STEM presents an exclusive interview Deputy of the State Duma of Russia of the III-VII convocations Oleg Shein.

-Mr. Shein, taking into account your recent comments on the Washington summit as an attempt by the United States to strengthen its influence in the South Caucasus, to what extent, in your opinion, does this meeting reflect an actual redistribution of power in the region? Or is it rather a symbolic gesture that does not change the balance, in which Russia continues to play a key role? What real prospects does this summit open up for Baku and Yerevan?

-The cornerstone of Russian policy in the South Caucasus for a long time was the preservation of the unresolved Karabakh problem. This suspended state allowed Moscow to remain the center of influence for both sides of the conflict.

In this situation, both Azerbaijan and Armenia lost out. Azerbaijan was deprived of 20% of its territory, about one million people became refugees, and Nakhchivan effectively lived under economic blockade conditions. But Armenia also suffered defeat: for a quarter of a century, the country was ruled by militants who regarded it merely as an appendage to the so-called “Artsakh” and treated the state as a bargaining chip. Succumbing to chauvinistic rhetoric, Armenia found itself in transport isolation and lost more than 20% of its population due to economic migration. The “joy” from victory in the war turned out to be such that every fifth family left the country.

The first blow to this “divide and rule” concept came in 2018, when the Karabakh clan was overthrown in Armenia. The second followed in 2020 — the operation of the Azerbaijani army to liberate the occupied territories.

After that, it became clear that no other Russian policy for the South Caucasus existed. There were only hasty attempts to remove the new government in Yerevan and a forced rapprochement with Baku, largely thanks to the personal relationship between Ilham Aliyev and Vladimir Putin. However, as the airplane crisis, the anti-migrant campaign, and the events in Yekaterinburg showed, Moscow regarded Azerbaijan not as a partner but as a new vassal to replace Armenia. The result was Russia’s de facto self-isolation from the peace process in the region.

Today a new era is beginning. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia now have the prospect of a united, peaceful South Caucasus — a space for trade, business, and investment, where resources are directed towards development rather than armaments. The scale of this historic event is hard to overestimate — it will inevitably take its place in the history books.

— What, in your opinion, are the most likely scenarios for the development of the situation following the Washington summit? Should we expect real progress in regional security and economic cooperation, or will the conflict lines, fueled by external interests, only intensify?

— The transitional period will be challenging. There are two main challenges, both related to neighboring countries. The first was minimized last year. Azerbaijan was fortunate that the Georgian opposition failed in the elections. Yes, failed — precisely that. According to the U.S. National Democratic Institute’s estimates, in autumn 2023, 54% of the population viewed the government’s performance positively, while 38% gave an unsatisfactory assessment. These results were reflected in the election outcome. However, had the supporters of Mikheil Saakashvili returned to power, who could guarantee that a new Russo-Georgian war would not break out? Yet much time has passed since the Battle of Tskhinvali, and this time Russian paratroopers would not have withdrawn from Gori and Poti. This would have meant that the strategic Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline would have come under Russian control.

The second challenge is the Armenian elections next year. During this process, undoubtedly, revanchist forces and their puppeteers will try to steer the country toward severing relations with Baku, essentially sacrificing Armenia for the geopolitical games of external powers.

I do not consider threats from Iran to be realistic. The situation of the IRGC is certainly dire, and all their tentacles, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and even the Houthis, are severely weakened. But they will not engage in a conflict against the United States, Turkey, and Pakistan, as it would be a suicidal endeavor. It is also clear that neither Islamabad nor Ankara would remain passive in the event of an attack on Azerbaijan.

However, the most important development has already occurred: a long-term peace is being achieved between the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia, who—although it will be extremely difficult—will have to learn to live together and prevent any external attempts to set them against each other again. This path will undoubtedly be successful because the fundamental obstacle, the so-called “Artsakh,” has disappeared.

— For the first time in 250 years, key negotiations on the South Caucasus have taken place outside of Russia — in Washington. How serious is the loss of the status as the main mediator for the Kremlin, and how will this affect Moscow’s future policy in the region?

— Yes, this is a very painful situation. Essentially, every country seeks to maintain influence along its borders — this is as natural for a state as breathing is for a human being. However, the methods of exerting influence can vary.

