STEM presents an interview with Turkish international relations expert and senior research fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM), Oral TOĞA

- The Israeli operation was named "Lion’s Strength". How do you assess the choice of this name, considering the Iranian symbolism where the lion holds a sacred role and is associated with national identity? Was this an attempt at psychological pressure on Iranian society?

- There are two main reasons behind this name selection. First, during the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the traditional Iranian flag featuring the "Lion and Sun" emblem was removed and replaced with a symbol representing the words "Allah" and "La ilaha illallah." While this new symbol has represented the revolution for the past 45 years, the opposition has adopted the former flag and lion symbol as their emblem. In this context, “the rise of the lion” symbolically refers to the return of the pre-revolutionary emblem, indicating that Israel is openly declaring its desire to change the system.

Furthermore, the Hebrew name of the operation, Am KeLavi — “A people like a lion”—carries theological connotations. It directly references the Jewish holy scripture, specifically Numbers 23:24 in the Torah: “The people rise like a lioness; they rouse themselves like a lion that does not rest till it devours its prey and drinks the blood of its victims.” The name thus conveys both the resolve of the Israeli people and their belief in divine support.

In sum, the operation’s name has both psychological and theological dimensions, clearly signaling Israel’s strategic objectives.

-  In your opinion, what is Israel’s ultimate goal in this conflict: simply neutralizing the nuclear threat, regime change, control over the region’s energy resources, or the formation of a new security architecture in the Middle East?

-Israel has several strategic objectives here. The first is to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capability through preventive strikes, a policy rooted in the Begin Doctrine. Second, Israel aims to prevent Iran from weaponizing its ideology, thereby reducing the likelihood of new proxy forces emerging in the future. Additionally, Israel seeks to position itself at the center of a security and trade corridor extending from India to Greece. In this context, Balochistan may be assigned a strategic role—both to strengthen India’s hand and to exert pressure on Pakistan. This is especially relevant considering the global trade routes: Iran offers India an ideal outlet since it is geographically enclosed by the Himalayas and Pakistan. Any instability in Pakistan would also endanger Chinese investments in Pakistani ports.

- How are such narratives perceived within Iran? Can it be considered that a significant part of Iranian society is tired of the policy of constant hostility towards Iran?

- Iranian society is deeply nationalistic. Even those critical of the regime still demonstrate an instinct to defend their state. However, a substantial portion of the population believes the regime is responsible for these attacks. There is a prevailing sentiment that “the regime has brought this upon our country.” Iranians are curious, globally aware, and culturally expressive people—often resorting to humor in times of crisis. Satire was present even during the initial days of the strikes. But now, concern and sorrow have become dominant.

- How technically, informationally, and strategically prepared do you think Israel was for this operation? Were technologies used that were previously unavailable to Tel Aviv?

- Since 1992, Netanyahu has consistently emphasized Iran as a nuclear threat. In the early 2000s, Israel successfully internationalized this issue. The current phase represents the culmination of a long-term plan—a 25-year strategic chess game. At this point, Iran finds itself in a very difficult position. Whether Israel used previously inaccessible technology remains unclear, but this operation is undoubtedly progressing with the support of the U.S. and the EU. Iran’s disproportionate support for Russia in the Ukraine war has also been a decisive factor in shaping the European stance today.

- How seriously, in your opinion, was Iran’s nuclear infrastructure damaged, including the facilities at Fordow? If the strike on Fordow was indeed possible, does this mean that the US secretly supported the attack?

- The primary goal is not merely to destroy physical infrastructure, but to dismantle the entire system built upon it. Even if some facilities are damaged, what’s truly sought is to terminate Iran’s “intent”—even for civilian purposes.

- Does Israel have super-penetrating munitions capable of destroying underground facilities? Or does this mean that the US provided such bombs to Israel?

- Such bombs have already been provided to Israel by the U.S., as revealed in open sources. It must also be considered that this is not just an Israeli campaign—significant American involvement is likely as well.

- To what extent is this operation limited in scope, and is escalation into a protracted conflict possible? How realistic is the risk of a nuclear confrontation in the event of further escalation, considering Pakistan’s statements about possible support for Iran?

