STEM presents an interview with historian, associate professor of Middle Eastern and Islamic History at Marmara University in Istanbul and president of the Iran Research Center, Dr. Serhan Afacan.

-How do domestic unrest in Tehran relate to the international context of US pressure following the events in Venezuela? Do you see a connection between the Iranian elite's fears of external interference and growing public discontent?

-I do not see a direct link between the two developments. The parallels drawn between Venezuela and Iran in recent days do not appear to have generated serious concern in Tehran. Iranian officials do not believe that the United States is capable of taking a similar course of action against Iran to the one it pursued against Nicolás Maduro, and I share this assessment.

That said, there is a strong external dimension to what has been unfolding in Iran for more than two weeks: the U.S. sanctions regime. The currency collapse and the broader deterioration of economic conditions –which pushed shopkeepers into the streets on December 28– are directly linked to these sanctions and to the “maximum pressure” policy launched by President Donald Trump after the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, in May 2018 during his first term.

-How might domestic protest movements impact regime stability and Iran's foreign policy strategy? What scenarios do you foresee for the near future?

-First of all, I believe that the Islamic Republic is there to stay. So, I do not think this wave of protests ever came close to threatening the regime’s survival. That said, there is clearly a more deeply felt sense of vulnerability among the upper echelons of the political system. An increasing number of people are dissatisfied –either with the regime itself or with some of its core policies– and this is a development that will have important implications for the future of the Islamic Republic.

While it is important not to overstate the scale of social mobilization –protesters in this and previous protest waves have constituted only a minority of society, and the regime continues to retain a significant social base– persistent social dissent has been generating rising political, economic, and security costs for the state. As a result, what we are likely to see going forward is not a full paradigm shift, but rather a limited recalibration in economic management and domestic governance. Foreign policy, however, remains a far more complex domain for adjustment.

Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance” has already suffered substantial damage over the past two years, particularly since October 7, 2023. Hezbollah remains a central actor in Lebanon, but it has been significantly weakened by sustained Israeli military operations and targeted attacks on its senior leadership. On December 8 last year, Iran also lost Bashar al-Assad as Syria’s leader –its most important state ally for decades– marking a major strategic setback. Although Iran continues to wield considerable influence in Iraq, especially through certain factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaʿbi), these groups have increasingly sought to consolidate their position within Iraqi politics and act in a more distinctly “Iraqi” manner rather than as direct extensions of Iranian regional strategy.

-How real is the threat of direct or indirect US intervention in Iran's internal affairs today, given Washington's current sanctions and military strategies?

-From the outset, I was among those who did not anticipate a U.S. or Israeli “intervention.” In fact, President Donald Trump signaled this clearly in his statements on January 14, and on January 15 Al Jazeera reported that the United States had conveyed to Iran that it would not launch an attack. I also do not believe that Israel would pursue such an option. Although Israel inflicted notable damage on Iran during the 12-day confrontation in June, it also incurred serious security risks. For Israel to take such a risk again, it would need to perceive a major and immediate security threat emanating from Iran –an assessment that does not appear to be in place at present.

More broadly, I find it likely that a different trajectory will unfold in Iran’s relations with the United States and Israel. This is something I have been arguing for several years. From what can be observed, Iran seems interested –where possible– in constructing a sustainable “status quo” with both actors. Even if a U.S. “attack” on Iran were to occur under a Trump administration –which I consider unlikely– it would most probably be symbolic in nature, driven more by Trump’s reluctance to appear inconsistent than by a genuine strategic calculation.

Moreover, President Trump is aware that his non-military tools against Iran are producing results. Any military adventure would be costly, highly unpredictable in its consequences, and would carry significant political risks for Trump domestically as well. 

-How do you think current events—the crises in Venezuela and the protests in Iran—impact concepts of international law, sovereignty, and the role of the UN?

