, and the outcomes of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Internal resistance from the church and opposition, combined with external pressures from Russia, threatens this agenda. While sustainable in the short term, nationalist backlash and economic challenges pose risks in the long term.

-How do you assess the prospects for an Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement? How far is Pashinyan ready to go in concluding a long-term peace, given the internal resistance?

-Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan aims to sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan by the end of 2025. Although consensus has been reached on a 17-point draft, disagreements persist over issues such as border demarcation and the Zangezur Corridor.

Despite internal resistance, Pashinyan appears committed to normalization. His proposal for constitutional amendments (removing references to Karabakh) and softening the “genocide” agenda reflect this determination.

Internal opposition, particularly from nationalist groups, poses challenges for Pashinyan. However, economic and diplomatic pressures—including Western support and Russia’s weakened position—may compel him to pursue an agreement.

A peace agreement could be signed by 2026, though its scope may be limited (e.g., a provisional deal without fully resolving border demarcation). To maintain domestic legitimacy, Pashinyan will likely frame the agreement as aligned with Armenia’s “national interests.”

-Is there a chance that the Zangezur corridor or the unblocking of communication routes will become a reality in the coming year? Or are the positions of the parties too polarized?

-The Zangezur Corridor, intended to connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, remains a contentious issue. Azerbaijan seeks to keep the corridor outside Armenian control, while Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan proposes a broader regional transport network under his “Crossroads of Peace” initiative.

Implementing the Zangezur Corridor fully by 2026 appears challenging, as the positions of both parties—Azerbaijan’s sovereignty demands and Armenia’s insistence on retaining control—are deeply polarized.

Smaller-scale projects proposed by Pashinyan, such as the Yeraskh-Sadarak-Ordubad-Meghri-Zangilan railway, could serve as interim solutions. However, the Zangezur Corridor remains the primary focal point for connectivity.   

-Which scenario, in your opinion, is most likely by 2026 - consolidation of Pashinyan's power, the return of the opposition, or a transitional crisis with a possible change of course?

-Three scenarios stand out for Armenia’s political future by 2026: Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan could strengthen his legitimacy through economic recovery, Western support, and a limited peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Support from the European Union is already evident; for instance, during Kaja Kallas’s recent visit to Yerevan, she notably avoided meetings with church representatives and made no statements on the matter. If Pashinyan successfully neutralizes the church and opposition, he could gain an advantage in the 2026 elections.  The church, diaspora, and Russia-backed groups could unite the opposition in the event of an economic crisis or renewed external conflict. However, recent arrests may shift this dynamic to a different trajectory.

Pashinyan’s reforms could stall due to internal and external pressures, potentially leading to a compromise government or a technocratic administration. This could pave the way for a leader pursuing a balanced policy between the West and Russia. However, Pashinyan’s efforts to foster strong ties with the West should not be misconstrued; he is unlikely to abandon a balanced foreign policy approach.

The most likely scenario is that Pashinyan maintains power until 2026, albeit with weakened constituency. Economic recovery and a peace agreement could buy him time, but resistance from the church and opposition will persist.

Pashinyan is pursuing a bold yet risky path. His moves toward Western alignment, normalization with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, and secular reforms hold the potential to modernize Armenia but fuel conflict with traditional power centers such as the church, opposition, and diaspora. His grip on power depends on how skillfully he manages internal and external balances. Armenia’s geopolitical position and reliance on Russia make a complete transformation challenging, but Pashinyan’s vision could prove sustainable if regional peace and economic recovery are achieved. Meanwhile, Türkiye and Azerbaijan expect the proposed amendments to Armenia’s Constitution to be implemented as soon as possible.