In December 2025, the EU and Armenia adopted a new Strategic Partnership Agenda, which formally continues the 2017 CEPA, but in terms of content and scope, reflects a much more ambitious and politically significant approach from Brussels. The document expands cooperation in the areas of security and defense, visa liberalization, protection of electoral processes, resilience to hybrid threats, major economic investments, and regional infrastructure, which were previously not on the bilateral agenda.

The document clearly demonstrates that the EU is strengthening its presence in Armenia through observation missions, military funding, and major investment projects, while simultaneously providing Yerevan with tools to strengthen its European policy vector and reduce dependence on Russia.

However, this document also creates geopolitical risks. The terminology used regarding Karabakh, the EU's increased involvement in Armenia's domestic affairs, and the neglect of key trilateral projects with Azerbaijan could complicate relations with Baku and provoke criticism of the EU's neutrality. Ultimately, the new agenda demonstrates the EU's shift from economic and technical cooperation to a political and strategic presence, while simultaneously creating new regional tensions that the EU will need to address to successfully participate in post-conflict stabilization in the South Caucasus.

In connection with the highlighted topic, STEM presents an interview with Richard Youngs, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe and an expert on EU foreign policy, democracy, and governance.

-Mr. Youngs, can the new EU-Armenia Strategic Agenda be seen as a qualitative departure from the CEPA logic and a transition to a more politicized and geopolitical format for the EU's presence in the South Caucasus? How does this affect the balance of the EU's relations with Azerbaijan?

-The EU has been displaced by the Trump administration in relation to Armenia-Azerbaijan and is still adjusting its policies to this new reality. Combined with events in Georgia, the EU imprint in the South Caucasus looks more limited today. This shift suggests that the EU is seeking to redefine its role from primarily economic and sectoral cooperation toward a more strategic and security-oriented engagement. As a result, the EU is recalibrating its relations with Azerbaijan, balancing tensions against strategic engagement.

-Why, in your opinion, did the EU decide to institutionalize the new format now—after the signing of the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, rather than before?

-The mediation focus has indeed begun to look rather behind the curve of events: the EU will gradually move beyond this, its focus on the border mission. Institutionalizing the new format after the peace agreement allows the EU to adapt to the post-conflict realities and to engage in a more structured and strategic way, rather than reacting to immediate crisis dynamics. This timing also signals an attempt to consolidate its presence and influence in the region, positioning itself as a stabilizing actor while recalibrating its priorities toward security and governance rather than purely mediation.

-Is the inclusion of security and defense issues in the EU-Armenia agenda an exception due to current geopolitics, or a foundation for a long-term model of EU engagement in the region? Where does Azerbaijan fit into this model?

- I understand the perspective from Baku that the EU may be tilting away from complete balance; in Armenia, though, there are concerns that the EU is too favourable to Azerbaijan and that this is holding back its relations with Armenia. At the same time, the inclusion of security and defense issues may signal the EU’s intention to gradually institutionalize a broader, more strategic presence in the South Caucasus, rather than treating such engagement as purely reactive. This evolving model will require difficult trade offs in the EU's relations with Azerbaijan if the union is to advance its security and governance priorities. 

- The document's use of language about "internally displaced persons" and "refugees" in relation to the events of September 2023 provoked a sharp reaction in Azerbaijan. Do you believe such terminology undermines the EU's stated neutrality as a mediator?

-The EU is offering military support to lots of governments now; I do not think this is anything specific to Armenia. Nevertheless, the choice of terminology will be politically sensitive in a region where security issues are so contested still. While the EU’s broader security assistance policies are global in scope, careful communication remains essential to maintain its credibility as a neutral actor between Baku and Yerevan.

-Baku views the modernization of the Nakhchivan railway as a key element of post-conflict regional connectivity and the practical implementation of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. How do you assess the European Union's potential role in supporting this project—financially, technically, or politically?

-The various transport and infrastructure projects you mention are indeed part of the EU agenda. Indeed, under the Global Gateway more and more EU funding is going to these kinds of connectivity projects. I would say this is likely to be more of the EU's future approach rather than a hard-security geopolitical approach, as you suggest. Supporting such infrastructure initiatives allows the EU to strengthen regional integration and economic interdependence, providing leverage and influence through practical, development-oriented engagement while avoiding overtly militarized or security-heavy involvement.

- In the long term, do you see the EU as a balancing force between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or as an actor increasingly aligned with one side or the other?

-Given the splintering of the Eastern Partnership, the future of EU relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia will be through these bilateral accords more tailored to the specific cooperation items with each country and not so much on the traditional EU model of governance cooperation. This approach allows the EU to remain engaged in both capitals without being forced into a rigidly “balanced” stance. Over time, the EU may therefore function less as a classical mediator and more as a pragmatic actor navigating separate, interest-based partnerships in the South Caucasus.