-I think the post–World War II international order has already lost much of its credibility. Many states no longer feel secure against the risk of foreign intervention, nor are they confident that actual or potential intra-state crises can be resolved peacefully. What happened to Mr. Maduro in Venezuela was shocking, yet it is worth reflecting on why so many people treated it rather lightly. The answer lies in developments over recent decades, marked by repeated invasions and military confrontations that have gradually normalized such actions.

This has little to do with the protests in Iran. Rather, the deeper issue is that, with only a few exceptions, the United Nations has been largely absent or ineffective in responding to the crises among states. As a result, the UN increasingly appears unable to guarantee or maintain international peace and security –the very purpose articulated in the first article of its Charter.

-How realistic is it to expect Tehran to reconsider its foreign policy or security strategy in the coming years?

-I think this is a realistic assessment, but one should not be naïve. Iran will reconsider its foreign policy only where it is compelled to do so. Ultimately, this is about power and coercion, and Iran is not unique in this regard. No one should therefore expect a comprehensive or wholesale reorientation of Iranian foreign policy.

That said, I do believe Iran will return to the negotiating table with the United States if the conditions are right, and it is even possible that, at some point, Tehran will seek limited avenues to de-escalate tensions with Israel. Beyond this, Iran’s broader regional posture –both in the South Caucasus and the Middle East–will be shaped by evolving circumstances and is likely to change gradually rather than through abrupt shifts.

-What long-term developments can we expect for Iran in the context of US pressure, cooperation with Venezuela, and the influence of Russia and China?

-There will be both internal and external consequences. Domestically, Iran has been undergoing a gradual transformation, and the ruling establishment appears to be attempting –albeit in an insufficient and uneven manner– to adapt to the realities of a changing society. Since the Mahsa Amini protests of 2022, for example, everyday social practices have visibly shifted; women in Iran today no longer feel uniformly compelled to veil their heads. This, however, represents only a small part of much broader and deeper societal demands.

Externally, I do not think Iran has received from either Russia or China what it expected, whether in economic terms or in the realm of security guarantees. At present, the United States remains the only international actor capable of exerting meaningful pressure on Iran that could induce policy change. I have already alluded above to the potential consequences of this pressure emanating from Washington.

-What is the real scale of the repression and the number of victims, according to independent and human rights assessments? How does the internet shutdown affect the verification of victims' identities?

-Although no definitive casualty figures are available, several sources have offered estimates that provide a broad sense of the scale of the violence. On Tuesday, January 13, Reuters, citing an unnamed Iranian official, reported that approximately 2,000 people had been killed. According to the same source, the Iranian authorities attributed these deaths –encompassing both civilians and security personnel– to what they described as the actions of “terrorists.”

On January 18, again citing an Iranian official in the region, Reuters revised the figure upward, stating that “at least” 5,000 people had been killed, including around 500 members of the security forces, based on what were described as verified figures. The official once more blamed “terrorists and armed rioters” for the deaths of “innocent Iranians.”

On Wednesday, January 14, the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported that at least 2,615 people, including both protesters and members of the security forces, had been killed, with a further 2,054 individuals seriously injured. According to HRANA, 2,435 of those killed were protesters –13 of them under the age of 18– while 14 were non-protester civilians and 153 were members of the security forces and so-called “government supporters.” The organization also stated that the number of detainees had surpassed 18,000 and noted that investigations were ongoing into reports of an additional 882 deaths.

At the same time, the Oslo-based Iran Human Rights Organization (IHRNGO) reported that, as of the same date, “at least” 3,428 people had been killed and more than 10,000 detained. By contrast, Iranian authorities have not released a comprehensive official casualty figure. Nevertheless, in an interview with Fox News on the night of January 14, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described the death toll as “several hundred,” adding that roughly 80 percent of those killed were members of the security forces, police, or “ordinary citizens” allegedly shot by terrorists.

-What signals is Russia sending regarding the current protests and possible regime change in Tehran? And what interests is Russia pursuing?