Russia possesses unique advantages bestowed by its geography and history. It is a neighbor, with a large economy, which means it can be a profitable trade partner, an attractive investor, and a valuable participant in industrial cooperation. America, China, and Europe are far away, while Russia is nearby.

Another enormous advantage is language. Russia accounts for 1.8% of the world’s population, yet 4.6% of all internet queries are made in Russian. Relatively recently, it was surpassed only by Spanish for second place, but it still significantly outranks French, German, Portuguese, and even Chinese. For example, in the Kazakh internet segment, 94% of users use Russian, 4.5% use Kazakh, and English ranks third with only 1.4%. Russian literature, science, and art have created a vast cultural layer whose significance remains substantial even decades after its peak development.

I do not know what language is used in negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but I would be very surprised if it were English. Language is communication, understanding, and connection. Neither the United States, China, nor France possess the head start Russia has gained over the last two hundred years.

However, geography, economy, and language must be skillfully leveraged. This is “soft power,” diplomacy, and a history of cooperation. It is complex. It requires intelligence and consideration of neighbors’ interests. Neither Azerbaijan, Armenia, nor Georgia are Russian colonies that have “gone rogue.” Attempting to engage them through threats and blackmail only destroys Russia’s ability to shape positive narratives.

— You have repeatedly emphasized Russia’s desire to maintain the status quo in the South Caucasus. How do you assess Moscow’s new tactics, which apparently seek to curb the development of regional cooperation through diplomatic pressure and provocations? Does Russia have a genuine strategy to adapt to the growing presence of the United States and China? And do you think Moscow realistically has the capacity to counter China’s increasing influence in the South Caucasus, given the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing at the global level?

— Here, the question is one of strategy. There is the “divide, threaten, and rule” strategy. It has led to political bankruptcy, yet its proponents still set the Russian agenda, believing it is simply a long game that requires patience. Then there is the strategy of cooperation. In fact, Russia could have initiated a solution for the Zangezur corridor, which, I remind you, was explicitly stipulated in the 2020 peace agreement signed by Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow. It was signed in Moscow. What prevented Russia from supporting its implementation over the past five years? If that had happened, there would be no meeting in Washington now; instead, there would have been a meeting in the Kremlin.

Regarding relations between Russia and China, this is a forced alliance. Economically, it is disadvantageous for Russia. Russia endures it. The strategy is in any case to normalize trade with Europe, but here again there are two paths. One is to try to intimidate Europe — “cut off the gas,” bankrupt it, and bring ultra-right forces to power whom they can control as vassals. The other is to treat Europe as an equal partner with its own culture, as Brezhnev essentially did. But in either case, there is an understanding that the European market is premium, and losing it is a systemic problem caused by attempts to replace the current Europe with one convenient for themselves.

China, of course, fully takes advantage of this, decisively pushing Russia out of Central Asia, filling the vacuum in the South Caucasus, and displacing Russia from the domestic market through exports of cheap goods. Let me remind you that in 2022 Xi Jinping publicly gave guarantees of Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity, emphasizing that China fully supports Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is clear that these guarantees were addressed not to the United States or Germany, but to Russia. China has become the top trade partner of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, pushing Russia to second place. This also applies to investments.

Moscow fully understands all this but is forced to endure it. China currently accounts for 35–40% of Russia’s foreign trade. Meanwhile, Beijing depends little on Russia — Russia’s share in China’s foreign trade is only 4%. This is less than Vietnam’s, not to mention the United States, Europe, or South Korea, where the difference is multiple. Therefore, severing trade ties with Russia would be unpleasant but tolerable for China, whereas Moscow cannot afford to object.

— In light of Iran’s increased activity in the region, especially in the transport and energy sectors, how do you see Tehran’s role in the new regional configuration?

— We understand well that Iran is not a monolith. The main problem Iran faces is an internal crisis caused by the policies of the ayatollahs. Iran has transformed into a quite modern urban society, and one of the clearest indicators of this is the fertility rate — the number of children per woman. It has dropped to 1.7, which is comparable to European levels. In other words, the traditional family model, where the wife is merely an appendage to the husband and a childbearer, no longer exists.