-The conflict is by no means limited. People expect images of total war to signify escalation, yet the current situation is already immense. The step-by-step, strategic progression creates confusion. Given the developments in Balochistan, Pakistan’s concerns are understandable. Instability in a critical neighbor like Iran would not serve Pakistan’s interests, so it is likely to take actions aligned with its national security.

- Can the strike on Iran also be viewed as part of an energy war? Which key logistical facilities, including ports and pipelines, are at risk? How would the potential destruction of these facilities affect regional and global supply chains?

This is a campaign similar in strategic aim to the one carried out in Iraq in 1991—though now more hybrid and advanced in execution. The ultimate objective is systemic paralysis. Therefore, key logistical facilities, including ports and pipelines, are all under threat. That said, regional and global supply chains may recover in the medium term.

- How do you think this could affect China as the largest importer of Iranian oil? Could energy destabilization be indirectly aimed at limiting China’s capabilities?

- China anticipated this escalation long ago and has gradually reduced its oil imports from Iran. Moreover, China is in a strong position when it comes to diversifying energy sources. A prolonged closure of the Gulf seems unlikely, as even with Israeli strikes and possible U.S. intervention, Iran may struggle to mount a decisive response.

- If the military operation continues, could it cause a massive flow of refugees from northern Iran to the South Caucasus? What risks does this scenario pose for Azerbaijan?

- While a refugee wave has not yet materialized, it is not an unrealistic scenario. There is already internal migration within Iran—many people are moving from large cities back to their hometowns. For this to evolve into international displacement, the situation must deteriorate further. In such a case, Iranian Azerbaijanis may attempt to cross into the Republic of Azerbaijan or Turkey. Overall, I believe Turkey would be the main destination. But for now, it’s too early to say.

- How do you assess Turkey’s actual position in the current configuration of the conflict between Israel and Iran? Could Turkey adopt a tougher anti-Israeli stance, and is it possible that Turkish-Israeli relations may deteriorate as a result of escalation? How likely is it that Turkey will be drawn into the conflict — directly or indirectly?

- If the October 7 attacks hadn’t occurred, Turkish-Israeli relations would have been on track for normalization. In fact, Netanyahu was scheduled to visit Turkey a week later. But following the Gaza conflict, relations once again became tense. In this phase of the conflict, Turkey is unlikely to be drawn in directly. However, if Israel succeeds in its aim to collapse the system, not just Turkey, but all of Iran’s neighbors will be forced into intense diplomatic and security activity.

- During the strikes, it was reported that representatives of the Iranian negotiation group engaged in talks with the US were eliminated. How might negotiations proceed now, and will they continue at all under these circumstances? How likely do you consider the timing coincidence between the start of the Israeli operation and the cancellation of the sixth round of US-Iran talks?

- Since Ebrahim Raisi’s death, Iran has been calling for negotiations. Even Javad Zarif, politically sidelined, re-entered the scene due to this need. However, Israel continues its strikes, having not yet achieved its strategic goals. Meanwhile, the U.S. has not responded in the way Iran had hoped. Although Iran is still trying to show flexibility, I believe it is now too late for that.

- Can it be assumed that if a full negotiation process between Iran and the US began, their gradual rapprochement might occur? And how would such development affect Israel’s positions in the Arab world and its role in the regional security architecture?

- I’ve always been skeptical about the negotiation process, and I still am. What’s being demanded of Iran amounts to zero enrichment or the Libya Model—completely dismantling and abandoning its nuclear facilities. This is not negotiation; it’s a call for surrender. Accepting these terms would mean Iran must overlook all the past hardships, sanctions, and the deaths of its scientists and military personnel. It would amount to complete defeat. While Iran insists its nuclear program is for civilian purposes, Western powers remain unconvinced due to Iran’s past ideological rhetoric and proxy activities.

- How long, in your opinion, could Iran resist a possible coalition of Israel and the US? In the event of regime change, who theoretically could lead the country? Is there currently a figure perceived as a potential leader of a new Iran?

- In the short term, I don’t think Iran can mount effective resistance. However, following a regime collapse, underground movements and chaos will likely ensue. I don’t believe a new Iranian government can be swiftly established. There is already movement in regions like Balochistan and Kurdistan. These could result in the secession of certain regions from Iran, followed by the formation of a new structure in the remaining territory.