-On January 13, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Moscow strongly condemned what it described as destructive foreign interference in Iran’s internal political processes, adding that U.S. threats of further military action against Iran were “absolutely unacceptable.” At the same time, Russia does not appear to view the situation in Iran as posing an imminent threat of regime collapse. However, in the context of ongoing negotiations between President Trump and President Putin over the war in Ukraine, Moscow has deliberately opted to limit its engagement on the Iranian issue. Nevertheless, should a genuine risk of regime collapse emerge in Iran, Russia would almost certainly seek to exert its influence to prevent such an outcome.

-How does Turkey assess the situation in Iran, given its relations with Tehran, its position on the Kurdish issue, and its own national interests? Could the current crisis affect Turkish-Iranian relations?

-There exists a well-established pattern of relations between Iran and Türkiye that both sides have largely respected, notwithstanding occasional periods of tension. This relationship is characterized by restraint in both policy and rhetoric on issues directly affecting each other’s national security, as well as a clear commitment to non-interference in internal affairs. Since the outset of the protests, Ankara has broadly adhered to this approach. From my perspective, Türkiye’s primary concern is not the fate of the Islamic Republic as a governing system, but rather the broader risk of Iran’s destabilization and a potential descent into chaos, and it has been careful to avoid actions that could contribute to such an outcome. In this context, Ankara’s criticism of Israel should also be understood as reflecting discomfort with what it perceives as Israel’s destabilizing behavior in the region. A similar logic underpins Türkiye’s opposition to the prospect of U.S. intervention, even though such a scenario does not currently appear realistic.

At the same time, while I do not believe Iran is presently facing a serious risk of collapse, a scenario of widespread chaos would pose a far more severe regional challenge than those experienced in Iraq or Syria. Such a development would likely trigger internal conflict, generate significant migration flows, and widen the operational space for certain terrorist actors. Although the situation has not reached this point, these considerations clearly shape Ankara’s security assessments. Accordingly, statements by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on January 9 and by AK Party Government Spokesperson Ömer Çelik on January 12 placed particular emphasis on the importance of Iran’s stability and warned of the risks associated with a chaotic breakdown. Mr. Fidan’s reiteration of this position on January 15 further underscored Türkiye’s opposition to any form of external intervention, including the possibility of a U.S. attack. While Ankara is fully aware of Iran’s deep-seated economic and political challenges, the nature of the bilateral relationship limits Türkiye’s stance to emphasizing that these issues remain Iran’s internal affairs.

Overall, I do not assess the current protests in Iran as constituting an acute security threat to the wider region. However, a descent into chaos would almost certainly produce destabilizing spillover effects, most immediately in the form of migration pressures, prolonged internal turmoil with regional repercussions, and expanded opportunities for terrorist groups. Even if such a scenario remains distant for now, the prospect of these outcomes continues to inform and shape Ankara’s security concerns.

-How might the current crisis in Iran affect regional security—in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, and Turkey? Particularly in the context of the resistance and influence of Shiite groups?

-These are fundamentally different cases and contexts and should be assessed on their own terms. Taken together, however, I do not expect the current protests to have a direct or immediate impact on Iran’s relations with these countries. As noted earlier, Iran’s network of Shiite groups has already been substantially weakened over the past two years, limiting the extent to which developments at home translate into leverage abroad.

With regard to Türkiye, the main considerations have already been addressed in the previous response. The Azerbaijani case is equally important and cannot be reduced solely to the issue of the Zangezur Corridor; the dynamics extend well beyond that single question. Over the past several years –particularly since the Second Karabakh War– it has become clear that neither Iran nor Azerbaijan is prepared to risk a serious escalation in bilateral relations. Moreover, in recent months, ties between the two countries have shown tangible signs of improvement.

-How will the crisis in Iran affect regional energy policy and global oil and gas markets, given Iran's role as a major exporter?

-I do not believe the recent protests pose any risk to energy exports. Iran has not even contemplated blocking the Strait of Hormuz or taking steps that would endanger the passage of tankers from the region.