The cultural conflict between society and the ayatollah regime—which relies increasingly on a shrinking fanatic segment of the population—is exacerbated by an economic crisis. Sanctions and militarism have benefited no one.

We recall the mass protests of 2022–2023, during which the IRGC and other security forces shot more than two hundred people. But just this past winter, two-thirds of Iran’s provinces were forced to close schools and administrative buildings due to energy shortages; transportation in Tehran ground to a halt, and the president urged citizens to lower the temperature in their homes. It is worth noting that the country ranks second in the world for natural gas reserves. The blackouts and gas shortages vividly illustrate how close Iran is to an energy crisis.

Under these conditions, the entry of the United States into Armenia truly represents an existential crisis for Tehran. The IRGC has no response other than war, but after Israel — with modest U.S. support — seriously damaged Iran’s nuclear program, the IRGC likely understands that such a war would provoke the formation of a broad coalition of the U.S., Israel, and Islamic countries. And there is a big question regarding which side the army, which is half composed of Turkic peoples, would take. This could mark the end of the 45-year-old myth of the “Islamic Revolution.” Therefore, I do not believe realistic Iranian threats concerning the Zangezur corridor.

Whether the civil political party in Iran, now associated with Pezeshkian, will be able to take advantage of these changes is difficult to say. It is weak institutionally and could only gain strength if it risks forming an alliance with the army, for whom the IRGC is the main rival. However, the crisis in Iran clearly has not yet reached a level that would presuppose such decisive shifts.

— Washington has repeatedly expressed concern about Russian "destabilization" in the region, while Moscow accuses the West of encouraging conflicts and distrust. How do you assess the real impact of external actors on internal processes in the South Caucasus — is it more a result of external pressure or internal mistakes and contradictions?

— We were taught in school that the sum of vectors is determined by their length and direction. The same applies in politics. Of course, external influence exists. For small countries — and even Azerbaijan, with its population of 10 million, is a relatively small country — the influence of powerful external powers is a serious challenge that requires rationality, diplomacy, composure, and firmness.

The key to breaking free from dependence lies precisely in resolving internal conflicts. If the countries of the South Caucasus move out of confrontation with each other and begin to live normally, trade, and cooperate, this means that their collective sovereignty in relation to external powers is strengthened.

The leadership of Azerbaijan has always understood this. Now, this understanding is also coming to the leadership of Armenia. The meeting in Washington has enormous symbolic significance, and it is important that it be followed by a full restoration of transport and economic cooperation among all the countries of the South Caucasus.

— Recently, Russia’s actions toward Azerbaijan and Armenia have been carried out according to a “divide and rule” strategy, involving pressure and direct threats, including nuclear rhetoric. How do you assess the political logic of the Kremlin, which jeopardizes stability in the region and effectively pushes Baku to seek alternative allies?

— Unfortunately, in my country, the party of war has prevailed. These people have no vision of a peaceful, developing Russia because they simply don’t know how to achieve it. Healthcare, education, utilities, pensions, decent wages — all of this is a mystery to them. That’s why they need an image of an enemy. What questions about education? The enemy is at the gates.

Hence the wave of hatred toward migrants, Ukrainians, feminists, the West, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan — it doesn’t matter whom. For example, currently there is a campaign against animal rights activists and laws are being passed banning feeding homeless dogs and cats. Recently, two roundtables were held in parliament on combating Satanism.

I remind you that from the very first days after the war against Ukraine began, endless threats against the overwhelming majority of Russia’s neighbors were broadcast on TV. Plans for military operations against the Baltics, Sweden, Kazakhstan, and especially Azerbaijan were discussed. Rational voices were drowned out. I was surprised to find myself the only Russian parliamentarian publicly condemning statements about nuclear strikes on Baku.

At a Federation Council committee session, it was stated outright: “We are not sure that Ukraine, after the special military operation, should retain its sovereignty, just like many other small states.”

Polad Bülbüloğlu then pointed out to me that the lead players in this cacophony of hatred were Armenian figures from Moscow — Simonyan, Bagdasaryan, Keosayan, and others. Essentially, they simply used their position in Russia to turn society against neighbors, primarily the Turkic world. Of course, this does not absolve the Russian chauvinists themselves, who have monopolized public discourse.

At that time, I was deputy chairman of the A Just Russia party and wrote a note to Sergey Mironov that the direct result of such policies would not be the paralysis of neighbors through fear — “hold me back, I’m crazy” — but rather their search for alternative centers of influence.

And that is exactly what happened. Neutral Swedes and Finns joined NATO. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan conducted joint military exercises with NATO. Russian political influence in the South Caucasus was effectively pushed out.

Separately, the plane incident and the killing in Yekaterinburg must be mentioned. It would seem obvious: military mistakes and police abuses happen in all countries. If guided by national interests, one should publicly apologize and hold the guilty accountable. After all, even Russia itself has an interest in ensuring detainees are not beaten to death and that civilian aircraft no longer receive shrapnel damage.

But if you understand that Russia is now governed by the party of war, the logic is different. People in uniform must be confident they bear no responsibility except, perhaps, for the charge of “acting beyond their rank.” Otherwise, they might begin to doubt whether they should actually follow the law, and then the entire political structure in Russia would start to crumble.

Of course, among ordinary people and the bureaucracy, there are many who want an end to all this madness and a return to normal life. This line will ultimately prevail, but not in the foreseeable future.

Therefore, it is quite natural that Azerbaijan is building strong alliances externally — with Turkey, Pakistan, China, and now the United States — minimizing risks. Armenia, less successfully, tries sometimes with Macron, sometimes with Trump. The difficulty is that Azerbaijan’s security, due to geographic reasons, is closely linked to the security of the entire South Caucasus, which is why the Washington meeting is so important.

— Russian political forces have actively supported opposition rallies in Armenia and openly criticized Pashinyan. How do you assess the extent to which Moscow’s actions undermine Russian authority and contribute to strengthening U.S. influence in the region? What is the future of Russian-Armenian relations given that Moscow no longer acts as a guarantor of peace, while Armenia increasingly depends on the West and other regional players?

— Armenia maintains a high degree of economic dependence on Russia, and this is its fundamental difference from your country. Russia accounts for 70% of Armenia’s foreign investments, compared to only 6.5% in Azerbaijan. Russia makes up 20% of Armenia’s exports and only 3.5% of Azerbaijan’s exports. Moreover, regarding Armenia, foreign trade figures are even higher because about 20% of Armenian exports go to the UAE, where Russians export gold and precious metals through Yerevan.

Additionally, remittances from Russia amounted to 65% of all cross-border transfers to Armenia last year, compared to only 11% for Azerbaijan. This is also an important factor reflecting economic ties.

Therefore, Pashinyan’s attempts to reduce political dependence on Moscow face objective economic barriers. As is well known, the economy is the basis of politics. Yes, it is likely that Yerevan will be able to attract additional investments from the U.S., and perhaps even American military personnel from private military companies may arrive to guard the so-called Trump corridor, but the Americans will not replace Russia as a source of income for the Armenian economy.

What could this lead to? The Kremlin’s main problem is that it traditionally bets on political outcasts — that is, those rejected by society. In Armenia, these are the Karabakh clans, who are rejected by the Armenian people. Moreover, Armenia’s “patriots” — supporters of confrontation with Azerbaijan — tend to be quarrelsome and divisive. Recall that in autumn 2023, they won the elections to the Yerevan city council, obtaining 33 mandates against 32 for Pashinyan’s supporters, but failed to agree on a single candidate for mayor, which ensured Pashinyan’s party’s success.

However, if an active and resourceful leader emerges from within Pashinyan’s own party, he could unite ordinary voters and achieve success. Even if this does not happen, over the next ten years a more moderate course from Yerevan toward Moscow should be expected, following the Georgian scenario.

By the way, the reasons for the Georgian scenario are clear: Russia accounts for 48% of Georgian exports and 31% of imports. This does not mean that Tbilisi or Yerevan must be Moscow’s puppets, but a purely anti-Russian line in both cases cannot last long. Such a situation does not contradict Azerbaijan’s interests but must be understood. Pashinyan’s line will come to an end.

— How do you comment on the current situation where control and management of transport corridors in the South Caucasus are passing under American protection? Can this be considered a strategic defeat for Moscow?

— Russia has not played a key role in the transport corridors of the South Caucasus because these corridors have effectively been blocked. Due to the complicated relations between Abkhazia and Georgia, the route from Sochi to Poti remains closed. Armenia, in fact, has been isolated and is only now getting a chance to emerge from that isolation. The only corridor Russia is trying to develop is the North-South corridor, but this effort is hindered by political instability in Iran and the lack of adequate communications there. Incidentally, I would like to remind you that the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway — so important for Russia — is being financed not only by Russian loans but also by Azerbaijan’s, in a 70:30 ratio.

What transport corridors have truly developed in the South Caucasus? First and foremost, one must mention the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which has even become the subject of cinematic plots in James Bond films. The initiator of this pipeline’s construction through rugged mountain ranges was Azerbaijan’s President Heydar Aliyev. This corridor transports oil not only from Baku’s oil fields but also from Kazakhstan. It is clear that this nearly 1,800-kilometer-long pipeline was built objectively against Russia’s political and economic interests, as it strengthened the independence of both Baku and Astana.

Next is the Middle Corridor, part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative launched back in 2013. Few realize that the primary global trade flow is between China and the European Union, amounting to over 800 billion dollars. There is no more powerful flow of goods between countries. Only 3% of this volume is transported overland; most trade happens by sea. However, China decided to invest in overland communications across Eurasia, rightly seeing this as a way to strengthen its influence. Initially, this project was supposed to run through Russia, but now it passes through Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. I witnessed these works progressing last year — the scale is impressive.

Finally, the Zangezur corridor. Originally, its purpose was to lift the blockade of Nakhchivan. But now, under American protection, it can become an alternative to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. That pipeline is located just about fifty kilometers from the military base in Tskhinvali and would be highly vulnerable if Russian-Georgian relations deteriorate. An alternative oil pipeline through Nakhchivan not only enhances Azerbaijan’s economic security but also significantly reduces the risks of worsening Russian-Georgian relations for obvious reasons.

Of course, it is important not to become overly dependent on the United States, since few harbor illusions about the Americans “consideration of anyone”s national interests. But I am confident that Azerbaijan’s leadership carefully calculates these risks and will skillfully avoid them.

The very fact that the president of a small country, tucked away in the southern foothills of the Caucasus Mountains, leads the legendary Non-Aligned Movement, that Baku has hosted the COP29 and the Formula 1 Grand Prix, and that Azerbaijan is one of the leading participants in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation speaks to highly skilled diplomacy. As for the symbolic keys to the White House — they have never been handed to anyone and are unlikely to be in the near future.

— How would you characterize Europe’s role in this situation?

— It is clear that Europe can be an important partner for the countries of the South Caucasus. Let me remind you that it was the Europeans who successfully mediated during the 2008 Russia-Georgia armed conflict. However, today the role of the European Union is clearly secondary. In my view, this is because the European discourse is more pro-Armenian than even Armenia itself. The situation in the South Caucasus is still viewed through the prism of the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, which has already ended. For example, the French National Assembly recognized Artsakh, which the National Assembly of Armenia has not done. All this perpetuates the conflict narrative from which the South Caucasus countries have already moved on.

Meanwhile, Europe does have significant resources. The EU and the UK provide 70% of investments in Georgia, which is about ten times more than Russia’s share. Of Georgia’s $9 billion external debt, only $7 million is owed to Russia. The rest comes from IMF loans and European institutions.

Regarding Azerbaijan, 70% of the country’s exports go to Italy, and the volume of supplies to Germany, for example, exceeds that to Georgia. Armenia has the weakest economic ties with Europe, which is explained by the historical factors I already mentioned.

A reset of European policy in the South Caucasus is inevitable, as the situation in the region has changed significantly. While Europe is lagging behind, the Americans are working more actively. The key factor must be a clear focus on the national interests of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, including revising the frankly dismissive attitude toward Azerbaijan, as well as developing a long-term and transparent strategy for purchasing Caspian hydrocarbons. With proper respect, Azerbaijan—demonstrating absolute pragmatism in foreign policy—will become a predictable, reliable, and independent partner for Europe.